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ABSTRACT 
Protecting self-determination in healthcare: a comparative study of the consent 
model and a novel property model. Leroy Edozien, University of Glasgow, 2013 
It is generally accepted in legal and bioethical discourse that the patient has a 
right to self-determination. The competent patient should be in a position to make 
informed decisions about his/her care. In practice, this is often not the case. 
Paternalism, the approach to medical practice that left decision-making in the 
hands of the doctor, is waning and it is increasingly recognised in both the legal 
and medical arenas that there are values other than medical factors which 
determine the choices that patients make. Unfortunately, these developments 
have not resulted in huge advances for patient self-determination. This is largely 
because the mechanism by which the law purports to protect self-determination – 
the consent model – has fundamental flaws that constrain its effectiveness. In the 
last three decades, various attempts have been made to reconceptualise consent 
on order to make it fit for purpose, but these have achieved only limited success. 
This thesis starts with the premise that it is often more productive to consider 
what an alternative model has to offer, than to persist with amelioration of a 
model that is fundamentally flawed. The limitations of the consent model are 
discussed and a novel model, the property model, is advocated. The theoretical 
underpinnings of this model and its structure are presented. Essentially, the 
patient’s bodily integrity is protected from unauthorised invasion, and his/her 
legitimate expectation to be provided with the relevant information and 
opportunity to enable him/her make an informed decision regarding treatment is 
taken to be a proprietary right.  It is argued that the property model potentially 
overcomes the limitations of the consent model, including the obstacle caused by 
the requirement to prove causation in consent cases. The property model provides 
a means by which the patient’s right to self-determination can be recognised as a 
distinct legal right. The model does not create new rights, only seeking to afford 
stronger protection of an existing right. No constitutional, professional, or other 
conflict is generated by applying property analysis to patient self-determination. 
The model fits with the rights-based approach that the courts have evolved in UK 
consent cases, and is consistent with modern medical professionalism. 
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PREFACE 
 
I have endeavoured to provide a theoretical framework for each of the 
concepts underpinning this thesis but have been mindful of the fact that this 
is a law degree thesis, not a treatise in philosophy or bioethics. A prior 
assumption is made that protecting patient self-determination is a good and 
desirable thing, and only a token effort is made to justify this assumption. 
Doing otherwise would have made the thesis cumbersome and thinly spread. 
 
The terrain covered in this work is vast. In compiling footnotes and 
endnotes, I have imbibed the wisdom of Baroness O’Neill who asserts that 
‘[i]n bioethics massive footnoting often indicates insecurity rather than 
authority, and frequently directs the reader to sources that reiterate rather 
than establish central points’.1  
 
Representing two constituencies – law and medicine – I have tried to be 
faithful to both, in terms of end product. A purely academic tome may serve 
its immediate purpose, but it is always more fulfilling if the product has the 
potential to find practical application. I aimed from the outset to develop 
an idea that has firm theoretical basis but is relevant and applicable in legal 
and clinical practice. It is my hope that, by situating my property analysis in 
a context of both jurisprudence and medical professionalism, a measure of 
success has been achieved in this regard. 
 
Cases from various jurisdictions (England, Scotland, Australia, Canada and 
the United States of America) have been cited and, for cases outside the 
United Kingdom, it has been made clear which jurisdiction is concerned; 
however, it was not the intention in this thesis to describe or examine the 
law of consent in each of these jurisdictions, and the citations are meant 
simply to illustrate fundamental concepts. 
 
                                                 
1
 O’Neill O, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics. Cambridge; Cambridge University Press 2002, at p xi 
                                                                             Edozien LC, 2013, Preface                            
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It is common in the legal literature to refer to the patient’s right to 
determine what happens to their body, and what treatment they wish to 
have or to decline, as autonomy. The word autonomy is capable of myriad 
interpretations, and could be controversial. For this reason, ‘autonomy’ has 
been avoided as much as possible in this thesis and the term ‘patient self-
determination’ has been adopted as an alternative. Wherever ‘autonomy’ 
appears in the thesis, it should be taken as synonymous (and inter-
changeable) with ‘self-determination’. It is explained in Chapter 2 that 
patient self-determination is taken in this thesis to mean the right of the 
competent patient to make decisions about his/her medical treatment. 
 
The thesis is no more than an attempt at proof-of-concept, introducing the 
concept of proprietary rights in the patient’s expectations from a 
consultation and showing that the concept has the potential to be applied in 
legal and clinical practice. Much further work, well beyond the scope of this 
thesis, needs to be done to take the concept forward. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
‘There is a growing demand among patients for more responsive consultations 
with doctors that will enable them to participate in clinical decision-making’1 
 
Traditionally health care was delivered on the basis that the doctor knew what was 
best for the patient. This tradition could be traced back to the Hippocratic Oath in 
which the doctor pledges to use those ‘regimens which will benefit my patients 
according to my greatest ability and judgement’2.  Decisions about what treatment 
should be given and when and how the treatment was delivered were in the hands 
of the doctor.* This tradition – medical paternalism - is ebbing, and gradually being 
superseded by a modern approach which places the patient at the centre of care3. 
In contemporary medical and legal practice it is acknowledged that the patient has 
a right to be proactively involved in decisions about their treatment and that a 
breach of this right is a breach of the patient’s bodily integrity.4  
Historically, consent has been the medium by which the doctor ensures that the 
treatment he/she provides does not violate the patient’s bodily integrity. It must 
be stated at the outset that consent is not regarded in this thesis as a right or, as 
Brownsword5  puts it, a free-standing ethic6; rather it is the medium by which the 
law protects the patient’s right to bodily integrity.  
Consent has served its purpose and continues to play a major role in medical 
consultations but, with the movement from medical paternalism to proactive 
patient involvement in decision making, and with increasing use of rights 
discourse, questions are now being asked as to whether the consent model remains 
fit for purpose and whether there are alternative models which offer advantages 
where consent has limitations.7 The law, as reflected in judicial pronouncements, 
seeks to protect the self-determination (‘autonomy’) of the individual through 
consent but critics have doubted that the law actually achieves what it sets out to 
do in this regard.8 For a start, there is no uniform conception of autonomy in law, 
                                                          
*
 In this thesis ‘treatment’ includes physical examination, ancillary investigations and the gamut of physical, 
psychological and pharmacological interventions employed to cure disease and/or promote wellbeing. 
              Edozien LC, 2013, Chapter 1 
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ethics and philosophy. Even if an agreed conception of autonomy were to be 
articulated for medical law and bioethics, Manson and O’Neil9 assert that the 
prevailing approach to consent does not protect self-determination, and McLean10 
states that ‘the law has developed in such a manner as to be systematically 
incapable, or perhaps unwilling, to find a formula that can support the preferred 
account’.11  Given that arguably consent as currently operationalised does not 
protect the patient’s right to self-determination, other critics have sought to 
develop more nuanced models of consent.12  
What is quite clear, and more or less universally agreed, is that consent as 
currently applied by the courts and by clinicians is inadequate in serving the 
intended purpose, and an alternative approach needs to be considered. It may well 
be, however, that the answer lies not in a refashioning of consent but in 
consideration of a different model. I argue in this thesis that, for various reasons, 
producing more sophisticated accounts of consent may not be the answer. In a 
nutshell, the argument is as follows.  
Firstly, it is argued in this thesis that while the consent model has its strengths, it 
has fundamental flaws that warrant consideration of alternative model(s). 
Secondly, as a general principle when a tool, system or strategy is not delivering 
the required end-product, consequent to fundamental flaws, it is often more 
productive to think laterally and consider alternative approaches, rather than 
persist with efforts to rescue the failing one. Sticking to the failing model when 
the situation calls for an alternative model could become a fixation, and it is well 
recognised in psychology and business that fixation increases the probability of 
poor judgement, poor decision-making, error and adverse outcomes.13 Fixation 
with consent in the face of contemporary developments in medical law could have 
similar consequences, and it will be argued in this thesis that the judicial thinking 
and outcome in the celebrated case of Chester v Afshar14 reflected fixation with 
the consent model. 
Thirdly, while the more nuanced conceptions of consent may have ethical and 
philosophical sophistication, they do not provide a readily applicable legal 
framework. The ethical foundations of consent are important, but the primary 
              Edozien LC, 2013, Chapter 1 
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focus of this thesis is on the legal protection of the patient’s right to self-
determination. 
Finally, the limits of the consent model have to do not only with the theoretical 
construct but also with the gap between the paradigm of consent espoused in 
theory and the paradigm that is operationalised in clinical practice. No matter how 
much theorizing is done about consent, the desired goal of protecting the patient’s 
right to self-determination will not be achieved if the legal framework for 
achieving this has no bearing on the attitudes and behaviour of clinicians.15 
Conversely, a legal framework that is in harmony with the context of clinical 
practice is more likely to serve the patient’s interests effectively. In other words, 
any framework that aims to secure and enhance the protection of patient self-
determination should be embedded in the core of medical professionalism if it is to 
be maximally effective. It is argued in this thesis that the limitations of the 
consent model (and especially the diluted paradigm of consent operationalised in 
clinical practice) are potentially avoidable by a new model, and that the new 
model should be embedded not only in the common law but also in medical 
professionalism. It will also be argued that, given recent guidance from 
professional bodies and regulators, the model advocated in this thesis is more 
likely to be embedded in clinical practice than the consent model has been – 
because the recent professional guidance has at its core the underlying principles 
of the proposed model. 
In the light of the criticisms and limitations of the consent model, this thesis 
explores the potential benefits of a property-based approach to protecting the 
patient’s right to self-determination. The property model comprises the following 
elements: 
 the patient’s right to self-determination is protected as a distinct legal right 
 the patient’s right to bodily integrity is a proprietary right 
 the patient also has a proprietary right in his/her legitimate expectation of 
involvement in decision-making about their own treatment  
 correlative to the patient’s proprietary rights, the doctor has a fiduciary 
duty to enable the patient make an informed decision, by providing relevant 
information 
              Edozien LC, 2013, Chapter 1 
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 pursuant to this fiduciary duty, the doctor-patient consultation is 
transactional (rather than the unidirectional passive transfer of data -  
described as the conduit paradigm16 of information disclosure - that is 
practised in consent discussions) 
 there is a bilateral distribution of responsibilities between doctor and 
patient: the doctor has a responsibility to take reasonable steps to ensure 
that the patient understands the information provided, and the patient 
takes responsibility for the information communicated to the doctor and 
also for his/her own decision.  
It could be said of the property model, as was said of the doctrine of informed 
consent by an academic commentator, that it ‘weaves social policy, 
communication theory, patient-doctor interactions and medical ethics into a ….. 
legal tapestry’.17 
 
Taking as its starting point the position that treating patients without reference 
to, or in disregard of, their views and preferences is anathema in contemporary 
clinical practice, the thesis compares the subsisting consent model and the 
proposed property model. It begins with a discussion of the patient’s right to self-
determination, drawing on concepts of medical paternalism, anti-paternalism and 
consumerism (Chapter 2). An attempt has been made to substantially elucidate the 
concept of paternalism because this is the antithesis of what the consent and 
property models both seek to entrench. Breach of the duty of care in tort cannot 
arise in the absence of a relationship, so the nature of the doctor-patient 
relationship is also explored in this chapter. The interpretive form† of this 
relationship is an essential element of the proposed property model. 
This is followed by a discussion of the legal and ethical aspects of the consent 
model (Chapters 3 and 4) and analysis of the limitations of this model (Chapter 5). 
Property has many meanings, and it is important to establish the meaning and 
context of the term as it applies in this analysis. This is done in Chapter 6. 
                                                          
†
 Explained in Chapter 2 
              Edozien LC, 2013, Chapter 1 
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In applying property analysis to the subject of self-determination in healthcare 
decision-making, there are two possible approaches. The more trodden one is to 
consider one’s body as one’s own property. The alternative approach, an 
untravelled road which will be explored in this thesis, is to regard the patient’s 
legitimate expectations from a medical consultation and the associated right to 
proactive involvement in decision-making as constituting a proprietary right. The 
association of property discourse with commodification of the human body will be 
a stumbling block in any attempt to promote a property model in doctor-patient 
consultations.  Chapter 7 attempts to remove this stumbling block by elucidating 
the issue of property rights in the human body and in body parts and particles. A 
key point in this discussion is that property (as understood in this thesis) defines a 
relationship, not a thing. To move further away from the reification of property, a 
novel theory of proprietary rights in the doctor-patient consultation is developed 
in the following chapter (Chapter 8). This theory ascribes proprietary rights to the 
expectations that arise from the doctor-patient consultation. Since both the law 
and ordinary usage commonly associate the term ‘property’ with tangibles, it is 
suggested that the term ‘proprietary right’ should be adopted in preference to 
‘property’ or ‘property right’ when applying property analysis to the doctor-
patient transaction and, in particular, the patient’s right to be the ultimate 
decision-maker in their treatment.  
The property model will confer no advantage unless it overcomes the limitations of 
the consent model, and this is discussed in Chapters 9 and 10. The property model 
has the advantage over the consent model that it does not require the occurrence 
of harm; thus, there is no requirement to prove causation – a major stumbling 
block in consent cases.  
It is argued that patient involvement in medical decision making is about more 
than just halting medical paternalism, and that the patient’s right to self-
determination is worthy of protection as legal right in itself (that is, as a distinct 
legal right), regardless of whether the patient has suffered any harm as a result of 
a breach of that right. The property model is a mechanism for achieving this. 
Possible implications of the adoption of the property model – such as widening the 
              Edozien LC, 2013, Chapter 1 
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legal scope of the fiduciary duty of the doctor and expansion of the tort of battery 
– are discussed.  
The theories discussed and developed in the preceding chapters provide an 
interpretative framework for analysing case law.  In Chapter 9, legal issues in key 
consent cases are re-visited using this framework, and the judicial decision in each 
of these cases is analysed in the context of the property model. 
Property analysis is not the only alternative to consent. Arguably, human rights law 
and contract law are feasible mechanisms for enshrining legal protection of the 
right to self-determination. It is submitted that human rights law is unable to 
protect this right with the rigour that the property model offers, while application 
of contract law could potentially subvert the doctor-patient relationship and, in 
any case, the doctrine of consideration could be an obstacle.  
Consent analysis may be helpful in protecting the patient against medical 
paternalism but, due to intrinsic and extrinsic limitations, cannot go far enough in 
equipping the patient for a more proactive role in decision making. Furthermore, 
the patient faces formidable obstacles in obtaining an appropriate remedy when 
the right to self-determination is interfered with. In other words, while the 
consent model provides a shield for the doctor but is not a sword18 for the patient, 
the property model may well provide both a shield and a sword for the protection 
of patient self-determination in medical decision making. 
The thesis concludes (Chapter 10) by asserting that the property model has the 
potential to promote patient involvement in healthcare decision making, subject 
to its further development.  
 
Choosing the right paradigm 
In order to appraise consent and self-determination in a realistic and pragmatic 
rather than abstract way, we must examine the concepts not in isolation but 
within the context of public policy.  Public policy discussions may be framed in 
metaphors, and it has been said that ‘an extensive repertoire of metaphors 
appears to be helpful in the pursuit of productive discourse about health’.19 
              Edozien LC, 2013, Chapter 1 
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This thesis adopts an ecological paradigm modelled on the ecological metaphor 
described by George Annas,20 who identifies two other metaphors in health care. 
He describes the military metaphor as having the most pervasive influence in the 
practice of medicine and gives the following examples: 
Medicine is a battle against death. Diseases attack the body, uniformed 
physicians intervene. We are almost constantly engaged in wars on various 
diseases, such as cancer and AIDS. Physicians, who are mostly specialists 
backed by allied health professionals, and trained to be aggressive, fight 
invading diseases with weapons designed to knock them out. Physicians give 
orders in the trenches and on the front lines and use their armamentaria in 
search of breakthroughs. Treatments are conventional or heroic, and the 
brave patients soldier on as gallant fighters who hope to conquer their 
diseases. We engage in triage in the emergency department, invasive 
procedures in the operating theater, and even in defensive medicine when a 
legal enemy is suspected.21 
 
He goes on to argue that the military metaphor encourages us to over-mobilise and 
ignore costs, and just as military superpowers engage in the arms race, so do 
healthcare providers engage in a race to catch up with the latest technology. The 
patient’s body is seen as a battlefield and clinicians concentrate on the physical.22 
Applying this to the subject matter of this thesis, consent procedures in clinical 
practice are often like well-rehearsed military drills, and a patient faced with a 
consent form to sign is often like the military personnel mindful of the culture to 
obey now, complain later. 
The other metaphor is the market metaphor which has consumer choice as its 
mantra. Clinicians in the contemporary National Health Service (NHS) are familiar 
with the provider side of this metaphor in which managers, cost-cutting and value-
for-money reign supreme. Emphasis is on efficiency, customer satisfaction and 
competition between healthcare providers. Annas23 criticises this metaphor for 
being just as dysfunctional as the military metaphor. He is critical of the ideology 
of medicine being displaced by the ideology of the marketplace. One must stress, 
however, that displacing the ideology of medicine with the ideology of the 
marketplace is a separate matter to, and should be distinguished from, the 
concept of transferring learning from the marketplace to the healthcare arena. 
Health professionals can learn and borrow ideas (including the freedom of the 
              Edozien LC, 2013, Chapter 1 
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consumer to make his/her own decisions based on his/her values) from the 
marketplace; this does not necessarily mean that one ideology is replaced by the 
other. 
His preferred metaphor is the ecology metaphor, a metaphor that places greater 
emphasis on the community than on individuals: 
Ecologists use words like integrity, balance, natural, limited (resources), 
quality (of life), diversity, renewable, sustainable, responsibility (for future 
generations), stewardship, community, and conservation. The concepts 
embedded in these words and others common to the ecology movement 
could, if applied to health care, have a profound impact on the way the 
debate about it is conducted and on plans for change that are seen as 
reasonable.24 
 
Control and conformity in health care are in tune with the military and market 
metaphors, whereas retreat from individualism and promotion of the communal 
spirit are encouraged by the ecological metaphor.  
The ecology paradigm has been chosen for this thesis because ecology values the 
relationship of individuals with each other and with the wider environment, and 
property is conceptualised in this thesis as defining relationships rather than 
things. Also, just as ecology regards biodiversity as enriching rather than 
diminishing nature, the increasing heterogeneity of social and cultural values in 
modern society are regarded in this thesis as enhancing the importance of self-
determination. The key implication of adopting an ecological paradigm in this 
thesis is that I subscribe to McLean’s25 view, regarding the individualist account of 
self—determination, that ‘it too may be described as socially contextualised’.26 As 
will be seen in Chapter 2 (pages 24-30 ), the conception of self-determination 
adopted in this thesis more or less decries the atomism associated with absolute 
autonomy, although it takes account of social responsibility and communal good. It 
would thus appear to be consistent with, or at least lean towards, the ecology 
paradigm. The notion of property adopted in Chapters 5 and 6 also fits with this 
paradigm. 
On the surface, it may appear that the ecological paradigm would be out of tune 
with the drive for individual choice in health care. In this regard, the ecological 
              Edozien LC, 2013, Chapter 1 
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paradigm is confronted head-on by rights discourse. In The Silent World of Doctor 
and Patient,27 Katz states that:  
The history of the physician-patient relationship from ancient times to the 
present… bears testimony to physicians’ inattention to the patient’s right 
and need to make their own decisions.28 
 
This historical position has evolved; contemporary healthcare emphasises patients’ 
rights and places patients at the centre of the health care system.29 “Patients’ 
choice” has become a mantra, but Annas feels that choice has been trivialised 
because the rhetoric of choice has not been tied to the language of rights: ‘Human 
rights language is much richer and more inclusive than choice language’.30  Rights 
language and choice language both have problems, the former carrying the 
connotation of a right to demand a particular treatment and the latter connoting 
the selection from an a la carte menu provided by the doctor.31  
In the discussion of self-determination that follows (Chapter 2, pages 24-30), it is 
made clear that self-determination is not absolute and, on the other hand, is more 
than the mere expression of choice.‡ Choice, however, is perhaps the most visible 
dimension of self-determination; decision making invariably ends with a choice (or 
preference), and in healthcare the freedom to make an informed choice from a 
range of treatment options (or to refuse all) is the hallmark of patient self-
determination.  
If rights discourse is a rich medium for advancing self-determination, then property 
analysis has a lot to offer – after all property rights have traditionally been highly 
valued by society, and accorded strong legal protection.  
As with absolute autonomy, rights discourse becomes burdensome when isolated 
from the overall interests of society. This tension between individual rights and 
communal interest is apparent in Chapter 2 (pages 28-29) where the concept of 
self-determination is discussed.  
 
                                                          
‡
 See also the definition of consumerism in Chapter 2, page 44. 
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Issues beyond the scope of the thesis 
The consent and property models are not mutually exclusive. They both 
acknowledge the primacy of the patient’s right to self-determination, and oblige 
the doctor to obtain the patient’s informed agreement before proceeding with 
treatment. This thesis does not argue that consent must necessarily be jettisoned; 
what it does is to offer an alternative model which retains the strengths of the 
consent model but potentially offers stronger legal protection to patient self-
determination. 
Also, the scope of the thesis is limited to establishing the principle that the 
patient’s legitimate expectation of involvement in decision-making about his/her 
care can be a proprietary right§ (the conceptual argument), and should be 
regarded as such (the consequential argument, i.e. that no untoward legal or 
ethical consequences flow from application of the property model). Detailed 
description of how the law can operationalise this principle is beyond the scope of 
the thesis. 
In this thesis, clinical decision-making refers to the selection of a course of action 
regarding the treatment of a patient. In some cases this would entail making a 
choice between treatment alternatives. In other cases, it may simply entail 
choosing whether or not to proceed with one particular treatment (i.e. a choice of 
treatment or no treatment). Processes involving cognition, intuition and emotion 
are involved in decision making, but an exploration of these processes is also 
outside the scope of this thesis. Their importance is, however, recognised in the 
central position which the property model accords to the transactional form of 
doctor-patient communication. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
§
 or an object of property 
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CHAPTER 2  
 
PATIENT INVOLVEMENT IN DECISION MAKING:  
THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION 
 
‘In modern law medical paternalism no longer rules…’ 1 
 
‘The dye is now cast: the rhetoric, if not the reality, of the relationship between 
physician and patient has been irrevocably changed by contemporary recognition of the 
importance of patient self-determination.'2 
 
To set the context for an analysis of the consent and property models, the 
concept of patient self-determination is discussed in this chapter. First, the 
conception of self-determination adopted in this thesis is clarified; then the 
basis for protecting self-determination (that patients want it, that it is 
associated with better clinical and health outcomes, and that it is a fundamental 
right) is outlined. As conceived in this thesis, patient self-determination 
comprises (a) the right to bodily integrity and (b) the right to make decisions 
regarding treatment. 
The ways in which patient self-determination may be suppressed or expressed 
are described.  Patient self-determination may be suppressed by medical 
paternalism or by instrumentalization (the use of persons as instruments to 
achieve the doctor’s goals, as happened in the Tuskegee and Willowbrook 
scandals3). The latter could be regarded as a crime, so has been excluded from 
further discussion, and attention is focused on paternalism.  
 
Self-determination is expressed when the patient, rather than the doctor, is the 
ultimate arbiter of what treatment may or may not be given, and when.  It is 
shown in this chapter that this decisional authority is moving from the hands of 
the doctor to those of the patient, but a lot more needs to be done. The 
progression from paternalism to ‘patient-centred care’ is described and current 
initiatives to promote patient self-determination in the UK National Health 
Service are outlined. 
 
The protection of patient self-determination entails the following elements: (a) 
recognition of, and respect for, the patient’s right to decide what treatment to 
have or not to have; (b) provision of an enabling climate for the patient to make 
self-determined choices (ensuring effective communication and building trust); 
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and (c) having regard for the context (social, cultural, emotional, etc) in which 
the patient has to make his/her decision. In keeping with the ecological 
paradigm adopted in Chapter 1, self-determination is viewed not in isolation but 
in the context of the doctor-patient relationship. This relationship is critical to 
the fulfilment of the three elements (a, b and c) listed above. The literature on 
various models of the relationship is briefly reviewed and it is concluded that 
the ‘interpretive’ approach to doctor-patient consultation offers the best 
protection for patient self-determination as defined in this thesis.  
 
Patient sovereignty 
 
The underlying principle of this thesis is that every person has a right to self-
determination in respect of the medical treatment that they receive. This right 
was famously affirmed by Cardozo J in the landmark US case of Schloendoff v 
Society of New York Hospital:4  
 
…every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to 
determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who 
performs an operation without his patient’s consent, commits an assault.5 
 
It was reaffirmed by Lord Donaldson MR in the UK case, Re T6: 
An adult patient who…..suffers from no mental incapacity has an absolute 
right to choose whether to consent to medical treatment, to refuse it or 
to choose one rather than another of the treatments being offered …This 
right of choice is not limited to decisions which others might regard as 
sensible. It exists notwithstanding that the reasons for making the choice 
are rational, irrational, unknown or even non-existent.7 
 
In the same vein, Butler-Sloss said in Re MB that: 
A mentally competent patient has an absolute right to refuse to consent 
to medical treatment for any reason, rational or irrational, or for no 
reason at all, even where that decision may lead to his or her own death. 
 
This right is commonly referred to in legal and other texts as ‘autonomy’ but the 
term is somewhat amorphous, each school of thought moulding it to suit their 
purpose. For example, philosophers view autonomy as an attribute of 
personhood, while psychologists regard it as a behaviour.8 Even among 
philosophers, concepts of autonomy vary. Autonomy could refer to freedom from 
Edozien LC, 2013, Chapter 2 
 
26 
 
control by others. It could also mean freedom from any factor which prevents 
one from making a choice consistent with one's values. In healthcare, the word 
autonomy is used with various interpretations.9 As Switankowsky10 put it, 
autonomy is ‘a philosophical concept that is riddled with psychological 
complexities and individual peculiarities’.11 
 
When a judge uses the term s/he probably takes it as no more than a shorthand 
for the right of the patient to decide what may or may not be done to his/her 
body. It is unlikely that the judge has considered any philosophical analyses of 
the term or anticipates that his/her use of the term will be subjected to such 
analysis. Coggon,12 for example, has noted that ‘[i]t is rare for a judge to 
provide an explicit, philosophical investigation of autonomy’13.  
  
In order to avoid (to the extent that this is possible) some of the confusion 
associated with the diverse interpretations of the word ‘autonomy’, the term 
self-determination is used as an alternative to autonomy in this thesis. The 
essence of self-determination is the notion of a person who is able to decide, 
choose, or act on the basis of his/her own volition rather than the dictates of 
another person or group of persons. Self-determination in healthcare is the 
antithesis of paternalism. As Lord Scarman14  put it, patient self-determination is 
‘no more and no less than the right of a patient to determine for himself 
whether he will or will not accept the doctor’s advice’.15 
 
At this juncture, it is worth clarifying the relationship between self-
determination and the principle of bodily integrity, the latter being a common 
starting point for defining consent to treatment. The principle of bodily integrity 
holds the human body to be inviolate; a person’s body cannot be interfered with 
by another without that person’s willing agreement. It is protected by Article 3 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which states that ‘[e]veryone has 
the right to life, liberty and security of person’, and by constitutional provisions 
in some countries.16  This principle is one of the two components of self-
determination (as defined in this thesis), the other component being decisional 
control. As Petersen17 puts it: 
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Self-determination is broader than bodily integrity in the sense that it 
concerns not only an individual’s body but also his or her actions and 
choices – including whether to engage in sexual relations, to marry or to 
bear children.18 
 
The distinction between bodily integrity and self-determination was made in 
passing by Robert Walker LJ in an English case:19 
 
Every human being’s right to life carries with it, as an intrinsic part of it, 
rights of bodily integrity and autonomy – the right to have one’s own body 
whole and intact and (upon reaching an age of understanding) to take 
decisions about one’s body.20 
   
This distinction is important in the context of this thesis because self-
determination could be expressed (or suppressed) in clinical situations that do 
not necessarily entail touching the body. In such situations, there may be no 
physical violation of the patient’s bodily integrity, but decisional control is taken 
away from the patient, thus breaching his/her right to self-determination. 
 
All accounts of self-determination have one thing in common: the individual 
should have a right to make his/her own decision/choice and should be allowed 
to exercise that right. Where they differ is in relation to two other elements: 
firstly whether a decision has to be rational for it to be a true expression of self-
determination; secondly, whether, in expressing self-determination, the 
individual is obliged to consider third party interests. 
 
Accounts that make rational decision-making a pre-requisite for self-
determination are excluded from further consideration in this thesis because the 
law, as it currently stands (see quotes above), does not require a patient’s 
decision to be rational in order for it to be accepted as legitimate, and any 
argument for this aspect of common law to be changed is outside the scope of 
this thesis. 
Taking account of third party interests is presented in the literature as a key 
difference between the individualistic model of autonomy and the relational 
model.21 One could, however, argue that, in practice, the difference between 
the two accounts is not as substantial as sometimes portrayed. In chapter 6, 
(page 166) the point is made that the notion of property in a coconut anywhere 
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on the island is, at least in practical terms, meaningless to the man who is the 
sole inhabitant of that island – property is a function of the relationship we have 
with persons around us. In a similar way, self-determination is a function of our 
social interactions and experiences. The very idea of having individuals make 
their own decisions stems from the fact that each individual has different life 
experiences, interests, priorities, values, etc, all the result of interactions with 
other members of the community. There would be no basis for recognising 
individualism if we were all just individual anatomical and physiological entities 
(in other words, biological clones), devoid of any social identity. The idea of 
self-determination being a function of the patient’s social interactions and 
experiences fits with the ecology paradigm adopted on page 12. It goes without 
saying, therefore, that any absolutely and purely individualistic notion of self-
determination is rejected in this thesis.   
 
The key question is, to what extent should individuals be allowed to make their 
own decisions, unfettered by what the rest of the community thinks or wants? In 
other words, where should be the balance between individual rights and 
communal interests? Lord Mustill referred to this balance in R v Brown22, albeit 
without specifying where the line is drawn: 
 
 ...the state should interfere with the right of an individual to live his or 
 her life as he or she may choose no more than is necessary to ensure a 
 proper balance between the specific interests of the individual and the 
 general interests of the individuals who together comprise the populace 
 at large.23 
 
 
Few in the Western world would contest the right of the individual to self-
governance.24 What is controversial, however, is where the line is drawn 
between this right and the interests of the community. In other words, to use a 
term that I return to in my adopted model of property (Chapters 6, page 179-
181), what should be the stringency of protection of this right?  
The extremist views on this question are moral individualism at one end and 
communitarianism at the other.  Moral individualism25 holds that persons are 
egoistic and each person should determine what counts as moral good on his/her 
own, without reference to objective standards.26  To some minds (but not in this 
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thesis) moral individualism could be taken as homologous with self-
determination. As stated above, this notion of self-determination is rejected. 
 
At the other end is communitarianism (as a philosophical concept rather than a 
political ideology) which emphasizes the need to balance individual rights and 
interests with those of the community as a whole, and argues that individual 
people (or citizens) are shaped by the cultures and values of their communities. 
Unlike classical liberalism, which construes communities as originating from the 
voluntary acts of pre-community individuals, it emphasizes the role of the 
community in defining and shaping individuals.27  
 
McLean28 regards the gap between these extremes as narrower than portrayed in 
the literature. Further she points out (and this is consonant with the ecological 
paradigm adopted in this thesis) that: 
 
The lessons that the individualistic account can learn from the 
relational one are that the moral worth of decisions is predicted 
not only by the mere exercise of choice but potentially also by the 
impact of that choice on others (emphases hers).29 
 
 
Studies have shown that patients make treatment decisions based on their social 
experiences, emotions, relationships and values.30 The question is not whether 
decision-making should be influenced by other-regarding considerations; we 
expect the individual’s decision to be influenced by experiences and 
relationships. Rather the question is whether, the individual having made their 
decision, the decision should be followed to the letter or be modified by the 
doctor in the light of communitarian considerations. The issue becomes less 
contentious if contextualised against the predominant political tradition. In the 
western world this tradition is democracy, which gives each individual the same 
right to elect the political leadership and encourages equal participation of all 
citizens in governance. In democracies, the individual is the unit of society, but 
individuals are also subject to the laws and customs of society. 
 
The conception of self-determination adopted in this thesis can therefore be 
encapsulated as follows. The patient has a right to determine what shall be done 
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with his his/her own body. Recognition of this right should manifest as proactive 
involvement of the patient in decision-making regarding his/her treatment. 
Acknowledging and acting in accordance with the extent to which a patient 
wishes to participate (or not participate) in making decisions is part of regard 
for that patient’s self-determination. In making their decisions, patients will be 
guided to varying degrees (from zero to maximum, as self-determined) by the 
opinion of their doctor and their personal experiences, values and relationships, 
but ultimately the decision should be theirs except where they have specifically 
and voluntarily opted to have the decision made for them by the doctor 
(excluding cases of incapacity, which are outside the scope of this thesis).  
 
Involving patients in decision-making: what does it mean? 
 
While it is widely acknowledged that patients should be involved in decisions 
about their treatment, there is no uniform articulation of what this means in 
practice.31 A patient may be ‘involved’ in the process but not be the one making 
the final decision. I submit that in such cases, the right to self-determination has 
not been upheld, except where the patient has specifically and voluntarily 
delegated to the doctor the responsibility for making the final decision. 
    
What is important is the exercise of self-determination, as distinct from the 
question of who has made the final decision. Respecting the extent to which a 
patient wishes to participate (or not participate) in making decisions is part of 
respect for that patient’s self-determination. So long as the patient has been 
fully involved in the process of reaching a decision and is in control of how the 
choice of treatment is finally made, self-determination has been upheld. So long 
as this process has been applied and the chosen treatment is acceptable to the 
patient, the issue of who actually made the choice (patient or doctor) is a 
secondary matter. In other words, the patient’s right to self-determination is 
expressed when she voluntarily delegates decision-making responsibilities to the 
doctor. 
 
Patient involvement in treatment decision-making is commonly construed in 
terms of doctor-patient communication and the patient’s use of information to 
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select a preferred treatment option. This construal has been criticised for being 
too narrow,32 but any exploration of patient involvement beyond this construal is 
outwith the scope of this thesis.  The concepts underlying the property model 
proposed in this thesis are, however, congruent with the ‘stages and 
competences of involving patients in healthcare decisions’ enunciated by Elwyn 
et al,33 reproduced in the box below. 
 
 
 
The basis for protecting self-determination 
 
If judicial or legislative intervention to enhance patient involvement in decision-
making is to be advocated, there must be further justification for this, other 
than saying that paternalism is bad. Patients should be involved in making 
decisions about their treatment because they have a right to bodily integrity, 
because it is usually their wish to be involved34 and this increases their 
satisfaction with care provided,35 and because it is in their health interests to be 
involved.36 Also if trust in health professionals and in the health system has been 
eroded, as claimed by O’Neill37, enhanced patient involvement in decision-
making is one way of regaining confidence and trust. Above all, it is argued in 
Stages and competences of involving patients in healthcare 
decisions  
 
1. Implicit or explicit involvement of patients in decision-making 
process. 
2. Explore ideas, fears, and expectations of the problem and 
possible treatments. 
3. Portrayal of equipoise and options. 
4. Identify preferred format and provide tailor-made information. 
5. Checking process: understanding of information and reactions 
(e.g. ideas, fears, and expectations of possible options). 
6. Checking process: acceptance of process and decision-making 
role preference, involving the patient to the extent they desire to 
be involved. 
7. Make, discuss or defer decisions. 
8. Arrange follow-up. 
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Chapter 9 (page 259) that the right to self-determination is so fundamental that 
it deserves protection as a distinct right. 
 
Patients want to be involved 
 
Studies show that the majority of patients want to be involved in decision- 
making regarding their treatment.38 National patient surveys involving a total of 
more than one million patients in England showed that ‘involvement in decisions 
and respect for preferences’ is one of the aspects of healthcare that patients 
consider to be most important.39   
The surveys showed, however, that many patients were not involved as much as 
they would like to be in decisions about their care and treatment, that 
‘[a]lthough most patients are treated with dignity and respect by NHS staff, 
there are signs that care is still too often delivered in a paternalistic manner, 
with many patients given little opportunity to express their preferences or 
influence decisions about their care’.40 For example, one-third of outpatients 
said they had not received a clear explanation of treatment risks and just over 
half of stroke patients said they had not been involved as much as they wanted 
in decisions about their care and treatment in hospital, including 19% who said 
they were not involved at all.41 
 
The authors of one study42 concluded that ‘people vary substantially in their 
preferences for participation in decision making’43 but their study actually 
showed that ‘[n]early all respondents (96%) preferred to be offered choices and 
to be asked their opinions’.44 Clearly, the vast majority of patients (close to 
100%) want to participate in decision-making, so what can be concluded from 
this study is not that there is substantial variability in preferences for 
participation but that there is near unanimity in expression of a wish to be 
involved in decision-making. There are studies which report that many patients 
do not wish to be make decisions about their care.45 A closer look, however, 
indicates that what the patients are actually rejecting is mere, sheer choice. 
The same patients also say they would like to be informed about their 
treatment. The correct interpretation of these findings is that the patients do 
not want the doctor to just present options and leave them to choose one. 
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Rather, they want the doctor to provide information and to explain why one 
option is recommended over the other, given the patient’s own circumstances. 
In this transaction, the patient develops trust in the doctor and may express 
his/her self-determination by opting to go with the choice recommended by the 
doctor.  
  
Medical paternalism: the antithesis to patient self-determination  
 
Although neither the Hippocratic Oath nor its modern incarnation, the 
Declaration of Geneva46, makes reference to the patient’s preferences or views, 
it would be unfair and incorrect to say that doctors never took cognisance of a 
patient’s views. They did. The point is that the patient’s views were not 
formally recognised as paramount, were not always specifically elicited, and 
were always trumped by what the doctor considered to be best for the patient. 
Even when the patient was actively engaged in decision making, it was not 
because the doctor perceived an ethical or legal obligation to uphold the 
patient’s right to self-determination; rather it was because such patient 
involvement produced better health outcomes.47   
 
No doubt, there is an inequality between patient and doctor regarding 
knowledge of, and insight into, the patient’s medical condition. This difference 
places the doctor in a position of power over the patient; thus, it is sometimes 
said that there is a fiduciary relationship48. Most doctors would argue that this 
power has historically been exercised in a benign and benevolent manner, and 
that the doctor sought to do what was best for the patient. It could be argued 
that patients too accepted this; after all, doctors have always topped the polls 
of professionals most trusted by the public.49 Patients trusted the doctor to do 
what was best for them, and did not need to be coerced by the doctor into 
accepting the clinical recommendation. From time to time there was legal or 
ethical challenge50 to this state of affairs but by and large this ‘beneficent 
authoritarianism’ (as Pellegrino and Thomasma51 termed it) held sway.  
 
With time, however, commentators and ultimately the public began to oppose 
what was described as medical paternalism.52 Paternalism is the philosophy of 
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acting in the perceived best interests of the patient irrespective of whether this 
line of action contradicts the patient’s own wishes. It assumes that the patient is 
not able to decide for him/herself how best to pursue his/her own good, and 
could take the form of interference with the patient’s freedom of action, 
withholding of information or deliberate misinformation. It is argued that 
paternalism erodes the patient’s self-determination, violates the humanity of 
the patient and compromises healing.53 Vocal critics of paternalism asserted as 
follows: 
 
[E]very act of paternalism will involve violating the principle of autonomy 
with regard to an individual without his/her consent and for the 
individual’s benefit…….[I]t is not automatically right to produce benefit 
for another without consent…54 
 
 
A focus on cure rather than care was decried. Medical paternalism, it is argued, 
assumes that the medical good is the highest good, overriding all other values, 
and ‘subsumes all the patient’s good under only one good – the medical good’.55 
Patients have values beyond the medical good, and these values could be just as 
important as, or indeed more important than, the medical good, and respect for 
the full range of values is an essential element of healing or caring. 
Furthermore, even the medical good is not constant, and doctors may have 
variable opinions and preferences among treatment options. 
 
The patient should be free to decide what is best for himself/herself based on 
adequate knowledge of the available treatment options. The doctor’s 
responsibility is to provide this information as clearly and as truthfully as 
possible, and to respect the choice of the patient whether or not this appears 
rational. Indeed, it has been argued that to violate a person’s self-determination 
‘is not to heal, but to wound, his or her humanity’.56 
Defence of paternalism  
 
While some reject the suggestion that there are any potential benefits of 
paternalism,57 others assert that: 
 
The sick still generally come to their physicians for expertise and 
reassurance, not knowledge and power. They want to be fixed and 
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reassured, not educated and forced to make decisions about matters with 
which they are quite unfamiliar.58      
 
Defenders of paternalism also say that: 
 
Failure to be paternalistic, in the proper sense of the word, deprives the 
patient and the family of real care in the time of their greatest need. 
Doctors have no need apologetically to defend paternalism.59 
 
The qualifier (‘in the proper sense of the word’) is worth noting. To Shinebourne 
and Bush,60 the proper sense of the word is derived from the literal meaning: 
medical paternalism is simply the doctor acting like a father would to his 
children; but they also say that ‘medical condescension….is not implicit in the 
word paternalism’61 and that ‘[p]aternalism does not have to imply disrespect 
for autonomy’.62  Their definition of paternalism is different from the one 
adopted in this thesis (see above), which requires the doctor to act in the 
patient’s perceived best interests irrespective of whether this action 
contradicts the patient’s own wishes. Definitional problems account for 
incorrect statements such as saying that ‘the reaction of sick doctors can 
ironically be to prefer paternalism to personal autonomy’63 (meaning that when 
doctors are themselves ill, they want the doctors treating them to act 
paternalistically). Reading the original research work64 on which this statement 
is based, it becomes clear that what the sick doctors prefer to autonomy is 
beneficence, not paternalism; they want the treating doctors to make any 
decisions considered to be in their best interests but this is different from saying 
that they want this action irrespective of whether it contradicts their own 
wishes. 
 
The position of the paternalist has been stated as follows:65 
 
Patients come to physicians to be healed (or at least, restored to function 
and relieved of suffering as much as possible). Given this over-riding 
agenda, the primacy of which both parties agree upon, anything that 
enhances healing is appropriate, anything that diminishes or undermines 
it is to be avoided. What enhances it seems quite clear: the trust that 
brings that patient in and generates acceptance, compliance, and 
cooperation with the physician’s recommendations. As to decision 
making, effective and appropriate management of illness dictates that 
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this is the physician’s function, often there is a clear and primary 
treatment of choice and the patient comes to the physician to have this 
identified and provided. 
There were other ways to enhance this process as well. Patients also 
came seeking reassurance, and the physician was loath not to provide it, 
even if he diverged from or stopped short of the truth. It was, and still is, 
a common belief among health care professionals that the more hopeful 
or optimistic patient does better therapeutically – responds better 
physiologically – than the more pessimistic, less hopeful patient. If strong 
reassurance enhances therapeutic response or, more specifically, if 
accentuating the positive and downplaying the negative is therapeutically 
efficacious, then it would be an abuse of the patient’s trust and best 
interests not to do it. 
On this view, truth telling can be counter-therapeutic and the whole new 
ethos quite misguided. Even now, physicians who are consciously 
committed to patient autonomy routinely err on the side of emphasizing 
the benefits of treatment and the likelihood of success.66  
 
One reason commonly cited for paternalistically withholding information from 
patients or misleading them is the fear that this information could induce 
anxiety in the patient. Higgs67 dismisses this attempt to justify paternalism: 
 
…the argument that lies are justified to prevent anxiety carries its own 
rebuttal. The antidote to fear is not silence but open 
discussion…………Were trust to decline so that patients did not believe 
what was being said to them, not only reassurance but also genuine 
support during an illness would become impossible……The presumption 
remains that competent people must be allowed to choose for 
themselves. If they do not have the information on which to base a 
choice, or even a realization that a choice is necessary at all, it seems 
hard not to see this in itself as a major harm.68 
 
In a robust analysis, Allen Buchanan69 identifies and debunks three arguments 
advanced in support of doctors paternalistically withholding information from 
patients. The first of these arguments is the ‘Prevention of Harm Argument’. 
This argument posits that if giving the patient information X will do great harm 
to him/her, the doctor is obliged by the duty of care not to give the patient this 
information. Buchanan70 states that for this argument to be valid, the doctor 
must show that, on balance, giving information X will do greater harm to the 
patient than withholding the information will. Also the argument assumes that 
the patient will be successfully deceived and does not take account of the 
possible consequences (distress; distrust) of the patient suspecting or finding out 
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that information has been withheld. A second argument is the ‘Contract Version 
of the Prevention of Harm Argument’. The argument here is that the terms of 
the contractual physician-patient relationship are such that the patient 
authorizes the physician to minimize harm to the patient by whatever means the 
physician deems necessary. Leaving aside the contentious issue of whether the 
doctor-patient relationship can rightly be described as contractual, one 
counterpoint to this argument is that every contract has its boundaries or limits 
and if the patient does not have full information, how can he/she know that the 
limits of the contract are being respected by the doctor? The third argument is 
the ‘Argument from the Inability to Understand’ which is based on the premise 
that the physician is justified in withholding information when the patient is 
unable to understand the information. The question arises: what harm would the 
patient suffer if given information that h/she cannot understand? This question 
takes us back to the first argument dismissed above. 
 
Strong and weak paternalism 
 
In medical paternalism the doctor acts in line with what he considers to be the 
best interests of the patient, irrespective of whether this line of action 
contradicts the patient’s own wishes. Sometimes this paternalistic act arises 
when the patient is too young or has limited intelligence or education, or for 
other reasons is not in a position to appreciate the consequences of their choice. 
When these conditions prevail and the clinician intervenes to act in the best 
interests of the patient, this is referred to as limited or weak paternalism.71 
Treatment delivered in an emergency situation is sometimes classified as weak 
paternalism, but it is also argued that such treatment is not paternalism but 
beneficence.72 In such situations the doctor is not acting without regard for the 
patient’s preference.  
 
In other situations the patient may suffer harm in the absence of the proposed 
medical intervention, and a clinician acting to protect the patient against their 
wish is manifesting ‘strong paternalism’.73 This form of paternalism has also 
been termed ‘best-interest paternalism’.74 In weak paternalism, the physician is 
disregarding a patient’s preference or action that is substantially non-
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autonomous. The subject of this thesis is the patient who is in a position to 
make decisions about his or her own treatment, so the focus is on strong rather 
than weak paternalism.  
 
Beauchamp and Childress75 list the following conditions that justify strong 
paternalism: 
1. A patient is at risk of a significant, preventable harm 
2. The paternalistic action will probably prevent the harm 
3. The projected benefits to the patient of the paternalistic action outweigh 
its risks to the patient 
4. The least autonomy-restrictive alternative that will secure the benefits 
and reduce the risks is adopted. 
 
These conditions point to the balance which the doctor has to make between 
his/her obligation to help and the requirement to respect the patient’s self-
determination, but the authors appear to be suggesting that it is okay to assert 
or to respect the patient’s self-determination so long as the doctor does not 
foresee that this would result in significant harm to the patient – in other words, 
protect self-determination, but be paternalistic when you see that going with 
the patient’s preference could harm the patient. This view is not different from 
the ‘Prevention of Harm Argument’ rebutted above. In addition to the counter-
arguments made in respect of this argument, there is the issue of what actually 
constitutes harm to the patient. In Re C76, the doctors’ view was that the 
patient would be harmed if he did not agree to have his foot amputated. The 
patient’s own view was that he would be harmed (psychologically as well as 
physically) by having to live with one foot; he would rather die with two. 
 
Paternalism distinguished from beneficence 
 
Paternalism is often described in terms that suggest it soothes the ego of power-
hungry doctors and is intrinsically bad for the patient.77 On the other hand, 
doctors and their advocates sometimes justify paternalism on the basis of 
nonmaleficence and beneficence78, two of the four ethical principles enunciated 
by Beauchamp and Childress79 (the other two being autonomy and justice). The 
Edozien LC, 2013, Chapter 2 
 
39 
 
principle of beneficence requires that we take positive steps to help others. In 
some situations it becomes an obligation rather than a moral ideal. In medicine, 
it has always been taken that the obligation to help others is the core tenet of 
the profession – after all the reason why people go to a doctor is to obtain help. 
Here, it must be emphasised that beneficence is not synonymous with 
paternalism. Beneficence is the ethical requirement to act in the best interests 
of the patient whereas paternalism, as defined in this thesis, is acting in the 
perceived best interests of the patient irrespective of whether this line of 
action contradicts the patient’s own wishes.  In other words, what distinguishes 
beneficence from paternalism is that the latter could entail acting in the 
absence of, or without reference to, the patient’s consent, or even against the 
patient’s wishes. Paternalism, by definition, entails infraction of self-
determination; beneficence, on the contrary, includes respect for self-
determination. 
 
It must be stressed also that paternalism transcends the mere actions or 
practices of the health professional: Buchanan80 recognises this when he states 
that ‘what is at issue is a paradigm, a way of conceiving the physician-patient 
relationship*’81. This means that paternalism is a manifestation of the values and 
attitudes of the doctor, and therefore lies at the core of the doctor’s concept of 
professionalism.82  
 
The same could be said of beneficence. Downie and Macnaughton83 assert that 
when doctors are ‘beneficent’ (seeking the best interests of their patients) it 
does not necessarily follow that they are upholding a moral good; rather, it is 
the values and attitudes (i.e. professionalism) which they bring into play that 
count: 
 
 Our argument can be put simply. What is the basic professional duty of 
 the doctor? It is to treat patients according to their best medical 
 interests. This is not the moral duty of beneficence; it is simply a job 
 description. Or if you want to insist that it is the moral duty of 
 beneficence then it is one to be found in most jobs. The ‘lollipop’ or road 
 crossings lady helps the children to cross the road to school. That is her 
                                                 
*
 The doctor-patient relationship is discussed below. 
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 job description. Call it the moral duty of beneficence if you like. The 
 garage mechanic mends your puncture. Call it beneficence if you like, 
 but it is just part of what he does for a living. Aristotle maintains that all 
 actions aim at some good, but he doesn’t mean a moral good. The 
 ‘good’ at which all actions aim is just the point of the action. In the case 
 of medicine that point is the best medical interests of the patient. To 
 pursue that aim does not put you in the ranks of the saints and martyrs, 
 or even of the moderately morally good; it is just what you do for a living. 
 Moral assessment applies to how doctors do their jobs, not to the bare 
 fact that that is the job they do.  
 The significance of this argument, if it is accepted, is considerable. 
 It has been a rarely questioned assumption that doctors, in pursuing 
 the best interests of their patients or in acting towards them in a 
 beneficent manner are showing morally good or indeed altruistic or 
 supererogatory moral qualities. Yet every working person from the 
 waitress to the bus driver might with as much justification claim  that 
 they aim at the best interests of whatever or whoever is the object 
 of their activity. Why then should doctors make such a fuss about it, and 
 claim a halo? The answer to this is complex…………. at least  part of the 
 answer is the belief that medicine is a profession and professions  have 
 ethical characteristics which are lacking in trades, industries and 
 business.84 
 
Professionalism, the framework of values and behaviour that defines the 
relationship between doctors and patients, will be a key factor in the 
implementation of any new model which aims to enhance patients’ involvement 
in healthcare decision making. Referring to the model of clinical practice in 
which treatment is given only with the consent of patients and they are not 
treated paternalistically, O’Neill85 said: 
 
 This revised model of doctor-patient interaction demands more than 
 simple change of attitude on the part of doctors, or of patients. It also 
 requires huge changes in the terms and conditions of medical practice and 
 ways of ensuring that treatment is given only where patients have 
 consented.86 
 
The issue of professionalism is revisited in Chapter 8 (page 234), as it is an 
important element in the proposed property model for protection of patient 
self-determination.  
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Socio-political currents that have induced or accelerated the kick against 
medical paternalism 
 
In the last couple of decades there has been a progressive retreat from medical 
paternalism. The socio-political currents that induced or augmented this retreat 
include the ascendency of rights thinking, higher levels public awareness and 
education, advances in science and technology, and public knowledge of the 
fallibility of doctors. 
 
The ascendancy of rights thinking; consumerism 
 
Perhaps the most powerful factor in the progressive subjugation of paternalism 
is the ascendancy of rights thinking in today’s world. The doctrine of human 
rights has its origins in the philosophy that individuals hold certain rights simply 
because they are individual human beings.87 Self-determination is closely linked 
with natural rights; indeed, self-determination can be regarded as a 
foundational natural right. As Madhok88 recounts: 
 
 …it is often held that the object of human rights is to enhance the 
 autonomy of the individual through safeguarding the security, liberty and 
 political rights of persons.89  
 
 
The concept of natural rights, entitlements possessed by individuals which 
others are constrained to acknowledge and respect, has been in existence for 
centuries but has spiraled in popularity since the Universal Declaration of Human  
Rights90 was adopted by the United Nations in 1948.  Human rights, descendants 
of natural rights, have increasingly become key elements of legal and political 
systems. Issues such as access to healthcare, distribution of health resources, 
and protection of reproductive health rights are commonly framed in human 
rights terms. In the United Kingdom, this development reached its apotheosis 
with the enactment of the Human Rights Act in 1998.91  
The raison d’etre of human rights is the prevention of abuse of power.92 It is, 
therefore, not surprising that claims relating to self-determination and related 
issues are commonly couched in the language of rights. As observed by Jones:93 
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Claiming or asserting rights has become the common mode by which 
people seek to promote an interest or advance a cause. That is to be 
explained, in part, by the special force possessed by the language of 
rights. If we are concerned that people should be able to speak freely, or 
to choose their own careers, or to vote, or to marry the person of their 
choice, or to have an abortion, or to hunt animals, or to determine their 
own lifestyle, or to work, or to strike, or not to suffer discrimination, or 
to receive medical treatment, or not to receive medical treatment, or to 
live, or to die, it is much more forceful to say that people have rights to 
do all of those things than to say merely that it is desirable or good that 
they should be able to do them. In coming to think of these things as 
rights, we shift them out of the realm of the merely desirable and into 
the domain of the morally essential.94  
 
 
Arguably, property analysis also shifts its subject matter from the realms of the 
desirable to the domain of the legally essential – society tends to ascribe 
property to that which is highly prized and which is central to one’s life as an 
independent person. 
 
Rights thinking in the healthcare sector is manifested in the American Hospital 
Association’s 1972 publication, A Patient’s Bill of Rights95, which (among other 
rights) affirmed the patient’s right to be given information and to give 
meaningful consent before treatment and the United Kingdom government’s 
publication, The Patient’s Charter,96 which set standards of care for National 
Health Service (NHS) hospitals. 
 
The ascendancy of rights thinking has had an impact on judicial thinking. In the 
past it was assumed that under the English common law, a man could not be 
guilty of raping his wife, but in R v R97 the House of Lords held that a woman had 
the right to give or withhold consent to sexual intercourse with her husband. In 
R v D,98 the House of Lords ruled that the position of paramountcy in the family 
accorded the father which previously afforded him a lawful excuse for forcibly 
taking away his unmarried child had been overtaken by social currents which 
exalted the child’s consent. Similarly, a mother’s traditional role in determining 
what treatment her child would have was over-ridden in Gillick v West Norfolk 
and Wisbech Area Health Authority99 where the House of Lords upheld the 
child’s right to decide for herself (with certain limitations).  These examples 
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show that the law evolves to stay in line with social norms, and give cause for 
optimism that the courts could in due course apply an alternative model to cases 
involving patient participation in decision making.† 
 
O’Neill100 states that to cite human rights as the reason for respecting individual 
autonomy we must first justify human rights, and that while adoption and 
ratification of human rights declarations may provide political legitimacy, they 
do not provide ethical justification.  Ethical justification, she points out, can be 
achieved via two routes: grounding human rights in the good of man or 
grounding human rights in human obligations. The former is less inviting, 
because it is open to disagreements on what constitutes the good and how the 
various components of human good should be prioritized. Her preferred route is 
the latter, and she describes rights and obligations as being analogous to the 
white and black squares on a chequerboard. O’Neill101 also cautions that if rights 
rhetoric is to be taken seriously then the corresponding obligations should also 
be taken seriously. Her concern about ‘a disconnected rhetoric of rights’102 is 
understandable, but it is a criticism that applies in the spheres of politics, 
political science and sociology, and not necessarily in the legal arena. It is trite 
in law that rights carry corresponding obligations, and in determining whether 
the rights of an individual have been breached, the courts would usually look at 
the corresponding obligations. The property model that is proposed in this thesis 
is like the chequerboard in O’Neill’s analogy; it emphasises both rights and 
obligations, both of these being complementary white and black squares. 
A focus on obligations emphasizes what action needs to be taken; it draws 
attention to relationships rather than to individuals. This is particularly 
important in healthcare decision-making; here, it can be argued that 
maintaining an interpretive relationship between doctor and patient is a 
corollary to, and facilitates, protection of the rights of the individual patient. 
The ecological paradigm adopted in Chapter 1 (page 12) situates the individual’s 
rights in the context of the doctor-patient relationship, rather than in isolation.    
As will be shown in Chapter 5 (page 135, 156), one of the criticisms of the 
                                                 
† In Chapter 9 I describe how judicial thinking on the patient’s right to self-determination 
vis-a-vis physician disclosure standards has evolved with social norms. 
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consent model is that it pays insufficient attention to obligations. The question 
of whether this criticism is overcome by the property model is addressed in 
Chapter 9 (see page 257). 
 
Society’s preoccupation with rights has given rise to consumerism in society at 
large. This has spread from the corporate sector to health services, and it is 
feared that it could have adverse implications for the doctor-patient 
relationship103. As with the concepts of self-determination and property 
described in this thesis, the concept of consumerism is capable of taking a 
variety of meanings when applied to healthcare. Haug and Lavin104 say that: 
  
 In simple terms, consumerism in medicine means challenging the 
 physician’s ability to make unilateral decisions – demanding a share in 
 reaching closure on diagnosis and working out treatment plans.105 
 
 
Put in these terms, consumerism is seemingly innocuous and can be regarded as 
simply a shorthand term for protection of patient self-determination. Other 
commentators106 use a different interpretation of consumerism. Morgan107, for 
example, describes a consumerist relationship as that ‘in which power 
relationships are reversed: with the patient taking the active role and the doctor 
adopting a fairly passive role, acceding to the patient’s requests for a second 
opinion, referral to hospital, a sick note, and so on’108. This is much further 
removed from paternalism than the definition given by Haug and Lavin109 - 
challenging the doctor’s unilateral authority in making decisions is one thing, 
advocating a passive (or indeed submissive) role for the doctor is another. The 
latter implies abandonment of medical professionalism, the doctor acting merely 
as a shop attendant supplying whatever the client wants from the shelf.  
Some studies110 show that while most patients want adequate information about 
their disease and treatment, not many wish to assume sole responsibility for 
decision-making (emphasis mine). This has led to the comment that ‘proponents 
of a strong consumerist approach to patient participation in health care 
decisions may be surprised by the way in which the behaviour of sick people 
deviates from the expected or desired response’111.  
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Randall and Downie112 take a broader view of consumerism, based on its 
application in a free market economy. In their conception, consumerism entails 
consumer access to a choice of goods or services competitively provided by 
suppliers who are obliged to provide adequate information on, and ensure the 
safety of, their products; the customer pays for the goods or services, takes 
responsibility for what he/she has purchased and obtains redress if the goods 
were misrepresented by the supplier. They say that since it is the doctor, not 
the patient, who takes responsibility (legal and moral) for the treatment 
received by the patient, ‘there is not now, and not likely to be in the near 
future, a true consumerism in healthcare’113. Elsewhere, Downie and 
McNaughton114 make the same point in these words: 
 
 …neither governments nor medicine seem willing or even aware of the 
 final step towards true consumerist ethics – responsibility. If I receive 
 adequate information in the marketplace, and put my money down, then, 
 as a consumer, I am responsible for my choice. Neither governments nor 
 the public seem willing to take the final step, and accept that patients 
 are responsible for their choices in medicine as much as in the 
 marketplace.  Doctors remain responsible even if it is the patient who has 
 made the choice.115 
 
 
In Chapter 9 (page 257), it is argued that in contemporary medical practice, the 
right to self-determination should carry with it obligations on the part of doctor 
and patient, and that the patient’s obligations include taking some responsibility 
for the treatment received.  
 
Involving patients in the decision making process is often abbreviated to 
‘offering choice’116.  Indeed, the expectation of choice underlies a 
postmodernist theory of consent:117 
  
Social and economic forces ensure that everyone in wealthy societies is a 
consumer. We expect to be offered choices—of groceries, shoes, radio 
channels, or holidays—and do not suddenly change when we become ill or 
injured. Doctors are among the leading purveyors of choices from before 
the cradle to the grave: prenatal screening; analgesia during childbirth; 
growth treatments; prostate surgery or watchful waiting; organ transplant 
or acceptance of death. Much treatment is not for serious disease but for 
convenience, such as to hasten recovery from minor illness. Even consent 
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to major surgery, like hysterectomy or spinal fusion, may be influenced 
more by personal preferences than by clinical judgment.118 
 
As is the case with ‘autonomy’ and ‘property’, however, ‘choice’ could be used 
or interpreted in different ways. It has been observed that ‘[t]he attempt to 
clarify what we mean when we speak about choice in healthcare is a task as 
complex as dealing with the history of ideas in the philosophical realm’119. 
The narrow construction of patient self-determination as a mere question of 
choice smacks of a flagrantly consumerist approach. Patient self-determination 
is not upheld simply by presenting the patient with an a la carte menu of 
treatment options or, in some cases, ‘a menu of one item’120.  Apart from not 
promoting the conception of self-determination enunciated below, there are 
ethical objections to promotion of ‘mere, sheer choice’121: 
 
 Why should all choices – even those not based on an adequate grasp of 
 others’ proposals – be protected at all costs? Is it of no importance that 
 choices may be good or bad, right or wrong, kind or callous, prudent or 
 risky, informed or ignorant? Or that choices may be based on misleading 
 views of others’ proposals, or of the realities, risks and benefits of 
 consenting to – or refusing – those proposals? Does it not matter that 
 individuals may accept proposals for action that are likely to injure them, 
 may ‘go along’ with manipulative proposals, or may succumb to ‘offers 
 they can’t refuse’? Respect for mere choice has been widely, and in our 
 view plausibly, viewed as a shaky and questionable justification for 
 invasive treatment.122   
 
The conception of self-determination adopted in this thesis transcends mere 
choice. On the other hand, it appears that judgment of what is or is not mere 
choice is value-laden and any choice that is risky, callous, wrong or capable of 
causing harm to the patient is at risk of being labeled mere choice. It will be 
argued in chapters 9 and 10 that the property model has potential to avoid the 
ethical problems associated with mere choice while also not preventing the self-
determining patient from making an informed choice that may in the eyes of 
others appear risky or irrational.  
 
Public awareness; advances in technology 
 
Arguably, the emergence of consumerist perspectives in public services123 and 
increasing emphasis on choice in healthcare delivery124 are in large measure due 
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to the populace being more informed. The emergence of a more educated, 
enlightened citizenry is one of the social factors cited by proponents125 who 
advance the deprofessionalization hypothesis126 as the explanation for the 
changing status of professionals in modern society.  Haug127 stated that: 
 
 By limiting access to training, leaders of the medical elite have generally 
 sought to contain the spread of their fund of esoteric knowledge, keeping 
 it from the unqualified and uninitiated.  This endeavour has only been 
 partially successful Despite the continued discovery of new technologies 
 and medical breakthroughs, the media have popularized a great deal of 
 the increasing fund of medical knowledge, and made it accessible o a 
 public whose rising educational level permits many people to grasp it, at 
 least in its main outlines.128  
 
 
The public are much more (and better) informed today than at any other time in 
history. This is due partly to higher average levels of education, but more 
importantly to the ready availability and accessibility of information through the 
mass media and the worldwide web. This has reduced (but not eliminated) the 
information gradient between doctor and patient.129  The internet has been 
associated with the following potential advantages:  
 
 …helping patients make informed health care choices (with potential to 
 decrease  health care disparities), shared decision-making with a 
 collaborative, teamwork  approach, more efficient use of clinical time, 
 augmenting of physician-provided information, online support groups, 
 and/or access to patients' own health information.130 
 
Studies show that younger and better educated patients desire a more active 
role in decision making whereas less well educated patients were in greater awe 
of doctors.131 The informed patient is in a better position to be actively involved 
in decision-making related to his or her health. On the other hand, a steep 
information gradient between doctor and patient encourages paternalism.  
 
 
Whereas in the past most medical interventions owed their effectiveness to the 
placebo effect, 20th century medicine offered a range of effective therapeutic 
options, thanks to advances in technology. This means that opportunities have 
arisen for the doctor to present patients with options and to discuss the relative 
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merits and adverse effects of each option, especially in those cases where there 
was no clearly superior option These opportunities, however, are meaningful to 
the patient only if he/she understands the options being presented and is in a 
position to make an informed choice consistent with his/her values, 
circumstances and world view. The term ‘preference sensitive’132 has been used 
to describe the rising number of conditions where there is not one but a range of 
acceptable treatment options and the best choice depends on the patient’s 
goals and circumstances. 
 
Another factor associated with technological advancement and reduction in the 
information gradient between doctor and patient is the relative decline of acute 
illness and rise of chronic conditions. Increasing numbers of patients are living 
with conditions such as diabetes, stroke, age-related degenerative disease and 
heart disease, and many of these patients have become experts in the 
management of their condition.133 
 
Finally, public awareness of the fallibility of doctors has increased, due to well-
publicised medical mistakes and scandals. This has induced many patients to 
question the doctor’s recommendations and to play a more proactive role in 
decisions about their care. Fewer patients would now, as Lord Justice Dunn said 
in Sidaway134, ‘prefer to put themselves unreservedly in the hand of their 
doctors’.135 The world has moved a long way since the days when Sir John 
Donaldson, also in Sidaway, felt that the prudent patient was probably ‘a fairly 
rare bird’136. The man and woman on the Clapham omnibus (identified by Sir 
John as the ‘natural habitat’ of the prudent patient) are today aware of their 
rights and ready to assert them. 
The following account137 from Australia could be said to apply in most of the 
Western world: 
…… When the participants were asked whether they thought the social 
status of medical practitioners in Australian society had changed over 
time, nearly everyone agreed that it had. A common observation put 
forward by the participants was that while doctors may still be generally 
respected in Australia, they are now subject to more criticism. In doing 
so, regardless of their age, the participants routinely drew comparisons 
between the medical practitioners they remembered from their 
childhood, and those they had dealings with today. An almost 
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mythological account was given of a kindly (almost invariably middle-
aged, white male) doctor, the traditional archetype of the "family 
doctor"……These days, it was often contended, this ideal figure of the 
"family doctor" had been challenged by increasing publicity around 
medical negligence or mistakes, sexual harassment or assault of patients 
by doctors, medical fraud and so on.138   
 
 It is not only the public’s attitude that has been influenced by the scandals; the 
attitude of the judiciary to the medical profession has also been affected.139 
Lord Woolf140 identified the scandals and the resultant dent in the ‘presumption 
of beneficence’141 as one of the reasons behind the change to a less deferential 
attitude to the medical profession by the judiciary. 
 
 
Curtains for paternalism 
 
 
 The currents described above have served to accelerate a retreat from 
paternalism that commenced in the second half of the twentieth century, 
following atrocities committed by medical doctors during the Second World War. 
This retreat was accompanied by increasing emphasis on consent procedures.142 
At first glance, it would appear that this emphasis was driven by a determination 
to restrain paternalism. Stephen Wear143 argues, however, that the agenda of 
those advocating this shift in the early days had less to do with the positive goal 
of enhancing patient self-determination, and more with concerns about research 
subjects and the outlandish practices of certain physicians. It is noteworthy that 
although the Nuremberg Court and society’s objection to unethical experiments 
marked the beginning of the march against medical paternalism, the medical 
community also reacted against such experiments.144  
 
Concern about research subjects arose notably in relation to the involvement of 
Nazi doctors in unethical practices and about the way institutionalised patients 
were treated.145   There were also the notorious Tuskegee146 experiment where 
southern blacks with syphilis were left untreated so that the natural course of 
the disease could be studied and the Willowbrook147 experiment where certain 
patients were intentionally infected with hepatitis. What is significant about 
these cases is that the doctors were not acting in the best interests of their 
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patients. Thus, when campaigners rose to assert the self-determination of 
patients, they did so not because of paternalism on the part of ordinary medical 
practitioners, but because of the unethical practices of a few errant doctors. 
Interestingly, the same paradigm applies in contemporary medicine where 
concern about errant doctors such as Shipman148 has led to reforms149 or 
proposed reforms that affect the way medicine is practised by the vast majority 
of law-abiding and well-meaning doctors. 
 
From these beginnings the movement for protection of patient self-
determination by means of consent gained momentum through a series of well-
publicised cases concerning prolongation of life in intensive-care units (when 
one school of thought felt that the patient should be allowed to die with 
dignity),150 blood transfusions administered to Jehovah’s Witnesses against their 
will151 and court-authorised Caesarean sections performed against the will of the 
women.152 These cases reach the heart of patient self-determination. 
 
In the UK a major step forward was taken with the publication in 2000  of ‘The 
NHS Plan’153 which set out the government’s proposals for creating a ‘patient-
centred service’ in which patients would be fully involved in decisions relating to 
their care. Ten years later, the coalition Government published its health white 
paper, Equity and excellence: liberating the NHS154 which outlined plans to 
make patient experience a measurable outcome of care, with an ethos of ‘no 
decision about me without me’ and ‘shared decision-making’155 becoming the 
norm.   
The NHS Constitution156, first published in 2009, spells out the rights and 
responsibilities of patients and service providers, including the patient’s right to 
make choices about his/her care. The Constitution does not create new rights 
but collates the rights that were previously created by primary and secondary 
legislation. From a list of 11 rights enshrined in this Constitution, the three 
considered most important by respondents in a national survey157 of patients 
were: involvement in decisions about treatment; information about treatment; 
and being treated with dignity and respect. The Health and Social Care Act158 
2012 places a duty on the NHS Commissioning Board and Clinical Commissioning 
Groups to involve patients in decision-making, and the Report of the Mid 
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Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry159 reaffirmed both the 
importance of the NHS Constitution and the need to place patients at the centre 
of care. 
The government is also making efforts to promote public awareness and 
facilitate provision of information to enhance engagement of patients – for 
example, through the website NHS Choices160. This website, which recorded its 
500 millionth visit at the end of 2012, will be replaced in 2013 by a new 
“integrated customer service platform” that combines patient information with 
opportunities for patients to give feedback on their care.161   
 
Retreat from medical paternalism: the profession’s response 
 
There is evidence that medical professionalism has been responsive to the 
challenge posed by these socio-political currents.162 Professional bodies from 
Europe and America jointly published a Physicians’ Charter in 2002163 which 
affirmed that 21st century medical professionalism rested on three fundamental 
principles: primacy of patient welfare, patient autonomy and social justice. 
Analogies for the doctor-patient relationship have changed from that of the 
priest164 in 1968 to that of a mountain guide165 in 2007, and the code of 
practice166 published by the General Medical Council recognises the primacy of 
patient autonomy. Both the General Medical Council167 and the royal 
postgraduate medical colleges168 have published guidelines on consent which 
assert the patient’s primary role in decision-making. Clinical governance169, a 
framework for ensuring the quality of patient-centred care, has been embedded 
in the National Health Service, and patient involvement in decision-making is at 
the core of this framework.170 McLean171 even goes as far as commenting that: 
 
 It is paradoxical that once embraced by the professions, the importance 
 of respect for autonomy seems to have been taken more seriously by 
 them  than by the law.172 
 
 
It is too early, however, to sing the nunc dimittis for paternalism – as there is an 
incongruence between the seriousness with which the principle of self-
determination is taken by the profession and the extent to which this principle is 
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actually upheld on the shop-floor.173  As observed by one commentator174 
recently, ‘[w]hile the medical community has espoused the value of autonomy in 
principle, much more work must be done to promote patient autonomy in 
practice’175 and ‘clinical evaluation research studies suggest that patients are 
routinely asked to make decisions about treatment choices in the face of what 
can only be described as avoidable ignorance’176. There has been progress in 
involving patients in informed decision-making but more work needs to be 
done.177 In a survey178 of NHS patients conducted in 2010, 48% of inpatients said 
they would have liked more involvement in decisions about their care. This is 
despite the introduction of the NHS constitution. The Patients Association found 
that many patients were unaware of many of the rights and responsibilities 
described in the NHS Constitution179 Over 98% of respondents in a survey180 
reported that they had been treated by the NHS without being notified of the 
NHS Constitution’s existence. The review181 of the Secretary of State for Health 
on the effect of the NHS Constitution reported that less than a third (27%) of the 
public are aware of the constitution and only 1% of NHS staff report being asked 
about it. 
 
Moulton and King182 are critical of this failure:  
 
While physicians, health services researchers, and medical ethicists have 
advocated the incorporation of shared decision-making into mainstream 
medical practice for decades, few physicians have successfully integrated 
the process into their practice. The failure to recognize the provider’s 
ethical imperative to align patient knowledge and patient treatment 
choices in cases of preference sensitive care is jarring.183  
 
A lot more needs to be done to protect the patient’s right to self-determination. 
This will require both a change in the orientation of clinicians and a more robust 
means of providing remedy when the patient’s right has been breached. 
      
Will the pendulum swing back?  
 
It was suggested 20 years ago that ‘solo fee-for-service practice in a competitive 
situation was more likely to be client-dependent than colleague-dependent’.184 
This is to say that where doctors work with other colleagues and require their 
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cooperation and approval, their performance is more likely to conform to that of 
other doctors than with the expectations of patients; in an isolated 
environment, the doctor is less susceptible to such countervailing pressures from 
colleagues. If this is true, then current shifts in healthcare provision have 
implications for patient self-determination. General practitioners (GPs) are now 
mostly in group practice and the days of the single-handed GP practice are 
numbered. Polyclinics are being promoted.185 In the acute sector, small units are 
closing down and bigger hospitals are being built. All of these may mean that the 
21st century approach to the delivery of healthcare could be more attuned to 
professional autonomy than to patient self-determination. If that is the case, 
then the need to safeguard patient self-determination is even more pressing. 
 
Healthcare resources are finite and rationing is inescapable in contemporary 
healthcare. This often means that healthcare providers are unable to accede to 
a patient’s wishes or offer a full range of therapeutic options.186  The principles 
of non-maleficence and equitable utilisation of limited resources could also be 
employed to justify refusal of a patient’s request when treatment is considered 
ineffective in prolonging life, improving quality of life or providing a 
physiological benefit.187 A 45 year old woman cannot, on the basis of self-
determination, demand assisted reproduction on the National Health Service 
where the results of such treatment are not considered to justify the cost. 
Sometimes a physician is concerned that granting a patient’s request could 
result in the patient suffering harm. A good example would be the rising tide of 
Caesarean section on maternal request. It is well established that while vaginal 
delivery may weaken the pelvic floor, it is safer in all other respects (post-
operative pain, injury to pelvic organs, infection, thrombosis, death) than 
Caesarean section. On the basis of the medical evidence, Caesarean section 
should not be performed simply on the basis of maternal request. Granting this 
request could expose the woman to avoidable harm, but respect for her self-
determination (according to one school) demands that her informed choice 
should be implemented.   As with the case of the middle-aged woman who 
demands fertility treatment on the NHS, society (or government and/or 
professionals) may determine that Caesarean section on maternal request (in the 
absence of medical indications) is a misuse of commonwealth resources. 
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Situations such as this are more common in the United States where ‘managed 
care’ operates to limit the choices available to patients. This has led some 
commentators to say that the paternalism of the individual doctor has been 
replaced by a ‘new paternalism’.188  
 
Another consequence of the new approach to healthcare delivery is that the 
patient is treated by not just one doctor but by a team of doctors and other 
practitioners, sometimes receiving conflicting information from different 
members of the team and not infrequently finding that no-one has had sufficient 
contact with him or her as to be in a position to understand his or her values and 
thinking. This situation has implications for consent and self-determination, for 
unless health professionals give consistent and meaningful information relevant 
to the circumstances and needs of the particular patient, true consent cannot be 
obtained. 
 
Patient involvement in decision-making: not black or white, blue or red 
 
Discussions of self-determination in healthcare are commonly framed in 
dichotomous or extremist terms. For a start, there is a tendency to present the 
subject as if there were only two absolutes; at one end, medical paternalism, at 
the other, patient sovereignty – with the expectation or assumption that one 
extreme must ride triumphant, even roughshod, over the other. In reality, day-
to-day clinical practice manifests a delicate interplay between the imperatives 
of beneficence

 and patient self-determination.  
 
Secondly, the subject is commonly presented in an adversarial framework, as a 
joust between doctors in the red corner (paternalism) and society in the blue 
corner (self-determination) of the boxing ring. The responsive nature of medical 
professionalism, as described above, negates this outdated presentation.  
 
Thirdly, the medical consultation is often framed as either the scenario where 
the patient’s illness diminishes his/her capacity to make a value-based 
                                                 
 Beneficence is distinguished from paternalism earlier in this chapter 
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decision189 or one where the doctor determines what is right and/or presents a 
limited number of options and ‘the patient’s role is only to say ‘yes’ – or to do 
without treatment’190. This narrow framing conceals a lot that lies between 
these two extremes. With advances in science and technology, it is increasingly 
common to have a wide range of treatment options available to the patient for a 
particular condition, including surgical and non-surgical treatment. In many 
cases, there is no one treatment that, on the basis of scientific evidence, is 
clearly the superior option. A woman presenting to her doctor with troublesome 
menstrual bleeding is unlikely have her self-determination substantially 
diminished by her medical condition; she can make an informed choice from a 
range of options, each of which carries its own effectiveness, advantages and 
risks. Whether she opts for surgical or non-surgical treatment and, if the former, 
what type of operation, is likely to be determined by her attitude to surgery and 
the perceived effects of the various options on her occupation, family life, 
sexuality and other non-clinical factors.  Similarly, for many chronic medical 
conditions a range of surgical, pharmacological, physical and psychological 
therapies have been developed, and the patient has to make informed decisions 
about which treatment to have or not have. In these cases the issue of self-
determination is more substantial than in those where the patient is very ill or 
where there is only one treatment and it is a case of accepting or refusing it. 
 
Reinforcing these dichotomies is an extremism: in bioethics there has been a 
near-universal tendency towards excessive preoccupation with paternalism. 
McCullough191 has recently decried inaccuracies in historical accounts which, in 
the relatively short life of bioethics, have depicted paternalism as an 
uncontested attribute of medical practice dating back to Hippocrates. While his 
attempt to set the historical record straight is laudable, what is perhaps more 
instructive is his insightful observation on the effect that inordinate 
preoccupation with paternalism has had on the march of bioethics. As a result of 
this preoccupation, bioethics lost the opportunity to critically address in depth 
the dynamics of the doctor’s power as a professional and as an agent of a 
healthcare organisation; rather bioethics has simply been about keeping this 
power in check. As a result, he concludes, patients have been denied the 
benefits afforded by a professional fiduciary relationship with their doctor and a 
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contractual relationship has been fostered. Extending this observation further, it 
can be said that preoccupation with consent has meant that attention is focused 
on the doctor’s duty not to touch the patient without authorisation, without 
adequate attention to the patient’s right to make decisions and to power 
relations between doctor and patient.‡  
 
 
Self-determination and models of the doctor-patient relationship 
 
Patients say that the extent to which they are able to make decisions about 
their treatment is largely dependent on the style of communication adopted by 
their doctor .192  The doctor-patient relationship is a critical factor in upholding 
or truncating self-determination.  It is, therefore, appropriate at this juncture to 
look more closely at models of the doctor-patient relationship. 
This relationship has been described as ‘the prototype of all professional 
relationships’193 and as a 'quasi-mystical relationship'.194 The nature of this 
relationship has implications for health outcomes, and the paternalistic form 
discussed above is only one of a number of forms that this relationship could 
take.  
Various models have been used to characterise the relationship.195 One approach 
is based on the doctor’s style of consultation: some doctors treat a disease 
rather than a patient (the scientific model);196 some see their role as providing 
the menu from which the patient can choose (the consumerist model);197 some 
define the consultation in terms of rights and duties (the contractual model)198 
and others simply take the patient as a person who has come to enlist assistance 
in sorting a problem or concern (the humanistic model).199 
 
Another approach is based on the power gradient between doctor and patient. 
Morgan200 describes four types of doctor-patient relationship (paternalistic, 
consumerist, mutuality and default), classified according to whether the patient 
and the doctor have high or low control of the consultation. A consumerist 
relationship is the direct opposite of the paternalistic one, the patient dictating 
                                                 
‡
 In chapter 9 it will be argued that the property model is capable of doing better in this regard. 
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the tune whilst the doctor acquiesces to the patient’s demands. A relationship 
of mutuality is one where doctor and patient are equals, each bringing 
something to the table. In a ‘default’ relationship, the doctor cedes control to 
the patient but the latter remains passive. 
 
Ezekiel and Linda Emmanuel201 propose four models of the physician-patient 
relationship: Paternalistic, Informative, Interpretive, Deliberative. In the 
paternalistic model, the physician acts as the patient's guardian, articulating and 
implementing what is best for the patient, regardless of the patient’s 
preferences. In this model, self-determination is no more than patient assent to 
the physician's opinion of what is best.  
 
In the informative model, the physician provides the patient with all relevant 
information and options and the patient selects the option he or she wants. This 
model draws a line between facts and values. The patient's values are well 
defined and known; what the patient lacks is facts. It is the physician's 
obligation to provide all the available facts, and the patient's values then 
determine what treatments are to be given. The physician is merely a technical 
expert, and there is no role for the physician's values, the physician's 
understanding of the patient's values, or his or her judgment of the worth of the 
patient's values. As consumerism par excellence this model exalts choice, but 
self-determination (as articulated in the ecological metaphor) is not just all 
about choice; it is deeper than mere choice, a point illustrated graphically in the 
following anecdote narrated by Bergson and Thomasma:202 
 
  Convinced of the merits of autonomy-emphasis, a friend once decided to 
 "go for broke' with autonomy in his family practice. Eventually patients 
 abandoned him, arguing that he was himself 'abandoning' his role as a 
 doctor by putting too much stress on their own decisions. He then took 
 care of young people on a commune farm and was hired by a university. 
 Soon that too fell through and he went out west to care for Indians on a 
 Reservation. This story demonstrates both the commitments of the 
 physician to support autonomy and care for the underserved, but also that 
 simply placing decision-making in the hands of the patient does not 
 recognize the deeper aspects of autonomy we have argued. This 
 physician, enlightened as he was, still identified autonomy only with 
 choice. 203 
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The third model is the interpretive model, in which the physician acts as 
counsellor or adviser, provides the patient with information on the nature of the 
condition and possible interventions, and assists the patient in determining 
which medical interventions fit with the patient’s articulated values. This is the 
model that best fits with the notion of self-determination espoused in this 
thesis. 
 
In the deliberative model, the physician acts as a teacher or mentor, engaging 
the patient in dialogue on what course of action would be best. Not only does 
the physician indicate what the patient could do but, knowing the patient and 
wishing what is best, the physician indicates what the patient should do. This 
model is similar to the ‘shared decision making’ paradigm of consent discussed 
in Chapter 3. The problem with this model is that decision-making still 
ultimately rests with the doctor rather than the patient. 
The authors state that a fifth model, the instrumental model, could be added to 
these four but hasten to dismiss this model as an aberration. The instrumental 
model disregards the patient’s values completely; the patient's values are 
irrelevant; the physician aims for some goal independent of the patient, such as 
the good of society or furtherance of scientific knowledge. The Tuskegee204 
(where southern blacks with syphilis were left untreated so that the natural 
course of the disease could be studied) and Willowbrook205 (where certain 
patients were intentionally infected with hepatitis) scandals are examples of the 
instrumental model in action. 
 
Ezekiel and Linda Emanuel206 note that the legal doctrine of informed consent 
appears to promote the informative model; whereas, in their view, the 
deliberative model may be the most appropriate in most clinical encounters. 
 
In the same vein, Charles and colleagues207 describe four models of decision-
making in the doctor-patient relationship: paternalistic, informed, shared and 
intermediate. The paternalistic model is the ‘doctor-knows-best’ model. In the 
informed model, the doctor provides all the relevant information on treatment 
options and risks, but deliberation and decision-making are the sole prerogative 
of the patient. In the shared model, the doctor and patient share decision-
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making and reach a consensus on the way forward. The intermediate model is a 
hybrid of the above models.  
 
Veatch208 also described four models, similar to the above: priestly, engineering, 
collegial and contractual. In the engineering model, the patient has full power 
and the doctor merely provides technical advice. The priestly model is 
paternalism and the engineering model is consumerism, so both are rejected in 
this thesis. The collegial model is shared decision making, where there is 
supposedly an equal partnership, but this appears to ignore the information 
gradient between doctor and patient which negates the idea of equal 
partnership; also the right to self-determination cannot truly be said to be 
protected unless it is the patient who actually makes the decision.  The 
contractual model explicitly recognises that there is a power gradient between 
doctor and patient, but in this model the patient retains control over decisions. 
Rights and duties are central to this model but medical professionalism takes a 
back seat. 
 
Bergsma and Thomasma209 describe three vertical models and three horizontal 
models. The vertical models  - models in which one pole or the other dominates 
the relationship - are: paternalism (the physician acts for the good of the 
patient even in the absence of their consent, or even against their wishes); 
patient autonomy (the doctor respects the independent decision making of the 
patient even when the doctor disagrees with the decision or finds it 
unconscionable); and entrepreneurial (medicine run as a profit-making 
enterprise). 
 
In the horizontal models - contract, covenant and negotiation - there is face-to-
face dialogue on the patient’s problems, and about the roles played by both 
parties in addressing these problems. A contract model, exemplified by the use 
of advance directives, reduces the likelihood that the patient's intention will be 
frustrated, but contracts cannot cover all contingencies. Also, the doctor may 
limit themselves to the terms of the contract and not feel obliged or inclined to 
do anything 'extra'.  It can be said that the contract model is founded on 
mistrust.  
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The covenant model has its roots, not in self-determination but in charity and 
cultural or religious values such as the sacredness of human life. It is arguable 
that this could be a horizontal model only if doctor and patient both resile from 
imposing their cultural or religious values on the other party. 
 
Clarke and colleagues210 have drawn attention to limitations of the models 
described above. Firstly, these models of medical decision-making have treated 
the patient alone outside of his or her social context as the subject in the 
physician-patient relationship, whereas many patients prefer family or friends to 
be involved and want advice from a spouse, son or daughter before they make 
the final decision. Here we see the ecology metaphor in practice. Clarke et al211 
are concerned that as long as the physician-patient model is that of an individual 
autonomous patient and a single physician in a decision-making context, the 
preferences of these patients will be ignored. They found in their own study that 
patients differ significantly from one another in what they expect from their 
physicians, with regard to communication, and 78.4% of the 51 patients 
interviewed said they would want a family member or friend present when a 
physician comes to discuss an operation. The authors concluded that the ‘strong 
preferences we found for involving family and friends in physician-patient 
communication should lead to a reconsideration of the concept of patient 
autonomy’212 and that ‘to aim for conformity to a “best” or preferred model of 
physician-patient decision-making may actually undermine patient autonomy’.213 
The point made by Clarke and colleagues is valid but the solution is not so much 
a reconsideration of the concept of autonomy but repositioning self-
determination in an ‘ecological’ context - as discussed above. 
 
In analyzing the merits of the consent approach or any other approach to 
protecting patient self-determination, it is important to be clear about the 
underlying model of patient-doctor relationship. As will be mentioned again in 
discussion of the relevant case law in Chapter 9, Lord Bridge invoked the 
‘realities of the doctor/patient relationship’214 as one reason why a doctrine 
enforcing the patient’s right to self-determination would be ‘quite impracticable 
in application’215. His view of the relationship, however, is a vertical and 
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paternalistic one, which is antithetical to the interpretive model espoused in 
this thesis. In the same case, another judge, Lord Templeman216, described the 
relationship as contractual. 
 
 The existence of a variety of models of the doctor-patient relationship is itself 
an indication that the needs of patients are not uniform, and consent tailored to 
meet the exigencies of counter-paternalism may not meet the needs of all – as 
this is not a case of one size fits all. It is perhaps more helpful if the models of 
patient-doctor relationship described by various scholars are seen as describing 
the range of approaches that a doctor may take during a consultation, rather 
than characterising the relationship per se.  
 
 
 
Conclusion: self-determination triumphs, beneficence survives 
  
In the light of the above narrative, there appears to be no irrefutable defence 
for paternalism in contemporary medical practice. I conclude that paternalism 
(specifically, strong paternalism) is unacceptable in contemporary medical 
practice in the western world. The drivers of anti-paternalism outlined above 
are here to stay and a return to paternalism is not foreseeable. Competent 
patients should be involved in decision-making regarding their care, and their 
choices and decisions should be respected by the doctor.  
 
This thesis takes the position that strong paternalism should not be encouraged; 
on the contrary self-determination should always be protected, albeit within an 
‘ecological’ framework, one that takes cognisance of the relevant communal and 
contextual factors.  
 
In the past, a doctor could perform a Caesarean section against the wishes of a 
woman in situations where the doctor recognised that not doing the operation 
could result in serious harm (for example, rupture of the womb) or death to the 
woman or her baby.217 This was paradigmatic of paternalism, as defined in this 
thesis. In contemporary practice, the doctor undertaking a Caesarean section 
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without the consent of the woman will be breaking the law.218 Legally and 
otherwise, paternalism is abhorred in contemporary healthcare, and protection 
of the patient’s self-determination has become a legal and moral imperative.  
 
This is not to say that beneficence, so central to traditional medical practice, no 
longer has a place. A doctor will continue to be guided by the principle of 
beneficence, but can no longer act beneficently in defiance of the patient’s 
wish on the grounds that respecting the patient’s wish could result in harm. 
Beneficence is sometimes either conflated with paternalism or presented as the 
justification for paternalism219. It must be noted, however, that respect for self-
determination is not incompatible with beneficence; indeed respect for self-
determination can be regarded as part of beneficence: by upholding a patient’s 
self-determination, the doctor is contributing to their welfare. Respect for self-
determination also reflects professionalism. Pellegrino and Thomasma220 
developed the concept of ‘beneficence-in-trust’ to describe the role of the 
doctor acting in the best interest of the individual while keeping in trust their 
moral values.  
 
National policies and professional guidance have increasingly recognised the 
patient’s right to self-determination, but the espoused principles of patient 
engagement have not been fully implemented in clinical practice. The law 
should give patients adequate protection in this regard, and provide adequate 
remedy when their right to make decisions is trampled on. Whether the existing 
provisions in English law can be regarded as affording adequate protection is a 
matter that will be returned to in later chapters. 
 
It does not follow that a patient can demand any particular treatment or that 
the doctor is obliged to accede to this demand. While protecting the patient’s 
self-determination is a cardinal goal, the overall interests and values of society 
(and often the patient) inform the pursuit of this goal.  
 
The consent model has been said to be the standard mechanism for protecting 
the patient’s self-determination, but a property model could be an alternative 
or complementary model, and this thesis sets out to compare both models 
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against the background of an ecological paradigm.  In keeping with this 
paradigm, the interpretive model of doctor-patient relationship is favoured. The 
informational model is rejected for being too consumerist and out of tune with 
medical professionalism. The deliberative and shared decision-making or joint 
investigation models, while consistent with medical tradition and 
professionalism, fight shy of explicitly underscoring the patient’s right of self-
determination. This thesis assesses whether the consent or the property 
approach is more consistent with an interpretive model of the doctor-patient 
relationship. 
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Chapter 3 
 
BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CONSENT 
 
‘Judges and legal scholars have long asserted the importance of patient 
autonomy in medical decision making. Yet autonomy has never been recognized 
as a legally protectable interest’1 
 
In Chapter, 2 an account was given of how developments in ethics and society at 
large progressively led to the erosion of paternalism and the ascendance (if not 
quite triumph) of the principle of self-determination. The mechanism by which 
this principle is protected in law is the law of consent, and legal developments 
have, in parallel with ethical and social developments, shaped our understanding 
of consent.  In this chapter the basic principles of consent law are reviewed and 
an attempt is made to show how case law has responded to rapidly evolving 
ethical and social perspectives.  The chapter sets the backdrop for the analysis 
that follows in later chapters. 
 
Should the focus be on patient or doctor? 
 
One of the earliest legal references to consent appears to be the 1767 case of 
Slater v. Baker and Stapleton2 where the courts imposed liability on a surgeon 
who failed to obtain consent. However it was not until the 20th century, starting 
with the US case of Schloendorff v Society of New York Hospital,3 that legal 
cases on consent began to flourish. As more and more cases reached the courts, 
the law became more and more complex. Whereas the law at the time of Slater 
did not go beyond a requirement that the surgeon should not treat a patient 
without the patient’s authorisation, the law today requires the physician not 
just to obtain the patient’s assent but to provide sufficient information, seek to 
ensure that the patient understands, recognise quite specifically what the 
patient agrees to or does not agree to, respect any refusals, and avoid a string of 
factors such as duress and deception which could vitiate consent. 4   These 
requirements form the basis of the distinction that Faden and Beauchamp5 make 
between the legal and moral foundations of consent: 
 
The law’s approach springs from a pragmatic theory. Although the patient 
is granted a right to consent or refuse, the focus is on the physician, who 
holds a duty and who risks liability by failure to fulfil the duty. Moral 
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philosophy’s approach springs from a principle of respect for autonomy 
that focuses on the patient or subject, who has a right to make an 
autonomous choice.6 
 
In other words, the law’s approach to consent focuses heavily on the duties of 
the doctor, while ethics and moral philosophy focus more on the patient’s 
autonomous choice. The point has been made above that it is not pragmatic for 
the law to concern itself with whether a particular choice is autonomous; 
nevertheless, it will be argued in this thesis (Chapter 9, page 259) that, if the 
patient’s right to self-determination is to be protected, the law should have this 
right as its starting point. 
 
 
The legal development of consent: battery and negligence 
 
In English law, a doctor undertaking treatment without consent may be liable for 
assault or battery or face an action in negligence.7 Battery and negligence are 
both torts

; assault could be a crime. Battery is an intentional, unauthorised 
touching of another person, irrespective of whether any injury results and 
irrespective of whether or not the defendant acted in good faith.8 Assault is an 
intentional act which induces in the victim an apprehension of imminent harm or 
offensive contact, but the term ‘assault’ ‘is now, in both ordinary legal usage 
and in statutes, regularly used to cover both assault and battery’.9 In Scots law 
no distinction is made between assault and battery but this brief review of 
battery and negligence takes an English law perspective, as the key consent 
cases (Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley 
Hospital 
10 and Chester v Afshar11) informing the comparative analysis of the 
consent and property models (Chapter 9) are from the English jurisdiction. 
Although the English law perspective is taken, cases from other jurisdictions are 
cited where they help illustrate the various applications of the consent model. 
  
Assault is a common law crime if there was evil intent on the part of the 
perpetrator or recklessness in causing the victim to apprehend imminent 
violence.12 In relation to consent, doctors usually do not have the necessary evil 
intent, so there may be no criminal action, but they may face a civil action. For 
                                                 
 See glossary for definition of tort 
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a civil law action there is no requirement to prove that the assault caused any 
damage, and the plaintiff only has to show that there was non-consensual 
touching.13   
 
The doctor commits a trespass against the person (i.e. a battery or assault) if 
s/he treats that person without prior valid consent, whether or not his/her 
motive was hostile. This includes the situation where a doctor obtains consent 
from the patient to perform one type of treatment and subsequently performs a 
substantially different treatment for which consent was not obtained. This was 
what happened in the iconic US case of Mary Schloendorff14 who was admitted 
into hospital in January 1908 for an examination under anaesthetic to assess the 
cause of her abdominal pain. While she was under anaesthetic, the surgeon 
removed a fibroid that had been found during the examination. There were post-
operative complications and the patient sued the hospital. The case was decided 
in favour of the defendant at first instance and intermediate levels, and an 
appeal was heard at the state’s highest court, the Court of Appeal. This was 
where the judge made the following statement on consent, part of which is 
often-quoted: 
 
In the case at hand, the wrong complained of is not merely negligence. It 
is trespass. Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right 
to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who 
performs an operation without his patient’s consent commits an assault, 
for which he is liable in damages.15 (Emphasis mine) 
 
In another case16, a woman asked to be injected in her right arm but was 
injected in her left arm, and she won damages in battery. In another case that 
arose from a clerical error, the doctor was held liable in battery for operating on 
the patient’s back instead of a toe.17 An action in battery was successful when a 
woman who went in for a minor gynaecological operation suffered an injury to 
the womb and was sterilized.18  Examples from American jurisdictions where 
battery has been established as a consequence of consent being exceeded 
include: consent given for a hernia operation but the doctor also removed both 
ovaries;19 myelogram involving a spinal puncture performed where consent had 
been for the simpler electromyogram; 20  a doctor performed a mastectomy 
whereas the patient had only consented to exploratory surgery.21 
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In practice an action in battery is only brought when the doctor has deviated 
completely from the terms of consent, or where consent was obtained by 
misrepresentation.

 Most consent cases take the form of an action in negligence, 
where the claimant seeks to establish that the defendant has breached a legal 
duty of care and that this breach has resulted in injury. Such a duty of care is 
presumed to be owed by a doctor to his/her patients, and this duty includes 
providing information.22 
 
Differences between battery and negligence 
 
There are important differences between an action in negligence and an 
allegation of battery. Two differences relate to damage (harm). Negligence 
requires proof that the breach of duty (in this case, failure to inform) caused 
injury; in battery there is no need to prove that harm occurred. As Lord 
Scarman23 put it, ‘damage is the gist of the action in the tort of negligence.’24 
Where harm occurs in battery, the defendant is liable for all damage that results 
from his or her action, while in negligence, the defendant is liable only for 
reasonably foreseeable harm.25  
 
A further difference between battery and negligence in the context of consent is 
that a broad explanation of the treatment will usually be adequate defence to 
an allegation of battery, but more detailed discussion will usually be required in 
order to meet the duty of care in negligence.26 In Chatterton v Gerson27, the 
claimant suffered numbness after a procedure to treat the chronic pain that she 
had in a scar. After a repeat procedure, also performed by Dr Gerson, she lost 
sensation in her right leg. Mrs Chatterton claimed trespass to the person in that 
there was no valid consent, since the implications of the procedures were not 
explained to her. She also claimed in negligence that the doctor had breached 
his duty of care by not providing sufficient information. Bristow J declared that 
‘once the patient is informed in broad terms of the nature of the procedure 
which is intended, and gives her consent, that consent is real’28 and the cause of 
action for alleged failure to disclose risks is negligence, not trespass. 
                                                 
 The reasons for this are discussed below 
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Another difference is that by definition battery entails touching, so will not be 
applicable in consent cases (particularly refusal of treatment) where there has 
been no touching, whereas bodily invasion is not a pre-requisite for establishing 
negligence. Truman v Thomas29 exemplifies this difference. A woman who had 
repeatedly refused smear tests died of cervical cancer and her children sued the 
doctor for failing to warn her of the risks of not having this test. Such a case 
could not establish liability in battery as there was no touching, but could be 
brought in negligence as the duty of care mandates discussion of the risks and 
benefits of alternative treatments, including the alternative of no treatment.  
 
Thus, battery is inadequate for protection of patients’ choice in the vast and 
growing proportion of medical decision making and treatment – for example, 
whether or not to take cholesterol-lowering medication - that does not entail 
physical contact. 
 
Lastly, in cases founded on battery, the onus lies on the doctor to prove that the 
patient consented to the treatment, whereas in negligence it is for the claimant 
patient to prove that s/he did not give a true consent.30  
 
 
 
Battery       Negligence 
 
Body must be touched   Bodily invasion not a pre-requisite 
No need to prove harm   There must be harm 
Defendant liable for all damage  Liable only for reasonably foreseeable  
      harm resulting from action 
 
 
Battery in disclosure cases: the position of English courts  
 
English courts have been reluctant to apply battery law in cases involving 
alleged non-disclosure of information to patients. In Sidaway,31 Lord Scarman 
specifically denounced as ‘deplorable’ the application of battery in claims for 
non-disclosure.32 By doing so, he endorsed the view expressed by Bristow J in 
Chatterton v Gerson33 and Hirst J in Hills v Porter.34  May J35 also considered 
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such an action deplorable when he dismissed a claim in battery brought by 
persons who had been treated with Human Growth Hormone (The Crutzfeldt-
Jacob Disease Litigation).  
 
The main reason why the courts have taken this position is that battery is an 
intentional tort. Cases of non-disclosure, even if negligent, are generally not the 
result of an intention to harm. Courts also consider it unfair to attach a stigma 
to doctors who have acted in good faith. Where there is evidence that the 
healthcare professional did not act in good faith, however, the courts have not 
hesitated in finding him or her liable in battery. In Appleton and Others v 
Garrett 36  the claimants brought an action against an NHS dentist who, for 
fraudulent reasons, had grossly over-treated patients. Extensive treatment was 
carried out on teeth that were in pristine condition. He was found liable for 
battery. The court found that had the dentist properly explained the treatments 
and the need for them to the claimants they would not have consented to these 
treatments. All eight claimants were awarded aggravated damages for pain, 
suffering and loss of amenity.  
 
Battery in disclosure cases: the position in other jurisdictions  
 
In some American jurisdictions, when a patient was not given prior warning of a 
potential complication (the occurrence of which was not an integral part of the 
treatment procedure but merely a known risk) and this risk materialized, the 
courts had tended to decide such cases in battery rather than negligence. 
Examples include failure to warn a patient a spinal operation involved an 
inherent risk of permanent paralysis37 and failure to warn of danger of radiation 
burns.38 The epochal judgement in Natanson v Kline39 shifted the thrust from 
battery to negligence. Mrs Natanson suffered burns as a result of radiation 
therapy after mastectomy, and sued the radiologist, Dr Kline, for failing to warn 
of the nature and risks of the treatment. It was ruled that action relating to 
consent cases of this nature should be brought under negligence law rather than 
battery.  
An opportunity arose in Cobbs v Grant40 for the California Supreme Court to 
clarify its position. Mr Cobbs’ spleen was ruptured during an operation for a 
duodenal ulcer in the hands of Dr Grant, and he needed a second operation to 
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remove the spleen. Subsequently, he developed a gastric ulcer. Dr Grant had not 
warned him that the initial operation carried a 5 per cent chance of injury to the 
spleen and that the operation carried a chance of inducing other ulcers. 
Regarding the form of action to be brought in such cases, the court said: 
 
 The battery theory should be reserved for those circumstances when a 
doctor performs an operation to which the patient has not consented. 
When the patient gives permission to perform one type of treatment and 
the doctor performs another, the requisite element of deliberate intent 
to deviate from the consent given is present. However, when the patient 
consents to certain treatment and the doctor performs that treatment but 
an undisclosed inherent complication with a low probability occurs, no 
intentional deviation from the consent given appears; rather, the doctor 
in obtaining consent may have failed to meet his due care duty to disclose 
pertinent information. In that situation the action should be pleaded in 
negligence.41 
 
 
Resurgence of battery? 
 
This exposition of the shift from battery to negligence is relevant because in 
Chapter 9 I will evaluate whether property analysis could either facilitate or 
inhibit a reversal of this shift. Although it is not currently fashionable for the 
tort of battery to be employed in the context of consent, it has been speculated 
that developments in human rights law could encourage the use of this avenue.42  
Such speculation could be fuelled by academic commentators, like Kennedy43 
who argues that: 
 
…patients’ interests could well be better protected if the tort of battery 
were held to have a wider application. In particular, questions of what 
has come to be known as ‘informed consent’ could well be differently 
analysed and decided. A patient may have consented on the ‘nature and 
purpose’ test, but the information provided by the doctor may be so 
inadequate, in that it failed to respect the patient’s right to know, so as 
to be able to choose, that the consent should be regarded as entirely 
invalid. Such an extension to the tort of battery would restore the law’s 
protection of the symbolic harm represented by the complaint that the 
patient’s right to know was not respected. It would, in other words, 
reflect a response based upon rights.44 
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The goal of enabling patients to exercise their right of self-determination is 
handicapped by the narrow interpretation of consent in the tort of battery. Many 
years after Kennedy’s call for expansion of this tort, little has happened in this 
direction. Perhaps the key to unlocking this door is property analysis – we return 
to this in Chapter 9 (page 259) where an argument is made for patient self-
determination to be protected as a fundamental right, independent of any injury 
that may or may not result from infraction of this right. Meanwhile attention is 
focussed on negligence, and in the rest of this chapter I discuss the requirements 
for valid consent, then the concept of informed consent. 
 
Valid consent 
 
For consent to be valid the following must apply: 45 
a) The patient must have the capacity or competence to make the decision; 
b) There must be no undue influence; 
c) The patient must have been given [or offered] sufficient information about 
the proposed treatment. 
 
In theory each of these requirements is simple and clear enough. In practice, 
their application is more complex and, as discussed below, the courts have not 
always provided clear-cut and consistent guidance.  
 
In addition to these requirements which are cited in all standard descriptions of 
consent law and practice, one would add that there should be no 
misrepresentation. In Sidaway,46 Sir John Donaldson MR said that ‘if the consent 
is obtained by fraud or by misrepresentation of the nature of what is to be done 
…it can be said that an apparent consent is not a true consent’.47 In Salgo,48 Bray 
J. warned that ‘the physician may not minimise the known dangers of the 
procedure or operation in order to induce his patient’s request.’ 49  In R v 
Tabassum50 it was held that consent to breast examination was vitiated by fraud, 
as the defendant had misled the women into believing that he was doctor. In 
Appleton and Ors v Garrrett51 a dentist concealed information for financial gain 
and Dyson J. held that there was no valid consent (see above). 
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The Bristol Inquiry recommended that where the procedure is experimental or 
innovative or the clinician inexperienced, the patient should be informed as part 
of the consent process. 52  It is arguable that failure to comply with this 
recommendation could count as concealment of information for the personal 
gain of the doctor or hospital. 
 
Competence 
 
As has been pointed out, competence ‘is not an all or nothing notion, as the 
legal definition suggests’53. In clear-cut cases, where a patient is in a coma or 
severely mentally handicapped s/he is clearly incompetent. At the other 
extreme is the highly knowledgeable and articulate patient with well-defined 
values and goals, who is able convincingly to communicate his/her wishes to the 
clinician. Most patients fall between the two extremes and determining 
competence to consent to a particular procedure is not always easy. The 
situation is compounded by the fact that a patient may be competent to give 
consent for one intervention but not for another. Strictly speaking a competent 
person must have a coherent set of beliefs that shapes his or her values or 
attitudes in a consistent way.54 In the absence of this coherent set of values, it is 
arguable that an authentic decision regarding medical treatment cannot be 
made. The assessment of competence is an onerous task for the clinician who 
must determine whether the patient is capable of retaining the information, 
weighing the options on balance against his or her values, beliefs and attitudes, 
and arriving at a decision.55 It has been observed that clinicians often do not 
proceed beyond a casual evaluation of patient competence due to time 
constraints, lack of communication and sometimes lack of education. On the 
other hand it is fair to say that a detailed assessment of competence is not 
necessary in all cases. An adult is presumed to be competent and a full 
assessment of competence is required only in those cases where the clinician has 
reason to rebut this presumption. 56 
 
Undue influence 
 
For consent to be valid it must be given without undue influence.57 The Law 
Commission 58  has said that purported consent could be invalidated by 
Edozien LC, 2013, Chapter 3 
83 
 
‘compulsion (that is physical force), coercive threats or offers (‘duress’) and 
defective beliefs induced by fraud or mistake’.59 Coercion does not appear to be 
a major issue in clinical practice, but more subtle forms of undue influence are 
encountered. Tales of women who have been manipulated into having 
unnecessary hysterectomy dramatically reflect ‘misinformed’ consent 60 and it 
may well be that these extreme cases are the tip of an iceberg, with the less 
extreme or dramatic cases remaining hidden beneath the surface. The 
manipulation does not have to be ill-motivated for it to vitiate consent.  
A distinction is made between narrow and broad meanings of voluntary action, 
between truly volitional and constrained volitional actions. 61  In the narrow 
definition of voluntary action, the subject simply exercises a choice between 
alternatives; in the broader meaning, the subject’s action is involuntary when 
his/her will is not taken away but his/her choice is unduly influenced. Take the 
case of a person who is held at gun point and opts to hand over his money rather 
than be shot. This is a choice he has made himself, but he is acting at the behest 
of the gun holder and does not have an independent reason for that action. He 
acted voluntarily in the narrow sense of the word but involuntarily in the 
broader sense – a constrained volitional action. In relation to patients’ decision-
making in clinical practice, constrained volitional action is the more common 
type of involuntary action.  
Healthcare providers do not literally hold their patients at gun point, but in 
some situations (such as when submitting to an interventional procedure) a 
patient may not have an independent reason for taking a particular action and 
only does so in deference to the awesome figure of the medical establishment. 
The patient’s apparent agreement to the procedure in such situations has been 
said to be assent rather than consent but while this description makes a good 
point, it does not go far enough in capturing the patient’s captive situation. This 
type of agreement, which is common in medical practice, should be described as 
a constrained volitional agreement to treatment. 
Professional guidance62 on consent cautions against undue influence. In its latest 
guidance, the General Medical Council63 advises doctors: 
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You must give information about risk in a balanced way. You should avoid 
bias, and you should explain the expected benefits as well as the 
potential burdens and risks of any proposed investigation or treatment.64 
 
You must respect a patient’s decision to refuse an investigation or 
treatment, even if you think their decision is wrong or irrational. You 
should explain your concerns clearly to the patient and outline the 
possible consequences of their decision. You must not, however, put 
pressure on a patient to accept your advice.65 
 
 
It is not always easy to determine where persuasion ends and undue influence 
begins. In Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment)66 Lord Justice Butler-Sloss 
said that ‘[t]he degree of pressure to turn persuasion or appeals to affection into 
undue influence may be very little’67 but in the same case Lord Donaldson said 
that it did not matter how strong the persuasion was, so long as it did not 
overbear the independence of the patient’s decision.68 The case involved a 34-
year-old pregnant woman who, following a road traffic accident, developed a 
lung abscess and needed surgery but declined blood transfusion. Her mother was 
a Jehovah’s Witness but she herself was not one. Reversing the decision of the 
lower court, the Court of Appeal held that her refusal of blood transfusion was 
not binding on medical staff because her mother had unduly influenced her. 
Since the court agreed it was wholly acceptable that a patient should be 
persuaded by a third party so long as the final decision was the patient’s, health 
professionals should not be discouraged from using persuasion where necessary.  
The informational model of doctor-patient relationship would not condone 
persuasion, but in Chapter 2 this model was discountenanced as being too 
consumerist and out of tune with medical professionalism. Persuasion is 
consistent with the interpretive model of the doctor-patient relationship and 
with medical beneficence; it also fits with the ecological metaphor underlying 
this thesis. The interpretive model obliges a doctor, for example, to try to 
persuade a patient to accept blood transfusion but such persuasion must not be 
allowed to degenerate into coercion. Faden and Beauchamp69 regard the use of 
persuasion as ‘an acceptable form of influence in informed consent contexts’.70 
The courts too acknowledge that the doctor has a role beyond mere provision of 
options: 
 
 …the patient, being unlearned in medical sciences, has an abject 
dependence upon and trust in his physician for the information upon 
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which he relies during the decisional process, thus raising an obligation in 
the physician that transcends arms-length transactions.’ 71  (Emphasis 
mine)  
 
 
Undue influence could of course come from the patient’s family,72 but that is 
outside the scope of this thesis. 
 
‘Informed consent’ – the term 
 
The term ‘informed consent’ is frequently used in clinical practice and in the 
literature, and two recently published books73 use the term in their title, despite 
the authors of one of the books recognising the term as a pleonasm. 74 It is 
important to distinguish between ‘informed consent’ as a doctrine and ‘informed 
consent’ used imprecisely to mean a valid consent, one where the broad nature 
of the treatment proposed has been explained to the patient. This latter use of 
the term has been described as unhelpful since the requirement that consent be 
informed is only one of the ingredients of valid consent.75 It is arguable that the 
phrase is tautologous, as consent must always be informed if it is to be legally 
and ethically acceptable.   In everyday life, people give meaningful consent (or 
assent) to various activities (for example, agreeing to participate in a social 
activity) without having full information but in legal usage, consent has to be 
informed in order to be valid. 
 
Jackson76 finds the term problematic because it is ambiguous, does not tell how 
much information should be provided, may make doctors over-burden patients 
with too much information, and emphasises information provision at the expense 
of understanding. She expands on the ambiguity of the term as follows: 
 
[T]he expression ‘informed consent’ may be both ambiguous and 
misleading. It is, for example, commonly used as a convenient shorthand 
for two separate legal duties: the duty to obtain the patient’s consent 
before treatment, and the duty to ensure that the patient has been 
adequately informed about the risks and benefits of their therapeutic 
options. Nor is it clear whether the word ‘informed’ refers to the doctor’s 
behaviour or the patient’s state of mind. Is consent ‘informed’ if 
information has simply been provided before consent is given, regardless 
of whether the patient has in fact read, listened to, or understood 
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anything? Or must the consent itself have been ‘informed’ by the 
patient’s prior consideration of all relevant material factors?77 
 
 
Commentators78 from outside the UK have similarly criticized this term, and in 
this thesis it is used only when directly quoting other texts. The point (made 
rhetorically in the passage quoted above) about the importance of taking steps 
to check that the patient understands the information provided is revisited later 
in this thesis (Chapter 9, pages 255-256).  
 
Informed consent – the doctrine 
 
As a legal term, ‘informed consent’ refers to the doctrine, developed in the 
United States, which underlies the amount of information that a patient should 
be given in addition to the ‘broad nature’ of the treatment. Even when used in 
this sense, the term could be problematic and some commentators have avoided 
it, preferring terms such as ‘real’ or ‘meaningful’ consent,79 but other critics 
suggest that these alternatives are equally unhelpful to the extent that they 
‘would render proof of causation still more difficult for claimants, and would 
enable doctors to justify non-disclosure on the basis of vague fears that the 
claimant was then incapable of making a sensible or rational decision’.80 This 
criticism, however, errs in assuming that ‘real’ or ‘meaningful’ implies ‘sensible’ 
or ‘rational’ consent. 
 
The phrase ‘informed consent’ originated in 1957 from amicus curiae submitted 
by the American College of Surgeons to the California Court of Appeals in Salgo v 
Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees.81  Martin Salgo sued his doctors 
for negligently failing to warn him of the risk of paralysis resulting from 
translumbar aortography.

 The court sowed the seed

 of the doctrine of 
‘informed consent’ when it held that the doctor owed a duty to the patient to 
disclose ‘any facts which are necessary to form the basis of an intelligent 
consent by the patient to the proposed treatment’.82  
 
                                                 
 See glossary 

 It was no more than a seed because whilst the court required full disclosure, it also said this 
should be consistent with the physician’s discretion. 
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The seed of ‘informed consent’ germinated as a doctrine in Canterbury v 
Spence,83 where it was held that it was for the court to determine the extent of, 
and any breach of, the doctor’s duty to inform. The claimant was a 19-year-old 
man with severe pain between his shoulder blades who was referred to a 
neurosurgeon. The doctor told him that he would have to undergo an operation 
(laminectomy

) to correct a suspected ruptured disc. The patient did not object 
to the operation or ask any questions, but in answer to his mother’s question the 
doctor said the operation was not any more serious than any other operation. 
The day after the operation, the claimant fell from his hospital bed; he was 
paralysed in the lower half of his body and became permanently disabled. The 
claimant sued the doctor and hospital on the ground that the doctor was 
negligent in failing to disclose a risk of serious disability inherent in the 
procedure. In a landmark decision, Robinson J upheld the claim that the 1% risk 
of paralysis should have been disclosed. Significantly, the court decided that the 
standard for determining whether adequate information had been given was not 
that of professional opinion but of the reasonable patient.  
 
In Sidaway84, Lord Scarman summarized the doctrine as follows: 
 
 …where there is a ‘real’ or ‘material’ risk inherent in the proposed 
 operation (however competently and skillfully performed) the question 
 whether and to what extent a patient should be warned before he gives 
 his consent is to be answered not by reference to medical practice but by 
 accepting as a matter of law that, subject to all proper exceptions (of 
 which the court, not the profession, is the judge), a patient has a right to 
 be informed of the risks inherent in the treatment which is proposed. The 
 profession, it is said, should not be judge in its own cause; or, less 
 emotively but more correctly, the courts should not allow medical opinion 
 as to what is best for the patient to override the patient’s right to decide 
 for himself whether he will submit to the treatment offered him…85 
 
 
In a nutshell, the doctrine mandates full disclosure of material risks to the 
patient, and the standard of disclosure is to be determined not by the medical 
profession but by the court, taking account of the patient’s expectations. The 
full disclosure is not however, referenced to the particular patient; it is full only 
in so far as it includes all that a hypothetical ‘reasonable patient’ would want to 
                                                 
 See glossary 
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be told. The doctrine is American in origin and application, and Robertson86 
suggests that expanding the liability of doctors was at the root of its 
development.  As the key point of divergence or controversy between 
jurisdictions that embrace the doctrine and those that do not is the standard for 
assessing the quality and quantity of disclosure, this issue is addressed in more 
depth in the paragraphs below. 
 
Standards of disclosure: what constitutes sufficient information? 
 
For consent to be valid, the patient must be given sufficient information, but 
what constitutes sufficient information? Over the years two standards have been 
employed: a) the professional standard or responsible doctor standard and b) the 
reasonable person or prudent patient standard. The professional standard takes 
us back to the paternalistic model where the physician decides what should or 
should not be disclosed, with more emphasis on beneficence and much less on 
autonomy. 87  This standard does not sit well with the principle of self-
determination that the consent model purports to protect.  
 
The prudent patient standard obligates the clinician to disclose information that 
any reasonable person would require to make a rational decision. Some courts 
have applied it not just in relation to the nature of treatment, but in 
determining the extent to which the risks of treatment should be disclosed to 
the patient by the clinician.88  
 
In his landmark decision in the US case of Canterbury v Spence,89 Robinson J. 
broke ground that the courts had been disinclined to explore previously. First, 
he departed from the ‘professional standard’, which was hitherto the test for 
disclosure. Second, he provided new guidelines regarding materiality of risk and 
the contentious issues of therapeutic privilege and causation. Before Canterbury 
v Spence, the test for negligence in relation to information disclosure was the 
‘professional standard’, also known as the ‘reasonable’ or ‘prudent’ doctor 
standard. Under this standard, the validity of an apparent consent depended on 
whether a responsible body of physicians (even if this was a minority one) 
regarded disclosure, or non-disclosure, of the particular information as 
professionally acceptable. One of the implications of this test was that it 
Edozien LC, 2013, Chapter 3 
89 
 
allowed policy considerations to override self-determination. Also, in adopting 
this test the courts failed to distinguish between the strictly medical aspects of 
clinical practice (such as making a diagnosis) and the non-medical (such as 
communicating with the patient). McLean, among others, has emphasized the 
importance of making this distinction between the ‘technical’ and ‘moral’ 
aspects of medical behaviour.90  On this issue, Robinson J said:91 
 
Prevailing medical practice, we have maintained, has evidentiary value in 
determinations as to what the specific criteria measuring challenged 
professional conduct are and whether they have been met, but does not 
itself define the standard. That has been our position in treatment cases, 
where the physician's performance is ordinarily to be adjudicated by the 
special medical standard of due care. We see no logic in a different rule 
for nondisclosure cases, where the governing standard is much more 
largely divorced from professional considerations. And surely in 
nondisclosure cases the factfinder is not invariably functioning in an area 
of such technical complexity that it must be bound to medical custom as 
an inexorable application of the community standard of reasonable care.92 
 
Robinson J93 explained why the professional standard did not apply: 
 
There are, in our view, formidable obstacles to acceptance of the notion 
that the physician's obligation to disclose is either germinated or limited 
by medical practice. To begin with, the reality of any discernible custom 
reflecting a professional concensus (sic) on communication of option and 
risk information to patients is open to serious doubt. We sense the danger 
that what in fact is no custom at all may be taken as an affirmative 
custom to maintain silence, and that physician-witnesses to the so-called 
custom may state merely their personal opinions as to what they or others 
would do under given conditions. We cannot gloss over the inconsistency 
between reliance on a general practice respecting divulgence and, on the 
other hand, realization that the myriad of variables among patients makes 
each case so different that its omission can rationally be justified only by 
the effect of its individual circumstances. Nor can we ignore the fact that 
to bind the disclosure obligation to medical usage is to arrogate the 
decision on revelation to the physician alone. Respect for the patient's 
right of self-determination on particular therapy demands a standard set 
by law for physicians rather than one which physicians may or may not 
impose upon themselves.94 
 
 
This judgment need not spawn triumphalism amongst proponents of autonomy, 
however. As has been pointed out,95 the judgment was based not just on the 
right to self-determination but also on the absence of logical justification for 
following the professional standard at all times (for example, experts may state 
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merely their personal views; and the myriad of variables makes each patient so 
different). Also, the court in Canterbury has been criticized for being equivocal 
about the protection of patients’ choice through formulation of an appropriate 
standard.96 While primacy of self-determination calls for a subjective test of 
causation, the court opted for an objective prudent patient test. This may be 
less than ideal, but it is pragmatic. Reliance on a subjective test would have 
placed too much weight on the patient’s unverifiable word, thereby encouraging 
unnecessary litigation and leaving doctors vulnerable. This balance between the 
ideal and the pragmatic also underlies the court’s views on materiality. The test 
for determining whether a particular peril must be divulged is its materiality to 
the patient’s decision. A risk is material ‘when a reasonable person, in what the 
physician knows or should know to be the patient’s position, would be likely to 
attach significance to the risk or cluster of risks in deciding whether or not to 
forego the proposed therapy’.97. The main factors are the incidence of injury 
and the degree of harm threatened. Even a very small chance of death or serious 
disablement, therefore, may well be significant. 
 
In less than a decade, 10 jurisdictions in the United States had adopted the 
principles behind Canterbury; 98  but a backlash soon followed — a medical 
malpractice insurance crisis forced many states to beat a retreat from the 
doctrine of informed consent, via legislation that either affirmed the 
professional standard or set statutory limits. 99  The primary purpose of these 
statutes was to limit the financial consequences of litigation.  
 
In Canada, the Supreme Court clarified the law in the case of Reibl v Hughes.100 
The claimant suffered from headaches and hypertension and was referred to a 
neurosurgeon who advised an operation. The surgeon did not tell the patient 
that the operation involved a 4% risk of death and a further 10% risk of having a 
stroke. The operation was performed competently, but the patient suffered a 
massive stroke which left him paralysed. He sued for battery and negligence. 
The court rejected the professional standard and affirmed the duty of the doctor 
to disclose any material risks and any special or unusual risks. On the issue of 
causation, the court opted for the objective test but modified it by investing the 
prudent patient with the attributes of the claimant (who was at no immediate 
risk without the operation and was within one and a half years of earning 
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pension benefits). A prudent person in this position would probably have opted 
not to undergo surgery, given a 10% risk of a stroke. 
 
Robertson101 pointed out that in 25 of the 46 cases (56%) decided in the ten 
years following Reibl, the claimants failed to show that the breach of duty to 
inform caused the loss. This is largely attributable to the adoption of the 
objective test, albeit subjectivized in varying degrees in the post-Reibl cases. 
Robertson’s review also showed that, contrary to expectations, Reibl did not 
open the floodgates to successful negligence claims. 
 
The abandonment of the professional standard was underscored in White v 
Turner,102 a case concerning breast reduction surgery: 
 
No longer does the medical profession alone collectively determine, by its 
own practices, the amount of information a patient should have in order 
to decide whether to undergo an operation.103 
 
 
The duty of the doctor to disclose all material or unusual risks, and that of the 
courts to determine this materiality, was reiterated by the New Brunswick Court 
of Appeal in Kitchen v Mullen.104 The claimant was given a blood product after a 
tooth extraction. This carries a small risk of transmission of hepatitis of which he 
had not been warned but which materialized. All three judges held that the risk 
should have been disclosed, but the action failed on the element of causation. 
This element has been a seemingly insurmountable hurdle in Canadian cases 
where the doctrine of informed consent was applied à la Reibl. In Considine v 
Camp Hill Hospital, 105  Ferguson v Hamilton Civic Hospitals 106  and Casey v 
Provan, 107  material risks were not disclosed and the claimants respectively 
claimed for urinary incontinence, stroke and loss of voice but all failed because 
causation was not established.*   
 
A more patient-friendly application of the doctrine of informed consent is to be 
found in the celebrated Australian case of Rogers v Whittaker.108 The plaintiff 
who had been blind in the right eye from birth was advised by the defendant to 
undergo an operation on this eye to improve her sight. The 1 in 14,000 risk of 
                                                 
*
 In Chapter 9 it will be shown that one way of skipping or removing the causation hurdle is to adopt the 
property model. 
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sympathetic ophthalmia in the healthy left eye was not disclosed. This risk 
materialized and she lost the sight in that eye. The court not only adopted the 
prudent patient test from Canterbury but went as far as adopting a subjective 
approach to the test (that is, ‘what did this particular patient need to know?’ 
and not ‘what did a reasonable person in her position need to know?’). The 
surgeon’s appeal was dismissed. 
 
Does the prudent patient standard encumber clinicians? 
 
Disclosure of information does not depend on medical skill so it would appear 
sensible for the standard of disclosure to be determined not by medical 
professionals but by patients. If patients set the standard an additional burden is 
placed on the physician, who has to make extra effort to find out what a 
reasonable patient would want to know. However, there is reason to believe 
that in clinical practice the professional standard is beginning to approximate to 
the reasonable patient standard. Various professional bodies now provide 
guidance to doctors on standards of information disclosure, and practically all of 
these documents address the kind of information that the objective patient 
would want to be given.109 It remains to be established whether the apparent 
rise of the prudent patient standard has led to better communication between 
clinician and patient.  
 
Subjective or objective prudent patient? 
 
Application of the prudent patient standard does not necessarily resolve the 
controversy, for there is also tension between the objective patient standard 
and the subjective patient standard. If the principle of autonomy-respecting 
consent is to be followed strictly, then it is the subjective patient standard that 
should be applied.  
 
McLean 110  emphasises the failure of the objective standard to protect self-
determination: 
 
 …the aggrieved patient might nonetheless conclude that the standard 
 that emerges from them is still not ideally suited to the protection of 
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 his or her own autonomy. The individual patient will have interests 
 and needs which might bear little relationship to the ‘prudent 
 patient’, however  conceptualized. Autonomy is essentially a 
 personal concept, which is supposed to take account of the 
 individual’s own interests and concerns – not those of some  homogenised, 
 fictional character.111 
 
 
In the same vein, Giesen112 asserts that: 
 
  …to the degree that the decision of the average, “reasonable” patient 
 would differ from the perhaps idiosyncratic decision of a particular 
 patient, the law’s “objective” standard fails to support that particular 
 patient’s right of self-determination.113  
 
Applying the subjective test could potentially open the floodgates to litigation, 
since the benefit of hindsight could be exploited.Chester v Afshar 114  shows, 
however, that this may not necessarily be the case: the claimant could have said 
(with the benefit of hindsight) that had she been warned of the risk of cauda 
equina syndrome
 she would not have undergone the operation, but she did not 
say so. She truthfully admitted that she would still have had the operation (but 
on another day, after thinking about it and seeking the views of others). 
 
Also, adoption of the subjective standard does not mean that the patient’s 
claims will automatically be believed: the Australian case Ellis v Wallsend 
District Hospital 115  establishes that the courts will still test the patient’s 
evidence for credibility - but this case predates Chester and was not endorsed in 
that case.  
 
There is also the potential problem that the physician would have to have an 
extensive conversation with the patient for every intervention proposed, but this 
problem only materialises where there is a focus on quantity rather than quality 
of information. Meeting the informational needs of the particular patient does 
not necessarily require more extensive conversations. On the contrary, such 
conversations could result in cognitive overload, which may compromise patient 
self-determination. 
 
                                                 
 See glossary 
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The issue is revisited in Chapter 9. For now, attention is turned to how English 
courts have addressed the doctrine of consent. 
 
 
English law and the doctrine of consent 
 
The doctrine of informed consent does not technically apply in English or Scots 
law.  In the discussion below, I concentrate on English case law because it is the 
English cases that form the basis of my comparison of the consent and property 
models. 
 
English law does not require full disclosure of all possible risks. The position in 
English law was stated by Bristow J in Chatterton v Gerson116 as follows: 
 
 …once the patient is informed in broad terms of the nature of the 
 procedure which is intended, and gives her consent, that consent is 
 real….117 
 
 
Also, English courts have historically stuck to the professional standard for 
disclosure, and thereby allowed medical opinion as to what is best for the 
patient to override the patient’s right to self-determination. The standard for 
assessing the care given by a doctor was articulated by McNair in his direction to 
the jury in the case of Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee.118 Mr 
Bolam was advised by the doctor to have electroconvulsive therapy (ECT), but 
was not warned of the small risk of suffering a fracture as a complication of this 
treatment. Unfortunately this risk materialized. He sued for negligence but lost.  
McNair J said that: 
 
 A doctor is not guilty of negligence if he has acted in accordance with a 
 practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical men skilled 
 in that particular art….119 
 
 
This was subsequently endorsed by the House of Lords120 and came to be known 
as the Bolam test. The application of the test to diagnosis and treatment was 
unquestionable, but it was uncertain whether it also applied to the disclosure of 
information.  
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Hatcher v Black121 was the first English case on non-disclosure of risk prior to 
surgical treatment. The claimant, having been assured pre-operatively that 
there was no risk to her voice, suffered vocal cord paralysis following surgery to 
correct a toxic goitre. The defendant was vindicated on the strength of the 
professional standard as well as causation. In directing the jury, Lord Denning 
said: 
 
… none of the doctors called as witnesses have suggested that the surgeon 
was wrong… If they do not condemn him, why should you?122 
 
 
Although such Denningesque obiter dicta would not usually be the basis for legal 
precedent, it gives an indication of the respect with which the medical 
profession was regarded at the time.  
 
A series of subsequent cases at first instance addressed the issue of information 
disclosure but laid down no firm principles.123 Before the issue reached appellate 
level, there were two opportunities (Chatterton v Gerson124 and Hills v Potter125) 
to address it at first instance courts.126 In both of these cases, the claimants 
sued in trespass and in negligence for non-disclosure of risks inherent in their 
respective surgical operations, and in each case it was held that the defendant 
had followed accepted medical practice. In one case 127  the patient, Miss 
Chatterton, suffered numbness after an operation that was meant to relieve her 
of pain in a post-operative scar. She sued in both battery and negligence, 
alleging that the doctor did not warn her of the risk of numbness and muscle 
weakness. Bristow J declined to apply the doctrine of informed consent and the 
claim failed. Similarly, Hirst J in Hills v Porter128 declined counsel’s argument 
for the doctrine of informed consent to be applied, saying: ‘I hold that the 
proper standard is the medical standard, in accordance with Bolam’s case’.129 
 
The definitive position was elaborated by the House of Lords in Sidaway v Board 
of Governors of Bethlem Royal and the Maudsley Hospital.130 In 1973, Mrs Amy 
Doris Sidaway underwent an operation to relieve the pressure on a nerve root 
that had been identified as the cause of the persistent pain in her right arm and 
shoulder. The risks of the operation included a 2% risk of nerve root damage and 
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a less than 1% risk of damage to the spinal cord. Unfortunately, the latter risk 
eventuated and she suffered paralysis. She sued on the ground that she had not 
been informed of the risk of spinal cord injury and claimed that, had she been 
informed of this risk, she would not have undergone the operation. 
At first instance, the trial judge dismissed the case. The Court of Appeal (Sir 
John Donaldson, Master of the Rolls, Justice Dunn and Justice Browne-Wilkinson) 
unanimously dismissed Mrs Sidaway’s appeal.131 Regrettably, their decision not 
to adopt the doctrine of informed consent was not based on a forensic analysis 
of the doctrine but on time-honoured deference to the medical profession and 
on assumptions that would be regarded with incredulity in today’s world. For 
example, Sir John said that ‘[i]t is a rare patient who wants to know what may 
go wrong in terms of what part of his body may actually be damaged’132, and 
Justice Dunn said that most patients ‘would prefer to put themselves 
unreservedly in the hands of doctors’.133 No one can seriously argue that such 
statements are sustainable in today’s world. In an article strongly criticizing the 
Court of Appeal decision, Annas134 said that it seemed ‘unreasonable…to permit 
the doctor's interest in doing what he or she thinks best to outweigh the patient's 
interest in making critical decisions about his or her own body’135. 
 
The case went to the House of Lords but again the claim failed. The decision of 
the House of Lords was predictable, 136  given its decisions in two cases 137 
(Whitehouse v Jordan138 and Maynard v West Midlands RHA139) where the court 
upheld the principle that a doctor is not liable if he had acted in accordance 
with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of fellow professionals. 
As there was a responsible body of medical opinion which would not have 
warned the claimant of the risk of spinal cord injury, Mrs Sidaway’s appeal was 
dismissed. The Law Lords, by a majority of four to one, endorsed the rejection 
in Chatterton140  and Hills141  of the applicability of the doctrine of informed 
consent in English law. In addressing this issue, Lord Bridge said:142 
 
The important question which this appeal raises is whether the law 
imposes any, and if so what, different criterion as the measure of the 
medical man’s duty of care to his patient when giving advice with respect 
to a proposed course of treatment. It is clearly right to recognise that a 
conscious adult patient of sound mind is entitled to decide for himself 
whether or not he will submit to a particular course of treatment 
proposed by the doctor, most significantly surgical treatment under 
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general anaesthesia. This entitlement is the foundation of the doctrine of 
‘informed consent’ which has led in certain American jurisdictions to 
decisions, and in the Supreme Court of Canada, to dicta, on which the 
appellant relies, which would oust the Bolam test and substitute an 
‘objective’ test of a doctor’s duty to advise the patient of the advantages 
and disadvantages of undergoing the treatment proposed and more 
particularly to advise the patient of the risks involved.143  
 
 
He went on to dismiss the doctrine: 
 
I recognise the logical force of the Canterbury doctrine, proceeding from 
the premise that the patient’s right to make his own decision must at all 
costs be safeguarded against the kind of medical paternalism which 
assumes that ‘doctor knows best’. But, with all respect, I regard the 
doctrine as quite impractical in application.144 
 
 
Lord Diplock also rejected the doctrine of informed consent:145 
 
The juristic basis of the proposed situation which originates in certain 
state court jurisdictions in the United States of America and has found 
some favour in modified form by the Supreme Court of Canada appears to 
me, with great respect, to be contrary to English law. Its foundation is the 
doctrine of ‘informed consent’ which was originally based on the 
assumption in Canterbury v Spence.146  
 
 
Lord Scarman was the only judge who favoured adoption of the doctrine:147 
 
My Lords, I think the Canterbury propositions reflect a legal truth which 
too much judicial reliance on medical judgement tends to obscure. In a 
medical negligence case where the issue is as to the advice and 
information given to the patient as to the treatment proposed, the 
available options, and the risk, the court is concerned primarily with a 
patient’s right. If one considers the scope of the doctor’s duty by 
beginning with the right of the patient to make his own decision whether 
he will or will not undergo the treatment proposed, the right to be 
informed of significant risk and the doctor’s corresponding duty are easy 
to understand; for the proper implementation of the right requires that 
the doctor be under a duty to inform his patient of the material risks 
inherent in the treatment. And it is plainly right that a doctor may avoid 
liability for failure to warn of a material risk if he can show that he 
reasonably believed that communication to the patient of the existence 
of the risk would be detrimental to the health… of his patient.148 
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In summary, the court decided that in cases of alleged inadequate disclosure of 
risks, the Bolam test applied. Why was there a reluctance to embrace the 
doctrine of informed consent? An explanation might be found in Lord Bridge’s 
speech. He gives three reasons: the doctrine does not take full cognisance of the 
variety of factors that influence a doctor’s clinical judgment; it is unrealistic to 
separate the primary medical problem from the issue of disclosure; and the 
objective test leaves it to the judge to decide what a reasonable person would 
do (which encourages uncertainty in litigation). This reasoning has been 
criticized as being ‘deeply flawed and uninformed in many respects’.149 The first 
of Lord Bridge’s reasons exalts paternalism and underestimates the propensity of 
the medical profession to close ranks. The second reason fosters the custom of 
deference to doctors (see below) and the third reason ignores the fact that far 
from being imprecise, Canterbury affords a meticulous analysis of the relevant 
principles. In defence of Lord Bridge, it must be accepted that adoption of the 
professional standard does not mean total surrender to the medical profession. 
As the learned judge asserted, the court might in certain circumstances come to 
the conclusion that disclosure of a particular risk was so obviously necessary to 
an informed choice on the part of the patient that no reasonably prudent 
medical man would fail to make it – and this was confirmed in Bolitho v City and 
Hackney Health Authority 150(discussed below). 
 
In retrospect, it appears that a major (perhaps the primary) reason for the 
failure of the English courts to embrace the doctrine of informed consent was 
their deference to the medical profession. The Right Honorable The Lord Woolf 
acknowledged this ‘over-deference’151 and said that Sidaway will now have to be 
read in a different light:  
 
 A doctor’s decision not to disclose risks will now have to be subjected to 
 logical analysis, and if he has withheld without a good reason information 
 that should have been disclosed then he will be liable even though his 
 decision may have been consonant with ordinary professional practice.152 
 
 
It should be noted that although the doctrine of informed consent does not 
formally apply in English law judges still use the term loosely, even at the level 
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of the House of Lords (Supreme Court): in Chester v Afshar,153 Lord Steyn used 
the term in the sense of valid consent.154 
 
England, Scotland, Ireland and some US states appear to be the only jurisdictions 
that still adhere to the professional standard of disclosure. This is not entirely 
surprising. Historically, American judicial and socio-cultural tradition has placed 
issues of individual rights on a high pedestal. At the other end of the spectrum, 
there has been a tendency, in the British tradition, for individual rights to be 
subjugated to societal imperatives, and ‘British courts routinely pay less verbal 
attention to the language of human rights’. 155  English disclosure case law 
generally manifests a reluctance to depart from the professional standard, but 
there is limited case law156 indicating a shift towards the reasonable patient 
standard.  
 
Following Sidaway, the professional standard was reiterated even more brazenly 
in Blyth v Bloomsbury Health Authority.157 The claimant had asked questions 
about Depo-Provera® (Pharmacia & UpJohn), the contraceptive injection she 
had been given, but did not receive comprehensive information. The Court of 
Appeal, deferring to medical opinion, found in favour of the defendant. The 
same court again applied the professional standard in the case of Gold v 
Haringey Health Authority.158  Mrs Gold was not warned of the possibility of 
failed sterilisation, but her claim failed because at that time some 
gynaecologists did not warn patients of this risk. 
 
A Scottish judge unequivocally upheld the professional standard in Moyes v 
Lothian Health Board:159 
 
As I see it, the law in both Scotland and England has come down firmly 
against the view that the doctor’s duty to the patient involves at all costs 
obtaining the informed consent of the patient to specific medical 
treatments… I can read nothing in the majority view in Sidaway which 
suggests that the extent and quality of warning to be given by a doctor to 
his patient should not in the last resort be governed by medical criteria.160 
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Are UK courts shifting position? 
 
Arguably, the law and judicial interpretation should reflect societal values and 
norms.161 Indeed, Lord Woolf162 asserts that the courts move with the times, 
albeit slowly: 
 
 ...there had developed an increasing awareness of patients’ rights. The 
 public’s expectations of what the profession should achieve have grown. 
 Like it or not, we have moved from a society which was concerned 
 primarily with the duty individuals owed to society to one which is 
 concerned primarily with the rights of the individual. You may find this 
 difficult to accept, but judges do move with the times, even if more 
 slowly than some would like. The move to a right-based society has 
 fundamentally changed the behaviour of the courts.163   
 
  
Over the years, consumer advocacy has been on the ascendancy in the UK, and 
in the health sector found expression in the Patient’s Charter164 launched by a 
previous UK government. It is therefore not surprising that there has been a 
tendency to shift from the professional standard. In Smith v Tunbridge Wells 
Health Authority, 165  it was held that disclosure of the risk was the only 
reasonable course of action, despite medical support for non-disclosure by the 
defendant. Another first instance decision was that in McAllister v Lewisham and 
North Southwark Health Authority. 166  In this case, the patient suffered a 
postoperative hemiplegia,
 the risk of which had not been disclosed. Rougier J. 
assessed each expert’s view and concluded that the warnings given by the 
defendant had been inadequate. In Newell and Newell v Goldenberg,167 Mantell 
J found a doctor negligent for not disclosing the risk of failed sterilization, 
opining that the ‘Bolam principle provides a defence for those who lag behind 
the times. It cannot serve those who know better’.168 Other cases manifesting a 
retreat from the professional standard include Gascoine v Ian Sheridan & Co and 
Latham169 and Lybert v Warrington Health Authority.170  
 
It may be that fear of opening the floodgates of litigation was a further 
unspoken reason for English courts being reluctant to adopt the doctrine of 
informed consent. If so, then as the doctrine has not necessarily opened the 
floodgates in other jurisdictions, it seems plausible that English courts will 
                                                 
 See glossary 
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continue to ease away from their traditional position. The House of Lords’ 
decision in Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority, 171  and the Civil 
Procedure Rules, laid down as a result of the Woolf reforms,172 both require 
expert witness opinion to withstand the scrutiny of logic, and will further 
encourage retreat from the professional standard, although it should be noted 
that Bolitho was not a case about consent. 
 
Bolitho relates to treatment received by two-year old Patrick Nigel Bolitho who 
suffered respiratory failure, cardiac arrest and concomitant brain damage. A 
doctor who had been informed of his condition failed to attend, and a breach of 
the duty of care was established. Difficulties arose, however, regarding 
causation. The doctor said in her evidence, and this was accepted by the court, 
that if she had attended she would not have intubated Patrick Bolitho. Experts 
called by the claimant and defendant gave opposing views as to whether 
intubation would have affected outcome.  The High Court, Court of Appeal and 
House of Lords all found in favour of the defendant as the case progressed 
through the litigation process and this was largely because the evidence of the 
expert called by the defence could not be dismissed as illogical. Lord Browne-
Wilkinson said in his judgement: 
 
....in cases of diagnosis and treatment there are cases where, despite a 
body of professional opinion sanctioning the defendant’s conduct, the 
defendant can properly be held liable for negligence (I am not here 
considering questions of disclosure or risk). In my judgment that is 
because, in some cases, it cannot be demonstrated to the judge’s 
satisfaction that the body of opinion relied on is reasonable or 
responsible. In particular, where there are questions of assessment of the 
relative risks and benefits of adopting a medical practice, a reasonable 
view necessarily presupposes that the relative risks and benefits have 
been weighed by the experts in forming their opinions. But if, in a rare 
case, it can be demonstrated that the professional opinion is not capable 
of withstanding logical analysis, the judge is entitled to hold that the 
body of opinion is not reasonable or responsible.173 
 
This signalled a shift from the professional standard, and represents a significant 
departure from the stance taken by the same judge in Sidaway (at Court of 
Appeal stage) when he stood stoutly for the professional standard: 
 
If the disclosure of the risks results in prejudicing the ability of the  
doctor to cure and the confidence of the patient in the doctor, the 
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existence of a duty to disclose such risks would positively militate against 
the main purpose of the relationship ... trust and confidence may be 
severely shaken by a formal communication of risks. 174 
 
Although Bolitho is credited with introducing the requirement for professional 
opinion to be capable of withstanding logical analysis, the fact is that this 
requirement existed long before Bolitho. In Hills v Potter175, Mr Justice Hirst 
said: 
 
  In every case the court must be satisfied that the standard contended for 
 on [the doctors'] behalf accords with that upheld by a substantial body of 
 medical opinion, and that this body of medical opinion is both respectable 
 and responsible, and experienced in this particular field of medicine.176 
 (Emphasis mine). 
 
 
Subsequently, in Sidaway, the Court of Appeal per Sir John Donaldson added the 
qualification ‘rightly’ to Justice Hirst’s principle: 
 
 The duty is fulfilled…..if the doctor acts in accordance with a practice 
 rightly accepted as proper by a body of skilled and experienced medical 
 men.177 
 
Thus even when the courts have a adopted the professional standard of care 
they ‘will always reserve to themselves the right to scrutinize expert medical 
evidence with a view to establishing in each case whether the standards 
practised by the profession conform to the standard of reasonable care 
demanded by the law’.178 
 
The retreat from the professional standard was to be continued in the cases that 
followed. In Pearce v United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust, 179  the Court of 
Appeal explored the extent of a doctor’s duty to give adequate information to 
the patient about the risks of treatment. The claimant had gone 14 days past her 
estimated date of confinement when she had a consultation with her 
obstetrician during which she begged to be admitted for induction of labour or 
Caesarean delivery. The obstetrician explained the risks of induction of labour 
and Caesarean section, and recommended normal birth without any form of 
medical intervention. Seven days later, the claimant was admitted for delivery 
but the baby had died in utero. She brought an action against the hospital, 
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claiming that the obstetrician was negligent in not advising her of the small risk 
associated with waiting for labour to start spontaneously after 42 weeks’ 
gestation. The judge dismissed the case and the claimant appealed.  
 
Although he did not decide the appeal in favour of the claimant (evidence having 
shown that the increased risk of stillbirth as a result of the additional delay that 
occurred was no more than 0.1–0.2%), Lord Woolf said that he was applying both 
Bolam and Bolitho to the matter of disclosure of risk, and he made it clear that 
doctors must disclose risks which the reasonable patient would expect to be 
disclosed: 
 
… if there is a significant risk which would affect the judgement of a 
reasonable patient, then . . .it is the responsibility of a doctor to inform 
the patient of that risk if the information is needed so that the patient 
can determine. . .what course he or she should adopt.180 
 
 
What began as a gradual shift assumed seismic dimensions in Chester v Afshar,181 
where the House of Lords felt compelled to modify the traditional rules of 
causation in order to grant remedy to a claimant who had not been fully 
informed of the risks inherent in an operation that she was going to have 
anyway, regardless of the risks. This case is discussed further in Chapter 9 but 
the facts are stated here to demonstrate how judicial thinking is moving with 
the times.  
It could be argued that previous retreats described above were no more than 
just a modification of the prudent doctor standard but Chester v Afshar 
establishes that English courts are now prepared to pay more than mere lip 
service to the patient’s need for information. The claimant underwent 
neurosurgery in the hands of the defendant. The court found that he did not 
inform her of the 1-2 per cent risk of cauda equina syndrome. Unfortunately this 
risk materialised. An action in negligence followed and the judge at first 
instance found in favour of the claimant. This judgment was upheld by the Court 
of Appeal. The House of Lords found that application of the ‘but for’ test would 
have resulted in the claimant being denied a remedy for the surgeon’s failure 
adequately to inform her of the risks of the operation. That the court was 
prepared to deviate from the traditional application of this test in order to find 
in favour of the patient is an indication of how committed it was to upholding 
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the claimant’s right to be informed. Chester marks a significant departure from 
the professional standard and establishes beyond doubt the willingness of the 
English judiciary to accord the highest priority to self-determination in medical 
decision-making. This willingness led the court to adopt jurisprudential 
contortions in order to find for the claimant – which in turn throws into sharp 
relief the inadequacy of the consent model. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The legal mechanism for protecting the patient’s right to self-determination is 
consent. A doctor undertaking treatment without consent may be liable for 
battery or face an action in negligence. The courts have been reluctant to take 
the battery route, mainly for fear of pouring odium on doctors acting with good 
intentions. There is a school of thought, however, that advocates expansion of 
the tort of battery to ‘reflect a legal response based on rights’,182 and it has 
been suggested that this tort ‘may be due for a fresh lease of life’183 with the 
rising profile of rights in English law.† 
 
The more common route is an action in negligence. Here, there is usually no 
dispute about the right of the patient to be informed, but controversy surrounds 
the standard for determining adequacy of disclosure. Although the UK has 
traditionally deferred to the medical profession in this regard, there has been a 
shift towards adoption of the patient’s right rather than the doctor’s opinion as 
the starting point for determining adequacy of disclosure. Even then, the courts 
will often fail to protect patient self-determination – because of the adoption of 
an objective rather than subjective test of what the patient would want to 
know. Thus, there are legal shortcomings in the consent model as far as 
protection of patient self-determination is concerned. There may also be ethical 
shortcomings and it is to this question that attention is turned in the next 
chapter.  
 
 
                                                 
†
 This suggestion is revisited in Chapter 9. 
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Chapter 4 
ETHICAL UNDERPINNINGS AND JUSTIFICATION OF CONSENT 
 
'Consent is...the cutting edge of the patient autonomy movement' 1 
'Consent is much more complex than theorists originally believed it to be’ 2   
 
There is an obvious legal justification for consent – unconsented-to touching is 
an assault, as discussed in Chapter 3 – but the purpose of consent is not just to 
protect doctors from litigious patients. To set the context for further analysis of 
the consent model, it is worth exploring the ethical justifications for consent.   
The question has been asked why consent is such an important requirement in 
health care, whereas it is not in other areas of human activity.3 Wear4 says, for 
example, that statistics regarding divorce are not routinely trotted out as part of 
the marriage ceremony. Similarly, a salesman is not obliged to ask if the 
purchaser really wants the product, and a formal declaration of consent is not 
required prior to purchase of the product.  
 
Freedom to pursue personal goals 
One argument for the necessity of consent in health care is that illness itself 
restricts freedom and consent helps to restore the sense of freedom and self-
determination that is undermined by illness 5 . In other words, consent is 
necessary not simply as an antidote to medical paternalism, but in a broader 
sense for enhancement of wellbeing and protection of the patient’s freedom. 
This argument could itself be tricky, in the sense that potentially it 
unintentionally provides justification for medical paternalism - if an ill person is 
weakened and unable to take control, then the clinician should assist him by 
making decisions. Nevertheless, the concept of freedom in relation to consent is 
an important one, for the importance of consent is that it facilitates the 
freedom to make choices that reflect the individual’s own values, beliefs and 
life experiences. No matter how well-intentioned a clinician may be, he/she is 
not usually in a position to share the same values, attitudes and beliefs as the 
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patient. In modern societies with advanced technology, depersonalisation and 
multiculturalism, there is increased heterogeneity of ideas, attitudes and 
cultures, which means that we are as individuals perhaps less likely to share 
attitudes, beliefs and cultures with each other. This, by the way, is another 
argument for preferring the subjective application of the prudent patient test to 
the objective application. 
Attitudes, beliefs and culture are key ingredients in formulating personal goals, 
such as those relating to one’s family, professional or social life. Personal goals 
are an important, but often under-estimated, determinant of decisions or 
choices made by patients. For example, the goal to attend a family wedding 
later in the year may be important enough to make a patient opt for 
conservative rather than surgical treatment. Sometimes tradeoffs are critical 
elements in the decision-making process. A pregnant woman who needs an 
urgent surgical operation for cervical or ovarian cancer may wish to defer the 
operation until after she has given birth to the baby, rather than have the 
operation immediately and lose the pregnancy, with the full understanding that 
delaying the operation could adversely affect the outcome of treatment. 
Shwartz and Bergus6 state that: 
 Although decision researchers always emphasize the importance of 
 goals  in decision making, goals are rarely considered explicitly 
 because they are unique to each decision maker, and it is often 
 assumed that only the decision maker has good insight into his own goals. 
 The incorporation of goals into medical decisions, although amenable to 
 systematization, thus remains in large part an art practiced by physicians 
 who excel in communication with patients in the clinical other 
 encounter.7    (Emphasis added)*                                                                                                 
  
Related to goals are constraints – social, economic or other factors which limit 
patients’ decision-making. An example would be the patient who is constrained 
from accepting blood transfusion because of his/her religion. In the consent 
transaction, it is important for doctors to explore their patients’ goals and for 
patients to make their constraints known to the doctor. As will be discussed in 
                                                        
*
 In chapter 9 (pages 25-259), it will be argued that the property model facilitates this systematized 
incorporation of patients’ goals into medical decision making. 
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Chapter 9 (page 255), this mutually rewarding exercise could help to determine 
what tailored and relevant information the doctor should provide (as opposed to 
a blanket full disclosure of information or what Manson and O’Neill8 refer to as 
‘explicit and specific consent’9).  
 
Protection from ‘strangers’ 
Apart from the traditional anti-paternalism justification of consent, changes in 
the nature of health care systems necessitate mechanisms for protecting the 
patient’s right of self-determination. The delivery of medicine is increasingly 
following an assembly-line pattern; almost gone are the days of the good old-
fashioned doctor who knew the entire family. Almost gone also is the hospital 
generalist who had a holistic view of the patient’s problems. These days, the 
patient is likely to be treated by a team of sub-specialists and a variety of health 
professionals. O’Neill10, quoting Rothman11, refers to them as ‘strangers by the 
bedside’12. O’Neill13 suggests that these developments in delivery of medical 
care break the traditional bonds of trust between doctors and patients. Trust 
aside, there is a potential threat to consent in this situation. If the authority 
gradient between patient and doctor was steep in the traditional setting, the 
gradient is even steeper when the patient has to negotiate not with just one 
doctor but with an establishment of highly skilled professionals. Without 
adequate protection, the right to self-determination could readily be 
compromised by these conditions. A model which has the rights of the particular 
patient as its cardinal point is more likely to secure this protection than a model 
that relies on standards set for or by the medical establishment and the 
objective man on the Clapham bus. 
 
Utilitarian justification 
Another justification for consent is utilitarian: consent helps protect patients 
from treatment that they consider harmful or undesirable. Alternatively, it 
enables them to choose the treatment option that they consider beneficial or 
preferable. In this role, as guardian of their own health rather than passive 
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submissive recipient of medical care, they are more likely to have better health 
outcomes - clinicians recognise that giving patients information and involving 
them in their own care is associated with better health outcomes.14 Indeed, the 
concept of an ‘expert patient’15 has evolved in recent times.  
The utilitarian standpoint is by definition dependent on context - so long as 
utility (happiness, satisfaction and other perceived benefits) is maximised and 
disutility (distress, dissatisfaction and so on) is minimised, the criterion for 
utilitarian justification is meet. Utilitarian ethics will not, therefore, always 
explain the basis of consent. When the underlying reason for providing 
information and seeking to gain a patient’s agreement to treatment is simply the 
desire for a better health outcome (rather than to enable the patient make an 
informed decision), then that goal is a different one from protection of the right 
to self-determination, and may even be diametrically opposite. Indeed, this 
approach has beneficence rather than self-determination as its ethical principle. 
It is arguable that when a physician obtains a patient’s agreement to treatment 
solely for the purpose of enhancing therapeutic benefits, what the physician 
obtains from the patient is assent, not consent. 
 
Respect for persons; self-determination 
The most acclaimed ethical basis for consent can be found in the principle of 
respect for persons: treating persons as ends in themselves and not solely as 
means or instruments for other ends. Underlying this principle is the concept of 
a person’s capacity for, and right to, self-determination. It is this principle that 
gets the most emphasis in contemporary discussions of consent.16  As Manson and 
O’Neill 17  put it, ‘[t]he reason most commonly given for the expansion, 
entrenchment and elaboration of informed consent requirements is that they are 
needed to secure respect for individual autonomy’.18 
The British Medical Association19 extols this principle: 
 Seeking consent is a moral requirement, and the BMA believes that 
 respect for others and their rights lies at the heart of this issue. Society 
 emphasises the value and dignity of the individual. Competent adults 
 have both an ethical and a legal right to self-determination and to 
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 respect for their autonomy. This entails their  having choice about what 
 happens to their bodies.20 
As discussed in Chapter 2 (page 41), rights thinking is on the ascendancy and 
underlies the push for protection of patient self-determination. However, it is 
feared that too much emphasis on self-determination in the consent process may 
result in replacement of paternalism ‘with a distant and impersonal relationship 
of strangers negotiating rights and duties’ 21 . The American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) asserts that if persons are to be 
respected and their wellbeing promoted, consent must be seen as expressing a 
fuller notion of relationship. 22   This interpretation of consent would be 
welcomed by those who advocate a duty-led approach, emphasising duty rather 
than rights as the cardinal ethic. As noted in Chapter 2, rights and duties are like 
opposite sides of a coin. If rights are heads and duties tails, then for champions 
of the duty approach the coin should always be tails up. 
 
The idea that consent is not an end in itself but a means to responsible 
participation by patients in their own care and a means to a mutually rewarding 
relationship between clinician and patient is one that needs to be more widely 
promoted23 amongst health care providers and acknowledged by champions of 
the individual self-determination movement (whose adversarial approach has 
been criticised by O’Neill24 for being counter-productive). All too often clinicians 
consider consent primarily as protection against litigation or equate consent 
with the signing of a form.

  
 
Clements suggests that we should be talking more about choice than consent. By 
this he means that the focus should be on the patient’s expressed and informed 
choice, not on the doctor’s preoccupation with avoidance of litigation. 25 He 
advocates dialogue between doctor and patient but sees preoccupation with 
consent formalities as an obstruction to this goal. 26 We will return, in Chapter 5, 
to Clements’ proposition. Meanwhile, it is reiterated that the self-
                                                        

 This is a paradigm of consent that will be contrasted with a broader paradigm in chapter 5 
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determination-protection goal is not mere choice but authentic choice – and 
scholars27 have questioned whether the law concerns itself with authentic choice 
(if in fact it has the wherewithal to do so in any case). 
 
Consent and self-determination 
In Chapter 2 (pages 24-29), the concept of self-determination was discussed and 
in the following chapter the evolution of the law of consent as a means of 
protecting the patient’s right to self-determination was reviewed.  For many 
years it was taken that the law of consent was so intricately bound to autonomy 
(however defined) that contemplating consent without autonomy was equivalent 
to speaking of Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark. In recent times, however, 
academic commentators28 have questioned this assumption.  
 
The first salvo appears to have been fired by Taylor,29 who declared that ‘the 
conventional view that the ethical foundation of informed consent is concern for 
autonomy is mistaken’. 30  He advanced the proposition that ‘the ethical 
foundation of informed consent is really concern for human well-being’31. His 
position is based on the premise that to undermine a patient’s autonomy, the 
doctor must have the intention to exert control over the patient; if this 
intention is not present, the patient’s autonomy has not been undermined: 
 A person, then, can fail to give his informed consent to a medical 
 procedure and yet not suffer from any diminution in her autonomy 
 with respect to his decision to undergo it. If concern for patient 
 autonomy is the ethical foundation for requiring that a person give 
 his informed consent to his medical treatment, then healthcare 
 providers who negligently fail to secure informed consent from their 
 patients would not be morally culpable for this, because this failure 
 would not result in their patients’ autonomy being compromised. But 
 to hold that a healthcare provider who negligently fails to secure a 
 patient’s informed consent is not morally culpable for such  failure is 
 highly counterintuitive. Since this is so, it appears that concern for 
 autonomy is not the ethical foundation for the doctrine of informed 
 consent. It seems that if a healthcare provider such as Grant fails to 
 inform his patients of the risks associated with their medical 
 treatment, he will  wrong them because this puts their well-being at 
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 risk. Thus, it appears that  the true ethical basis for the doctrine of 
 informed consent is not patient autonomy, but patient well-being.32 
 
The point has been made in Chapter 2 that this thesis is concerned not with 
notions of how autonomy may or not be compromised but with the patient’s 
right to self-determination. The starting point for the argument propounded in 
this thesis is the patient’s rights, not the doctor’s intentions.  Whatever the 
intention of the doctor may or may not be, the patient has a right to make an 
informed decision about his/her treatment, and the law should protect that 
right. As legal protection of self-determination is focus of this thesis, further 
exploration of Taylor’s view of the ethical basis of consent is not pursued. 
Attention is turned to the conception of autonomy applied by the courts.  
 
Examining case law, McLean33 concluded that there is inconsistency regarding 
which conception of autonomy actually grounds the legal regulation of consent. 
Consent law, she finds, does not adhere to a particular account of autonomy. 
This is because ‘[t]he law has imperatives of its own and often encapsulates 
policy and other considerations in deciding on the quality and standing of 
individual decisions’.34 As a result of these imperatives, we find that while the 
courts stoutly proclaim the right to self-determination, they employ tests which 
look at what the hypothetical prudent doctor or prudent patient would want, 
rather than what the index patient wants. Critiquing a number of American and 
English cases relating to end of life and to pregnancy, cases where individual 
autonomy is confronted by relational considerations, she concludes 
disapprovingly that individual autonomy has been trumped and says: 
 …the law’s ingenuity in simultaneously proclaiming adherence to 
 individual autonomy yet using a more relational account to reject its 
 application in hard cases knows no bounds.35 
 
To be fair to the courts, they do to some extent recognise the problem of 
applying an objective yardstick while proclaiming individual autonomy, but are 
constrained by practicalities. This is reflected in Lord Scarman’s speech in 
Sidaway v Board of Bethlem Royal Hospital:36 
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 Ideally, the court should ask itself whether in the particular 
 circumstances the risk was such that this particular patient would  think it 
 significant if he was told it existed. I would think that, as a  matter of 
 ethics, this is the test of the doctor’s duty. The law,  however, operates 
 not in Utopia but in the world as it is: and such an inquiry would prove 
 in practice to be frustrated by the subjectivity of its aim and purpose. 
 The law can, however, do the next best thing, and require the court to 
 answer the question, what would a reasonably prudent patient think 
 significant if in the situation of this patient. The “prudent patient” 
 cannot, however, always provide the answer for the obvious reason 
 that he is a norm (like the man on the Clapham omnibus), not a real 
 person: and certainly not the patient himself.37 
 
Although this view was part of a minority judgement, it was subsequently 
adopted by the court in Pearce v United Bristol HC NHS Trust38. So, while the 
courts may generally apply the objective test, recognising that the prudent 
patient is not the patient himself or herself leaves the door open for them to 
apply a more subjective test when feasible and conscionable.  
There is, indeed, discordance between the individual self-determination 
proclaimed by the courts and the relational account they implement. In some 
cases, however, particularly those involving life or death situations, the courts 
face difficult challenges, and contextual issues may account for this 
discordance. To elucidate the point, we have to go back to the discussion in 
Chapter 2 and, particularly, to the point that individual autonomy does not exist 
in a vacuum but is itself socially contextualised. Ardent advocates of individual 
autonomy will, presumably, concede that the individual has to be alive in order 
to exercise autonomy. If individual autonomy is so highly valued, particularly as 
part of respect for persons as ends rather that means to an end, society should 
not be casual in allowing life to be extinguished. This is not to say that on no 
account should individuals be allowed to make informed choices in matters of 
life and death; rather, a fine balance has to be found on a case-by-case basis 
between respect for self-determination and respect for the sanctity of life. 
Commitment to finding this balance is implicit in adoption of the ecological 
metaphor espoused in this thesis.  The law has shown a willingness to shift the 
balance in favour of self-determination – as Lord Donaldson MR stated in Re T 
(Adult: Refusal of Treatment):39  
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This situation gives rise to a conflict between two interests, that of the 
patient and that of the society in which he lives. The patient’s interest 
consists of his right to self-determination—his right to live his own life 
how he wishes, even if it will damage his health or lead to his premature 
death. Society’s interest is in upholding the concept that all human life is 
sacred and should be preserved if at all possible. It is well established 
that in the ultimate the right of the individual is paramount.40 
 
When cases involving life or death decisions are separated from others, a pattern 
emerges in relation to whether the individual or relational accounts of self-
determination are upheld by the courts: in cases relating to the sanctity of life 
they recognise fundamentally valued relational interests, but in other cases 
(exemplified by Chester v Afshar,41 discussed in Chapters 2 and 9) they have 
progressively shown a willingness to give individual self-determination its due 
primacy. Although MacFarlane v Tayside Health Board,42 a case where the court 
applied relational interests, did not involve a life or death situation, the essence 
of the case was about the value of a child’s life (the value of a child is 
incalculable). The claimants were a couple who had completed their family and 
decided to have permanent contraception by means of vasectomy. Following the 
procedure they were informed that the sperm count was nil, but they 
subsequently had a pregnancy and delivery of a healthy child. They sued for the 
pain and suffering attributable to the pregnancy and for the cost of bringing up 
the child. The House of Lords held that the couple could recover for the physical 
harm of the pregnancy but could not recover for the costs of rearing a healthy 
child.                                  
In Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust43 the claimant was a woman 
who had undergone voluntary sterilisation because she could not cope with 
looking after a baby as she was blind in one eye and had poor vision in the other 
eye. As a result of the operation being negligently performed, she became 
pregnant and had a healthy child. The House of Lords held that the claimant 
could not recover for the costs of bringing up the child but, in addition to her 
claim for pain and suffering arising from the unwanted pregnancy, awarded a 
sum of £15 000 for the breach of her right to self-determination.  
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These cases suggest that the courts tend to protect self-determination within a 
socialised context, without necessarily aiming to apply one or other favoured 
account of autonomy. I would describe this pragmatic approach as ‘applying not 
A or B but AB’, where A (minimalist) and B (rational) are purist, theoretical 
conceptions of autonomy and AB is the practical, socially contextualised, 
‘ecologically’ responsive conception of the principle of self-determination. This 
is the approach advocated in Chapter 2 where I attempted to articulate a 
contextualised conception of the principle of self-determination. 
 
While McLean examines the legal context, Manson and O’Neil44 approach the 
debate from an ethics perspective. They criticize the prevailing minimalist 
conception of autonomy as lacking moral content and therefore as being 
incapable of providing the ethical basis of consent. The prevailing conception 
lacks moral content because it regards autonomy simply as independence, or 
freedom to choose, regardless of whether the choice leads to good or bad 
outcomes. If this minimalist, individual conception of autonomy is ‘seen as 
fundamental to ethics’,45 then consensual activities that many persons (including 
libertarians) deem unacceptable could be ethically justified. The fact that these 
are deemed unacceptable means that there are other ethical principles – such as 
beneficence and respect for human dignity - that limit individual autonomy.  
Prevailing paradigms of consent, they state, have no difficulty in 
operationalising this conception of autonomy but are vacuous.  
 
They also give three reasons why other conceptions of autonomy – autonomy as 
reasoned, reflective, rational choice – are inadequate.46 Firstly, they are more 
cognitively demanding, so they set a higher bar for attainment of adequate 
consent. Secondly, if rational autonomy is seen as fundamental to ethics, then 
other principles such as beneficence ‘would have to be seen as subordinate, or 
dismissed’.47 The third, and in their view decisive, reason is that if consent were 
to be based on these rational conceptions, then it would be difficult for the 
prevailing paradigm of consent, which  protects even unreflective choice, to 
operationalise this conception of autonomy. 
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These reasons for rejecting rational accounts of autonomy as providing 
justification of consent have been criticised by Bullock.48 Arguably, however, 
this criticism is based on a misunderstanding of the position taken by Manson and 
O’Neill49 . Bullock50 criticises them for using the term ‘fundamental to ethics’ 
without clarification, as it could mean either that the principle referred to is the 
only ethical concern or that it is one of the primary ethical concerns. However, 
this criticism is flawed because the only way this term could be interpreted, for 
the rest of the authors’ account to make sense, is to regard it as meaning the 
principle that trumps any other principle. She further argues51, in respect of the 
third reason for rejecting rational autonomy as the justification of consent: 
 Manson and O’Neill argue that rational autonomy cannot be the  primary 
 justification for informed consent procedures because “[i]nformed 
 consent requirements protect actual choices, which are often not rational 
 choices” (2007, 21). They thus assume that a  subject’s irrational choice 
 ought to be protected under the doctrine, which cannot be the case if 
 the justification for informed consent  practice is a principle of respect 
 for rational autonomy. Again, this argumentation seems incomplete; their 
 reason for rejecting minimal accounts of autonomy was that they  were 
 permissive and allowed irrational choice to be a foundation for ethical 
 decision-making. On the other hand, they present rational  accounts as 
 being too stringent because they fail to allow for irrational choices. 
 Although for Manson and O’Neill the appeal to autonomy cannot be 
 substantiated on either minimal or rational interpretations, the shift in 
 their argument means that their rejection of autonomy as a justification 
 for informed  consent fails to be conclusive.52 (Emphasis mine). 
 
The fallacy in this argument is that Manson and O’Neill53 do not ‘assume that 
subject’s irrational choice ought to be protected’ by the doctrine of consent. On 
the contrary, their entire case for rethinking consent is motivated by, and based 
on, both dissatisfaction with the protection of irrational choice and a desire to 
ensure protection of only those choices that are rational as well as associated 
with good outcomes.54 
The Manson/O’Neill view on autonomy and consent has also been criticised for 
ignoring the growing literature on relational autonomy.55 While it can rightly be 
said that they did not go into any depth about relational autonomy, it is fair to 
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say they acknowledge its existence. They do say, as indicated above, that the 
prevailing paradigm of consent (by which, I take it, they mean the paradigm 
actually practised by clinicians) cannot operationalise the various rational 
concepts of autonomy. 
 
Returning to the work of Manson and O’Neill56, their conclusion is that autonomy 
cannot and should not be the justification for consent: 
 …appeals to individual autonomy, however conceived, are unlikely to 
 provide convincing justifications for informed consent procedures. 
 The question of justification has not been settled by decades of 
 insistence that informed consent is required in order to respect
 individual autonomy.57 
 
Manson and O’Neill propose instead a novel justification: consent as waiver, 
which is discussed below. 
 
Consent as waiver 
When consent is given, specific ethical or legal or other requirements that are 
‘generally inviolable’58 are waived by the person consenting. In the absence of 
such requirements, there is no consent to be obtained. An example given by the 
authors is that one does not need consent to cross the road – there is no 
requirement that has to be waived for one to do so. On the other hand, consent 
is needed to have a picnic in a neighbour’s garden – his right to exclude has to 
be waived. The scope of consent is not set by autonomy but by the norms and 
expectations that have to be waived for the proposed treatment to be 
legitimate59.  
 
The justification for obtaining this waiver is that but for it the outcome of the 
intended act would be ‘pain, injury, damage, distress and even death’60; but for 
it the act or intervention would do wrong to others or fail to meet legitimate 
expectations.  
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The procedures for obtaining consent and the specificity of consent sought and 
obtained must both take account of the underlying norms that are to be waived 
in particular cases.61 This means that standards for consent will vary from case 
to case; there will be no uniformity of standards, it will all depend on the norms 
that would be breached but for consent. Applying this to medical practice, the 
standards for consent will be more rigorous for complex interventions than for 
straightforward, routine procedures, because it is likely that the former will 
carry more significant norms or expectations that have to be waived. Failure to 
recognise this and applying a blanket approach instead will show ‘a lack of 
understanding of the reasons why consent matters’.62  
 
They also say that ‘[t]he most significant ethical and legal norms may be so 
important that they cannot be waived by the consent of those affected’. 63 
Although the examples they give in support of this (consensual cannibalism, 
torture or killing) are extreme, in theory this statement leaves open the 
question of what counts as significant norm and who determines this. 
Presumably, it is whatever society at large abhors. This then would justify the 
position taken by the courts in the cases involving sanctity of life, as discussed 
above – respect for the sanctity of life is a significant ethical norm which should 
not be waived. 
 
The implication of the Manson/O’Neill distinction between these two 
justifications of consent (consent as protector of individual autonomy and 
consent as waiver) is as follows. When we justify consent on the basis of 
respecting individual autonomy we promote a conception of consent that relies 
heavily on disclosure of information; the patient makes an informed decision 
based on this information and autonomy is thus respected. The problem with this 
conception is that there is more to communication than mere disclosure of 
information, and apparent consent obtained without regard for various norms of 
communication may not be genuine consent. On the other hand, when consent is 
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justified on the basis of waiver of otherwise inviolable requirements, we are 
obliged to adopt a transactional approach to consent, which entails two-way 
communication of intelligible, relevant and accurate information between 
doctor and patient. This transactional approach to consent is discussed in 
Chapter 5.  Patient self-determination is not upheld simply by the passive 
transmission of information to the patient; the transactional approach provides 
for exchange of information between doctor and patient, facilitating mutual 
understanding and empowering the patient to make an informed decision. 
 
One of the problems with the Manson/O’Neill analysis is that it fails to 
distinguish clearly between consent to participate in research and consent to 
treatment, sometimes actually conflating these two different activities. The 
argument for a gradient of consent standards, for example, is more applicable to 
research than to clinical practice. It is not difficult to accept that the consent 
requirements for recruiting a patient into a retrospectively conducted study 
using previously collected data or biological samples need not be as rigorous as 
those for recruiting into a clinical trial of a new drug never before tested on 
humans. When it comes to clinical practice, however, there is one ethical and 
legal norm that is not only important but also common to both routine and 
complex interventions – the patient’s right to determine what may be done to 
his or her body - and as a minimum requirement or standard, this right has to be 
protected. 
 
An even bigger problem with the Manson/O’Neill analysis is that it fails to 
distinguish between two paradigms of consent (which I discuss in Chapter 5): the 
paradigm designed to protect self-determination (described elsewhere as the 
‘autonomy-enhancing’ or ‘autonomous authorisation’ paradigm64) and the one 
that actually operates in clinical practice (variously described as the 
‘institutional requirement’ or ‘harm avoidance’ paradigm65). It has been pointed 
out that:66 
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 The ethically and legally preferable model is one seeking to enhance 
 the patient's autonomy and understanding of the medical decision  through 
 a process of active collaboration between the physician and patient. 
 While the autonomy-enhancing model is widely recognized as being 
 superior to the harm-avoidance approach, recent studies illustrate that 
 the reality of medical practice remains closer to the  latter.67 
 
The Manson/O’Neill description of the disclosure model of consent fits with the 
latter paradigm, and their analysis would hold if it was concerned solely with 
that paradigm - but one hastens to point out that the ‘institutional requirement’ 
paradigm was not designed or intended to respect the principle of self-
determination. In fact, the paradigm is perceived by doctors and patients as a 
means of avoiding litigation.68  
 
Conclusion 
 
In summary, the consent model can be justified by a range of ethical approaches 
the most sustainable of which is the rights-based approach of respect for patient 
self-determination. This justification has recently come under strong criticism, 
but when cognisance is taken of the distinction between consent as theoretically 
conceptualised by libertarian ethicists and consent as operationalised by 
clinicians, we find that Manson and O’Neill’s criticism applies to the latter but 
not necessarily to the former. The position taken in this thesis is that respect for 
self-determination remains a valid ethical justification for requiring consent. In 
effect, the law (as described in the previous chapter) and ethics (as discussed in 
this chapter) of consent remain basically in harmony. 
 
The emphasis on the duty of health professionals to be trustworthy and honest is 
welcome, and this duty is at the core of the property model articulated in 
Chapter 9. Also it could be difficult to move doctors from one paradigm of 
consent to another. An alternative way of addressing the concerns expressed by 
Manson and O’Neill69, therefore, may be to consider an alternative model (such 
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as the property model presented in this thesis) rather than seek to ‘rethink’ 
consent. Their concern about consent being founded on mere independence, or 
freedom to choose, regardless of whether the choice leads to good or bad 
outcomes, is valid, but only to an extent. While mere choice could be vacuous, 
insisting that self-determination should apply only when choice leads to a good 
outcome is self-defeating: judgments on what constitutes good or bad outcome 
are commonly value-laden, and what is good in the eyes of one person may be 
bad to another. It is not for the law to arbitrate on value judgments; rather it 
should allow free choice, within the framework of societal norms and policy 
considerations.  
They advocate a transactional model of consent, on the basis that 
communication entails more than mere disclosure of information. In subsequent 
chapters of this thesis, the property approach to protecting self-determination 
in healthcare decision-making is shown to be essentially transactional. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Edozien LC, 2013, Chapter 4 
126 
 
End notes 
                                                        
1 Wear S. Informed Consent – Patient Autonomy and Clinical Beneficence within 
Health Care, 2nd Edition. Washington D.C: Georgetown University Press. 1998 p2 
2 Swintankowsky IS, A New Paradigm for Informed Consent, University Press of 
America Inc. Maryland; 1998 page ‘x’ (Introduction) 
3 Wear, op cit p40 
4 Ibid, p41 
5 Ibid, p42 
6  Schwartz A and Bergus G, Medical Decision making. A Physician’s Guide.  
Cambridge; Cambridge University Press 2008 
7 At p6 
8  Manson NC and O’Neill O, Rethinking Informed Consent in Bioethics. 
Cambridge; Cambridge University Press 2007 
9 At p10-11 
10 O’Neill O, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics. Cambridge; Cambridge University 
Press 2002 at p20 
11  Rothman DJ, Strangers at the Bedside: A History of How Law and Ethics 
Transformed Medical Decision-Making, Basic Books 1991 
12 O’Niell, op cit, p20 
13 Ibid 
14 Little P, Everitt H, Williamson I, Warner G, Moore M, Gould C, Ferrier K, Payne 
S, Observational study of effect of patient centredness and positive approach on 
outcomes in general practice consultations (2001) 323 Br Med J 908–11. 
Greenfield S, Kaplan SH, Ware Jr JE, Yano EM, Frank HJ, Patients’ participation 
in medical care: effects on blood sugar control and quality of life in diabetes 
(1988) 3 J Gen Intern Med 448–57; Fallowfield LJ, Hall A, Maguire P, Baum M, 
A’Hern RP, Psychological effects of being offered choice of surgery for breast 
cancer (1994) 309 Br Med J 448. Heisler M, Bouknight RR, Hayward RA, Smith 
DM, Kerr EA, The relative importance of physician communication, participatory 
decision making, and patient understanding in diabetes self-management (2002) 
17 J Gen Intern Med 243-52. Jahng KH, Martin LR, Golin CE, DiMatteo MR, 
Preferences for medical collaboration: patient-physician congruence and patient 
outcomes (2005) 57 Patient Educ Couns 308-14. Mandelblatt J, Kreling B, 
Figeuriedo M, Feng S, What is the impact of shared decision making on 
treatment and outcomes for older women with breast cancer?  (2006) 24 J Clin 
Oncol 4908-13. Mead N, Bower P, Hann M, The impact of general practitioners' 
patient-centredness on patients' post-consultation satisfaction and enablement 
(2002) 55 Soc Sci Med 283-99. Schulman BA, Active Patient Orientation and 
Outcomes in Hypertensive Treatment (1979) 17 Medical Care 267-280.  
15 Department of Health, The expert patient: a new approach to chronic disease 
management for the 21st century. London; DH September 2001 
16 See, for example, McLean SAM, Autonomy, Consent and the Law. Oxford; 
Routledge-Cavendish 2010. Maclean A, Autonomy, Informed Consent and Medical 
Law. A relational challenge. Cambridge; Cambridge University Press 2009; Taylor 
JS, Autonomy and informed consent: A much misunderstood relationship (2004) 
38 The Journal of Value Inquiry 383; Wear S, Informed consent: patient 
Edozien LC, 2013, Chapter 4 
127 
 
                                                                                                                                                                        
autonomy and clinician beneficence within health care. Washington DC; 
Georgetown University Press 1998 
17 Manson and O’Neill, op cit. 
18 At p185 
19  British Medical Association, Medical Ethics Today. The BMA’s handbook of 
ethics and law. Second edition. London; BMA  and BMJ Books 2004 
20 At p71 
21  American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Informed consent. 
Washington DC; ACOG 2004  
22 Ibid 
23 This idea is also consonant with the ecological metaphor described in chapter 
1. 
24 O’Neill O, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics. Cambridge; Cambridge University 
Press 2002 
25 Clements RV, Informed choice: should we bin the consent form? (2005) 11 
Clinical Risk 69-71 
26 Ibid, p70 
27 McLean SAM, Autonomy, Consent and the Law. Oxford; Routledge-Cavendish 
2010. Chapter 2. 
28  Taylor JS, Autonomy and informed consent: A much misunderstood 
relationship (2004) 38 The Journal of Value Inquiry 383. McLean, op cit. Manson 
and O’Niell, op cit. 
29 Op cit 
30 At p383 
31 Ibid, p384 
32 At p387 
33 McLean SAM, op cit  
34 At p4 
35 At p152 
36 [1985] AC 871 
37 Ibid 
38 [1999] 48 BMLR 118 
39 [1993] Family Law 93 
40 At p113 
41 Chester v Afshar [2004] 4 All ER 587 
42 [2000] 2 AC 59 
43 [2003] UKHL 52, [2003]; 4 All ER 987, HL 
44 Manson and O’Neill, op cit 
45 At p20 
46 At p21 
47 Ibid 
48 Bullock E, Informed Consent as Waiver: The Doctrine Rethought? (2010) 17  
Ethical Perspectives  529-555 doi: 10.2143/EP.17.4.2059845 
49 Op cit 
50 Op cit 
51 Ibid 
52 Ibid at p534 
53 Op cit 
Edozien LC, 2013, Chapter 4 
128 
 
                                                                                                                                                                        
54 Ibid, p19-20 
55  Maclean A, Autonomy, Informed Consent and Medical Law. A relational 
challenge. Cambridge; Cambridge University Press 2009 p44 
56 Op cit 
57 At p22 
58 p76  
59 At p79 
60 At p74 
61 At p78 
62 At p82 
63 At p84 
64 Swintankowsky IS, A New Paradigm for Informed Consent. Maryland; University 
Press of America Inc. 1998; Fadin RR and Beauchamp TL, A History and Theory of 
Informed Consent. New York; Oxford University Press 1986, p274-287 
65 Ibid 
66 Ali V, Consent Forms as Part of the Informed Consent Process: Moving Away 
from "Medical Miranda"  2003 54 Hastings LJ 1575 
67 Ibid 
68 Heywood R, Macaskill A, Williams K, Informed consent in hospital practice: 
health professionals perspective and legal reflections (2010) 18 Med LR 152-184. 
doi: 10.1093/medlaw/fwq008  
69 Ibid 
129 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
LIMITATIONS OF THE CONSENT MODEL 
 
‘[S]tandard accounts of informed consent, standard arguments for requiring 
consent in clinical and research practice and standard ways of 
implementing consent requirements lead to intractable problems.’1 
 
Laudable as the notion of consent to treatment is, there are limitations to 
its scope and effectiveness in protecting patient self-determination. Some 
of these limitations are intrinsic to the concept of consent as elaborated in 
bioethics, and scholars have sought to address this by reconceptualising or 
‘rethinking’ consent, 2  and advancing alternative conceptions 3 . Some 
limitations arise not necessarily from the concept per se but from how it is 
operationalised. These include difficulties (such as pressures of time)4 in 
applying the theoretical principles of consent in everyday clinical practice. 
These difficulties and related factors have resulted in discordance between 
the paradigm of consent espoused by bioethicists and the paradigm of 
consent that is actually practiced by clinicians5. Limitations also arise from 
the judicial constructions of consent. 6  In this chapter, the dichotomy 
between theoretical and operational paradigms of consent is discussed. 
Other factors that limit the effectiveness of the consent model are 
discussed, and the alternative approaches proffered by Manson and O’Neill7 
(‘genuine consent’) and Maclean8 (‘relational consent’) are considered.  This 
sets the stage for a subsequent discussion of the possible role of a property 
approach in redressing the limitations of the consent model.  
 
A convenient point from which to start this chapter is a discussion of the 
paradigms of consent. It is convenient to start at this point because in 
Chapter 4, it was argued that while the Manson/O’Neill reconceptualisation 
of consent is intellectually robust, it conflates the two paradigms which I 
have distinguished above. Their criticism of the current concept of consent 
applies mostly to the paradigm practiced by clinicians, rather than to the 
ethically-espoused paradigm. If their criticism is upheld, then what needs 
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changing is not the concept of consent but the way in which that concept is 
operationalised. 
 
 
Paradigms of consent 
 
Similar to the way in which the concept of autonomy has many conceptions, 
the concept of consent has been interpreted in many ways and explained 
with various theoretical models.9 The various paradigms of consent can be 
categorised into three groups. The first group (Category 1) comprises 
paradigms of consent that are framed by both the law and bioethicists for 
the purpose of protecting the patient’s right to self-determination. The 
second group (Category 2) comprises paradigms of consent that are actually 
implemented most of the time in clinical practice. The third group 
(Category 3) is one that can be readily dismissed from further analysis in this 
thesis. This group comprises paradigms of consent that amount to no 
consent, what one may call ‘non-consent’, null or invalid consent or, in 
some cases, mere assent. None of these three groups is homogenous; within 
each group that are variations in conception but, generally, the differences 
between the categories are stark except that sometimes the way consent is 
operationalised in clinical practice (Category 2) actually amounts to no 
consent at all (Category 3). Any criticism of consent and any proposals for 
revamping the mechanisms for protecting the right to self-determination 
should recognise these differences and make it clear which paradigms is 
being addressed. 
 
Randall and Downie10 identify four conceptions of consent: 1. Consent as 
being told what is going to be done. This is the paternalistic approach, and 
it is arguable that this is not consent at all. From the legal perspective, this 
would be a null ‘consent’. 2. Consent as simply agreeing or acquiescing to a 
treatment proposal. In this conception, consent equates to mere assent. 3. 
Consent as joint investigation. The patient makes his/her own choice from a 
range of options, with help from the physician. It fits into category 1 
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outlined above; it is also consonant with the ecological metaphor described 
in chapter 1.  4. Consent as patient's self-assertion11 or freedom to choose. 
This conception is consonant with the narrow construction of self-
determination. The nature of 'choice' in this model must be clarified - 
choice in this case does not mean selecting from a range of options offered 
by the doctor (as in Randall and Downie’s conception 3 above); rather it 
refers to the situation where the patient demands a form of treatment even 
if the doctor does not recommend it. An example would be Caesarean 
section performed at maternal request in the absence of a medical 
indication. Another example is that of a woman requesting (demanding?) 
hysterectomy for heavy menstrual bleeding when her doctor has offered less 
invasive but effective options such as ablation of the endometrium. 
 
One problem with this categorisation is that the true situation is not always 
as clear-cut as suggested by the four conceptions. For example, when a 
patient makes a choice it is not always clear whether she has done so within 
conception 3 or 4. If doctor and patient have jointly gone through options 
(including the risks, benefits and alternatives) and the well-informed 
patient has chosen an option different from the doctor’s preference, does 
this fall under ‘consent as joint investigation’ or ‘consent as self-assertion’? 
If the patient is requesting or demanding a treatment that is known to be 
ineffective or dangerous, then this would fall into conception 4 (and the 
doctor has professional and ethical issues to contend with). On the other 
hand, if s/he is demanding a treatment that is known to be effective but is 
not the doctor's preferred option (because it is more invasive or costs more 
or is outwith his/her technical competence or does not fit with his/her life 
values) would this be conception 3 or 4? Such judgments often involve value 
as well as medical considerations, and it has been argued 12  that while 
doctors can define the limits of medical factors, it is not for them to also 
define moral or non-medical limits. In any case, it is now well established 
not only by General Medical Council (GMC) guidance13 but also by judicial 
                                                 
 See glossary. 
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pronouncement14 that a doctor is not obliged to provide treatment that is 
ineffective or not in the best interests of the patient. 
In summary, the first two conceptions in Randall and Downie’s list can be 
consigned to my category 3 and will not be discussed further. The third 
conception falls into category 1. On the basis that respect for self-
determination does not include an obligation to provide any treatment 
demanded by the patient, their fourth conception is also consigned to 
category 3. 
 
 
Category 1 consent 
 
Concentrating now on category 1, there are subtle or not so subtle 
differences between conceptions falling under this category. It is not 
surprising that this is the case, because as shown in Chapter 2 (page 56), 
there is no standard model of doctor-patient relationship or consultation. 
The key point is that all conceptions in this category accord primacy to the 
patient’s right to self-determination. Where they differ is in the process for 
obtaining consent. In the Randall and Downie15 conception described above, 
the process is one of joint investigation. This process combines respect for 
the patient's dignity and self-determination with respect for the physician's 
dignity and professional autonomy, and the authors say that it offers 'the 
best ethical-medical package'16 for patient and doctor. 
 
There are other accounts17  that propose a similar process for obtaining 
consent, which view consent as ‘shared decision making’18. Shared decision-
making has the following as key characteristics: (1) at least two participants 
- physician and patient - are involved; (2) both parties share information; (3)  
both parties take steps to build a consensus about the preferred treatment; 
and (4)  an agreement is reached on the treatment to implement.19 This 
conception of consent is advanced by the psychiatrist J Katz20 and the (US) 
President’s Commission,21 but is opposed by Faden and Beauchamp22 who 
say the essence of consent is that the patient authorises autonomously and 
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not that patient and doctor reach a decision together.  The American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (ACOG) 23  hints at the 
provenance of this paradigm:  
 
If in the 1970s informed consent was embraced as a corrective to 
paternalism, the 1980s and 1990s exhibited a growing sense of the 
need for shared decision making as a corrective to the exaggerated 
individualism that patient autonomy had sometimes produced.24 
 
The ACOG asserts that if persons are to be respected and their well being 
promoted, consent must be seen as expressing a fuller notion of 
relationship 25 . Clements 26  advocates minimum standards of dialogue 
between patient and doctor in the consent process. These views are 
fundamentally the same as those expressed, albeit within a more 
theoretical framework, by ethicists such as Manson and O’Neill27 and Randall 
and Downie28 who see consent as more than mere disclosure of information. 
But does their richer conception of consent actually find application on the 
shop floor of medical practice? It appears not. 
 
Ruth Fadin and Tom Beauchamp29 distinguish between two conceptions of 
consent which they describe as consent as autonomous authorisation and 
consent as a policy-oriented ritual. In the autonomous authorisation 
paradigm, a patient with (i) substantial understanding and (ii) in the 
substantial absence of control by others (iii) intentionally (iv) authorises a 
professional to undertake a particular intervention.  A person whose act 
fulfils conditions i-iii but who refuses the intervention gives an informed 
refusal. The authors stress that only the patient authorises (that is the 
patient, not the doctor, makes the final decision) and it is not a pre-
requisite that agreement on the performance (or withholding) of the 
intervention should be reached through any particular method. By this 
emphasis, their intention is to clearly distinguish this paradigm from the 
‘shared decision-making’ or ‘joint investigation’ paradigms. They go on to 
describe this notion of authorisation: 
 
In authorizing, one both assumes responsibility for what one has 
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authorized and transfers to another one’s authority to implement it. 
There is no informed consent unless one understands these features 
of the act and intends to perform that act. That is, one must 
understand that one is assuming responsibility and warranting another 
to proceed.30  
(Emphasis mine; the notion of authorisation involving assumption of 
responsibility is one to which I return below, and also in when 
comparing the consent and property models in Chapter 9, page 257) 
 
 
In the Faden/Beauchamp policy-oriented conception of consent, effective 
authorisation is obtained from a patient through a procedure stipulated by 
institutional rules and regulations. Here, consent is ‘effective’ in the sense 
that it meets the regulations set by the hospital (or healthcare facility) and 
is accepted by that institution as valid. Requirements for this paradigm of 
consent ‘typically do not focus on the autonomy of the act of giving 
consent…but rather on regulating the behavior of the consent-seeker’.31   
 
Writing a decade after Faden and Beauchamp, Irene Switankowsky 32 also 
identifies two paradigms of consent:  the harm avoidance model and the 
autonomy-enhancing model. She states that the harm avoidance paradigm is 
the common framework within which physicians operate. In this model 
consent is considered to be a mere legal formality and a minimalist 
approach is adopted to disclosure of risks. In the autonomy-enhancing 
model, all treatments must be disclosed and discussed in detail with the 
patient. The risks and benefits of each treatment are disclosed, not just the 
treatment that is preferred by the physician. 
 
Swintankowsky’s two paradigms may appear similar to the 
Faden/Beauchamp paradigms but they are not quite identical. An important 
difference is the emphasis that Swintankowsky places on full disclosure in 
the autonomy-enhancing model. Faden and Beauchamp33 on the contrary 
decry such an emphasis; in their view it is understanding that counts, not 
disclosure – a patient can autonomously authorize an intervention in the 
absence of any disclosure, so long as the patient sufficiently understands 
the implications of the intervention (for example, a general surgeon who 
Edozien LC, 2013, Chapter 5 
 135 
needs to undergo a hernia operation does not need full disclosure before 
he/she can autonomously authorize it). This equates in legal terms to saying 
that the test for adequacy of information disclosure should be subjective. 
 
The issue of disclosure of information and, in particular, the courts’ 
concentration on standards of disclosure was discussed in Chapter 3 (pages 
88-104) and it was shown that the courts have gradually moved away from 
relying on doctors to set the standards. It was also shown that the tension 
between the ideal of a subjective test and the pragmatism of an objective 
one calls for a continual balancing act by the courts. This tension and its 
resolution are discussed again in Chapter 9 (page 277).  
 
Berg and colleagues34 recognise that consent as ‘autonomous authorisation’, 
consent as ‘institutional requirement’ and ‘consent as shared decision-
making’ are interrelated, but they also emphasise that the distinctions 
between them are important and should be acknowledged:  
 
Acknowledging them permits us to see that sometimes strict 
adherence to the rules governing informed consent may actually 
undermine the dialogue involved in the process of shared decision-
making, or may fail to enable a particular patient autonomously to 
authorise a treatment plan. Alternatively, placing too much emphasis 
on sharing the decision may undermine the decisional authority of 
some patients; for example, if they over-value maintaining a good 
relationship and comfortable interaction with their physicians, at the 
expense of expressing their own views. These patients may eventually 
be disappointed when they find that they, not their physicians, bear 
responsibility for what they authorised their doctors to do. Like the 
hypothetical homeowner who would like to be able to blame her 
painters for her own paint colour choice, patients may want to blame 
their physicians for choices they later regret. Recognising that in 
authorising another to act on one’s behalf, one still retains 
responsibility for what is authorised, may help avoid misplacing 
blame.  In order to be responsible for what they authorise, however, 
patients must be well informed and act autonomously.35 
 
 
The idea of patients taking responsibility when they consent to treatment is 
one that needs more emphasis in clinical and legal practice, and will be 
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revisited in Chapter 9 (page 257). Suffice to say at this point that the 
theoretical conceptions of consent espoused by most bioethicists are 
broadly grouped as the category 1 paradigm described above, but it is 
widely acknowledged that this paradigm is not always operationalised in 
clinical practice. It is important to distinguish between category 1 and 
category 2 paradigms because consent that is valid in the first paradigm may 
not be valid in the other, and vice versa. Crucially, any analysis of consent 
in relation to self-determination must make clear which one of these two 
paradigms is the subject of analysis. Attention is now turned to the 
dichotomy between the theoretically envisioned paradigm and the 
operationalised one.  
 
 
Category 2 paradigm of consent  
 
In this paradigm of consent the patient is presented with a menu of choices 
(sometimes ‘a menu of one item’36) and a ‘yes or no’ response is elicited. 
The menu may be accompanied by either a large quantity of information, 
most of it generic rather than specific to the patient, or little or no 
information. The emphasis is not on comprehension of information but on 
the signal which indicates that the doctor may proceed with treatment.  In 
most consultations the signal is verbal but for surgical operations and other 
interventional treatment it is usually a signature.  From a theories-of-
consent perspective, this paradigm of consent has been classified as 
‘Functionalist consent’37. 
 
In practice, this paradigm is heavily dependent on the consent form, and in 
the minds of many clinicians consent is a signature on the form.38  This 
paradigm of consent is boosted by the UK Department of Health’s policy39 on 
consent, which appears to place undue emphasis on consent forms. It 
appears that the current practice of health professionals in the UK matches 
this paradigm rather than what I have classified above as the category 1 
paradigm of consent.40 Clements41 paints this scenario: 
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 The preoccupation with the form inhibits, not encourages, dialogue. 
 It leads to the ludicrous caricature often encountered in the 
 anaesthetic room just before the patient is wheeled into theatre. The 
 consultant surgeon, arriving late, puts his head round the door and 
 enquires of the anaesthetist ‘has she been consented?’ Leaving aside 
 the abuse of the intransitive verb, the question speaks volumes for 
 the surgeon’s understanding of the counselling process that should 
 precede surgery.42 
 
In a similar scenario, a woman in the throes of labour pain who signs a 
consent form minutes before she is whisked to the operating theatre for a 
Caesarean section is deemed to have given an institutionally valid consent, 
but almost certainly has not autonomously authorised the operation – in 
other words, Category 2 ‘consent’ may have been obtained but not Category 
1 consent.   In the box below, a case (from the author’s personal 
experience) further illustrating the difference between these two categories 
of consent is described. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case report distinguishing between Category 1 and Category 2 
consent 
A patient listed for hysterectomy is taken to the operating theatre on 
the day of the operation. When she arrived in the anaesthetic room, the 
consent form (which she had signed on the ward) was missing. The unit 
managers and theatre staff were minded to cancel the operation, in the 
belief that there was no valid consent. The surgeon explained that he 
had discussed the operation comprehensively with the patient before 
and during her admission into hospital, and these discussions (including 
her agreement) were documented in the health records and in a letter to 
the patient’s general practitioner. In his opinion, the patient had given a 
valid consent and there was documentary evidence of this, even though 
there was no signed consent form. The managers and the theatre team 
then agreed that the operation should proceed. The institutional 
requirement for a consent form (Category 2 or ‘functionalist’ consent) 
was not fulfilled but the operation was performed with the valid consent 
of the patient (Category 1 consent). In clinical governance audit of 
consent, this case would be flagged as bad practice, because it did not 
meet the institutional requirement for a signed consent form, and cases 
where a form was signed would be classified as good, regardless of the 
presence or absence of transactional communication between doctor and 
patient.   
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The British Medical Association has expressed concern that despite ‘a 
considerable amount of written guidance on consent, from regulatory, 
professional, and indemnifying bodies as well as government 
departments’,43 the way in which consent was sought in practice was less 
than satisfactory. 
 
Clearly this paradigm does not meet the requirements of the principles 
underlying category 1 consent. This raises two questions: why is this so, and 
what can/should be done about it? The first question is addressed in this 
chapter and the second will be addressed in subsequent chapters.    
 
There are barriers that circumscribe the potential application of the consent 
model in day-to-day clinical practice44. One of these is the difficulty in 
achieving optimal communication. Often there is not enough time or space 
for an adequate discussion, particularly in public sector hospitals. At other 
times there may be language, cultural and social barriers inhibiting 
communication between clinicians and patients. These limiting factors are, 
however, relatively trivial compared to the factors discussed below. 
 
 
Doctors’ knowledge and perception of the principles of consent 
 
There are a number of reasons why the operationalised paradigm of consent 
differs from the theoretical one. One of these is that doctors’ knowledge 
regarding consent law is shockingly poor45 and their perception of consent 
way off the mark established in bioethics. There is evidence that health 
professionals do not know enough about basic aspects of the law of consent, 
such as at what age can a child give consent or what happens when an adult 
is unable to give consent.46 
 
Reflecting and/or reinforcing this knowledge deficiency, is a misdirected 
perception of consent, firstly as an event, secondly, as primarily a shield 
against litigation.  Consciously or sub-consciously, obtaining consent is often 
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perceived by clinicians as an event marked by the signaling of an agreement 
(this signal often but not always being the signing of a form). In its broad 
construction, obtaining consent is a process which begins with an open 
discussion of the purpose, benefits and risks of the proposed intervention 
and the alternatives (including the alternative of no treatment), and does 
not end until the treatment has been delivered or declined. These issues are 
explored between doctor and patient in the context of the patient’s values, 
goals and constraints, as discussed in Chapter 2 (pages 30-31). 
 
The construction of consent as a process rather than an event, while 
accepted unequivocally by professional groups47 and some academics48, has 
been challenged by Maclean49 who sees consent as a state of mind, and if it 
is a state of mind it should not also be regarded as a process50. In a sense, 
however, there is no conflict between both sides, as they both accept that 
there is a process of communication between doctor and patient and that 
there is a signal given by the patient at the end of the process. The only 
difference is that while one school of thought uses the word consent to refer 
to the entire pathway from consultation to signal, the other regards only the 
signal as consent, everything else is ‘the process leading to consent’51.  
 
Doctors appear to be concerned principally with the signal, that is the 
event, and not so much with the process that precedes, informs and 
determines that signal. The signal is, of course, an expression of the 
patient’s state of mind. 
 
The point about obtaining consent being a process rather than an event is 
more than a matter of semantics. The patient’s receipt, digesting and 
understanding of information is itself a process. When doctors take 
obtaining consent to be an event rather than a process, what they obtain is 
more likely to be an assent to what has been proposed (Category 3 
paradigm), than a real consent to treatment. Also when the courts look at 
where or not a valid signal (consent) has been given, they look at the 
preceding transaction. 
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The operational paradigm of consent tends to focus on the decision itself, 
paying insufficient attention to the process by which the decision is reached 
by patient and doctor. Any alternative model that takes due account of the 
communicative transaction leading up to the decision, rather than just 
focusing on the final decision, will meet the imperatives of cultural 
sensitivity while also upholding the principle of self-determination. 
 
 
The other flawed perception is seeing consent as primarily a means of 
securing protection against litigation. Advising that it is time this perception 
was abandoned, Clements52 said: 
 
 It is high time for a change of emphasis; we should no longer be 
 looking over our shoulder at the lawyers so as to escape a charge of 
 battery; rather, we should be seeking to improve the dialogue with 
 the patient to make sure that she has the information necessary to 
 express her choice of treatment.53 
 
This misperception has been a longstanding attribute of the health 
professions, but there is evidence that it is beginning to change. In the first 
seven editions (1952-1971) of the iconic Myles Textbook for Midwives 54 
there was no mention of Consent, Choice or Information. 55  Consent was 
mentioned for the first time in the eighth edition, but what the author 
described is not a true consent: 
 
 It is customary and expedient for midwives to request women 
 admitted in labour to sign a permission slip for the obstetrician-in-
 charge to carry out any treatment or operation which may be 
 considered necessary, including an anaesthetic. This is a wise 
 precaution,………. particularly at the present time when unscrupulous 
 persons may initiate litigation against medical staff or Area Health 
 Authorities on the slightest pretext When any treatment, operation, 
 or anaesthetic is required, the doctor will explain the situation to the 
 patient so that she understands what is involved.  When she signs the 
 permissions form, she gives her informed consent.  This is a wise 
 precaution.56  
 
In signing a ‘permissions form’ what the patient gave was not ‘informed 
consent’ but assent (the Category 3 paradigm). Clearly, the purpose of 
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‘consent’ in this context was protection of the healthcare professional from 
litigation. There was really no intention to uphold the patient’s right to self-
determination. 
 
Subsequent editions of the textbook57 showed a shift from ‘permissions’ to 
‘choice’: 
 
 The midwife must take care not only to talk to the mother but to ask 
 for her consent to what she plans to do and to invite her comments 
 and questions.  Promotion of informed choice is an essential element 
 of contemporary midwifery care……..It should be remembered that 
 for some women their choice is to relinquish control and it should 
 not..…be assumed that all women desire or are capable of taking 
 decisions about their care.  They are, however, all entitled to 
 information given in such a way as to assist their comprehension.58 
 
 
The consent form 
 
This thesis makes no distinction between implied and expressed consent nor 
between written and unwritten consent.  Most clinical consultations do not 
entail the signing of a consent form but the doctor is still in these 
consultations required to obtain the patient’s consent to any treatment that 
is proposed. Nevertheless, in the minds of doctors, particularly in secondary 
and tertiary care, consent is commonly equated to a signature on a consent 
form.59 This is despite the fact that there is no requirement in common law, 
and only exceptionally in statute60, for consent to be written. Also, doctors 
and patients have different perceptions of what the form is about, with 
many patients thinking that the primary function of the consent form is to 
protect the hospital.61   
 
In one study62, most patients (68%) thought consent forms allowed doctors 
to assume control. Less than half of patients believed that consent forms 
reflected their wishes.  One in every five patients did not know whether 
they could change their mind after they had signed the form, and 16% 
incorrectly thought that signing a consent form removed their right to 
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compensation if things went wrong. One in 10 patients reported that they 
did not know what they had agreed to when they signed the consent form, 
and approximately one-third were unsure whether the operation could be 
performed if they refused to sign the consent form. Nearly a quarter did not 
know whether the operation could be performed if they were unable to sign 
the consent form, and some mistakenly assumed it could not. The majority 
of patients (71%) did not know that their next of kin could not sign on their 
behalf if they were unable to sign for themselves.63  
 
Apart from failing to meet the requirements of patient self-determination, 
consent forms often fail the test of validity.64 Consent may be valid in the 
absence of a signed consent form; on the other hand, consent may be 
invalid even though a consent form has been signed: 
 
 The most outstanding finding of this study was the fact that 
 40% of the consent obtained for treatment was not valid immediately 
 after the consent form was signed.65 
  
Thus, for all of the attention focused on consent forms, the patients 
remained ill-informed and not in a position to assert their right to self-
determination. This has led one clinician to suggest that the consent form 
should be binned:66  
 
 …the consent form is the single most important obstacle to the 
 proper dialogue between doctor and patient…Preoccupation with the 
 form inhibits not encourages dialogue.67 
 
As stressed by the Bristol Inquiry68, consent is about communication, not 
forms: 
 The process of consent should apply not only to surgical procedures 
 but to all clinical procedures and examinations which involve any 
 form of touching. This must not mean more forms: it means more 
 communication.69   
 
If the Bristol recommendation for more communication rather than more 
forms is implemented, there would be a shift from category 2 and category 
3 to category 1 paradigm of consent, and the transactional approach 
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recommended by Manson and O’Neill 70  (described below) could stand a 
better chance of being realized. National guidance71 produced by the English 
Department of Health, however, appears inadvertently to favour more 
forms, although it also encourages better communication.  The guidance 
includes 4 forms covering adults and children, and awake and anaesthetized 
patients. It even includes a ‘consent form’ for treating incompetent adults, 
despite the clear legal position that consent cannot be obtained from the 
patient or his/her relatives. 
 
Manson and O’Neill72 note that the attempts to make consent more rigorous 
(in particular by making it more explicit and specific) have led to ‘the 
development of increasingly complex, lengthy and (at worst) 
incomprehensible consent forms’73.  
None of the above should be taken as meaning that there should be no place 
for documentation of consent. Binning the form does not mean that consent 
transactions should not be documented. Documentation of consent 
transactions constitutes what Manson and O’Neill74 describe as a ‘second-
order informational obligation’ 75. The obligation of clinicians to disclose 
information is a first-order obligation, and the obligation to ensure that this 
obligation is met is a second-order obligation 76 . The authors say that 
‘although the distinction between first and second-order obligation has 
received little attention in discussions of informed consent (in contrast to 
the relevant first-order informational obligations), it is an important 
distinction’77  but they do not quite say how the second-order obligation 
derives any importance other than from the importance of its corresponding 
first-order obligation. Arguably, however, an obligation to document the 
consent transaction will help ensure that communication is effective (see 
discussion below). Such documentation could include letters to patients 
after the consultation78. These would help the patient understand what has 
been communicated, consider it in his/her own time, and reach an informed 
uncoerced decision. 
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Patients’ perception of the consent process 
 
If doctors’ perception of consent is flawed, it is no surprise that the 
patients’ perception is problematic. In a study79 of the adequacy of the 
consent process as it is currently practiced, the authors arrived at this 
conclusion: 
 
 ….there is substantial disparity between the ideals of the consent 
 process as depicted in the bioethical model and how it is perceived 
 and experienced by patients. These findings are disconcerting for 
 healthcare professionals and patients alike and raise questions about 
 how far current consent processes genuinely fulfill their aim of 
 safeguarding autonomy and protecting patients’ rights.80 
    
 
Even when the consent process satisfies administrative and legal 
requirements, patients’ needs may not be met, and some patients may, for 
example, even consent to surgery they do not want.   Category 2 consent 
has a lot to answer for. 
 
In summary, a major limitation of the consent model is the apparent 
difficulty in translating the true essence of the model into clinical practice. 
From this perspective, it is somewhat surprising that there are not many 
more cases reaching the courts. Perhaps this is a reflection of the costs and 
difficulties of accessing the legal system and the hurdles of causation that 
have to be scaled in negligence law. Or could it simply be that, as 
Clements81 reminds us, ‘[i]n the great majority of contacts between doctor 
and patient, the patient is explicitly inviting … contact for she wants to be 
treated’82, and he/she is loathe to sue the doctor? Whatever the case, the 
ethical-legal concept of consent has not permeated medical practice. When 
doctors conduct consent transactions the background context is not 
knowledge of the legal principles but fear of litigation. As Jones83 stated, ‘it 
seems likely that the law does not have a positive effect on the quality of 
doctor-patient communication’84. 
 
Even in the cases that do reach court, there are factors which limit the 
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effectiveness of the consent model in securing protection of the patient’s 
right to self-determination. These factors relate to judicial constructions of 
consent. 
 
Limitations imposed by deconstruction in case law 
 
Apart from the limitations of consent in clinical practice discussed above, 
there are also limitations associated with the way in which the doctrine of 
consent has been deconstructed in case law. Although patient self-
determination lies at the heart of contemporary discourse on consent, it was 
not the main factor underlying the development of consent principles from 
the outset. Consent initially developed to protect bodily security and only 
subsequently was it seen as a means of protecting self-determination85.  
Various authors86 argue that despite the development of the legal doctrine 
of ‘informed’ consent, the patient’s right to self-determination is still not 
protected.  
 
In Chapter 3 (page 94), the view that the UK courts have proved incapable 
of standing firmly on the side of self-determination because they fail to 
apply a subjective test and have usually opted for either the professional 
standard or an objective prudent patient standard instead was discussed. 
Critics87 point to the continuing inclination of the courts to respect medical 
opinion as one reason why patient self-determination has not been fully 
protected. They also point out that the adoption of the objective rather 
than the subjective tests for disclosure standards fails to fully protect 
autonomy:88 
 
The need for consent was acknowledged (indeed rhapsodized) by the 
courts but proved to be ineffective all too often in the most 
problematic of cases. The underlying reason for this failure of English 
law always to uphold patient autonomy was the judiciary’s deference 
to the medical profession. Emphasis upon the ethical duties and 
professional standards of doctors inevitably undermined consideration 
of the rights of patients. The HRA [Human Rights Act] acts as a 
reminder that this is unacceptable within a democratic society 
adhering to the rule of law.89 
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Even after the test, appropriate or not, has been applied to determine 
whether disclosure met the reference standards, there is still the hurdle of 
causation. To establish a claim in clinical negligence one must prove not 
only breach of duty but also injury, causation and remoteness of damages.90 
The patient has to show that but for the failure to disclose the risk, s/he 
would not have suffered the injury; by traditional causation principles that 
held sway until Chester v Afshar 91  appeared to put a spanner in the works, 
s/he had to convince the court that if the risk had been disclosed s/he 
would not have proceeded with the treatment. This means that even when 
an injury has occurred, a claim may not necessarily succeed; where there is 
no injury, no claim lies, even if there has been failure to disclose risks. More 
importantly, the emphasis is on harm caused rather than enhancement of 
patient self-determination – and this raises questions about the suitability of 
action in negligence as a vehicle for protecting self-determination.92 
 
Lord Hope of Craighead, in Chester v Afshar93, recognised this problem: 
 
Liability for the non-disclosure of risks is judged by reference to the 
tort of negligence which looks to the nature of the doctor’s duty and 
applies the Bolam test to it, rather than the validity of the consent of 
the patient to what would otherwise be a trespass.  There are then two 
problems that face a patient who brings a claim for non-disclosure of 
risk: that of proving breach of duty and that of proving causation.  The 
greater the difficulties that stand in the way of the patient on these 
issues, the more difficult it is to say that the law of informed 
consent works as a means of protecting patient autonomy. 94 
(Emphasis mine) 
 
 
Beyond liability and causation, there are also limitations introduced when 
public policy considerations come to the fore. 95  These considerations 
include ethical and equitable use of limited resources and the need to 
protect the public good. Choice and communication issues may be limited by 
resource considerations, and allowing a competent minor to refuse life-
saving heart transplantation, for example, may be seen as contrary to the 
public good.96  It is argued in this thesis, however, that any model adopted 
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for the legal protection of patient self-determination cannot exist in a social 
vacuum and so must be subject to public policy considerations. The aim 
should not be to insulate such a model from public policy, but to have a 
legal framework that brings a degree of certainty to the relationship 
between the chosen model and public policy considerations. The consent 
model appears to lack this degree of certainty as there is no statutory 
framework and, despite the constraint imposed by precedence in case law, 
much is left to the whims and caprices of the judges in each case. 
 
Finally the concept of therapeutic privilege 97  may also be seen as one 
limitation of the doctrine of consent. The doctor’s therapeutic privilege 
allows him/her to withhold any information that might be harmful to the 
patient. In Sidaway98 Lord Scarman accepted this as an exception to the 
‘prudent patient’ test. 99  The extent to which therapeutic privilege 
compromises the principle of consent depends on how broadly or narrowly it 
is defined – too broad a definition defeats self-determination and restores 
paternalism. The narrow definition limits this privilege to cases where 
disclosure of information could cause a serious medical complication or 
render the patient incapable of exercising her right to self-determination100.  
Fears that therapeutic privilege could open the back door for re-emergence 
of medical paternalism are quelled by guidance from the professional 
bodies. The General Medical Council101 directs doctors as follows: 
 
You should not withhold information necessary for making decisions 
….unless you believe that giving it would cause the patient serious 
harm. In this context ‘serious harm’ means more than that the 
patient might become upset or decide to refuse treatment. 
If you withhold information from the patient you must record your 
reason for doing so in the patient’s medical records, and you must be 
prepared to explain and justify your decision. You should regularly 
review your decision, and consider whether you could give 
information to the patient later, without causing them serious 
harm.102 
 
Also, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists103 says that: 
 
It is reasonable to argue that therapeutic privilege is almost never a 
Edozien LC, 2013, Chapter 5 
 148 
basis for permanently overriding the obligation of informed consent. 
Ordinarily such overriding represents a temporary situation, one that 
will later allow the kind of communication conducive to the restored 
freedom of the patient.104 
 
 
It could be argued, therefore, that the medical profession has, independent 
of legal guidance, introduced safeguards against undue use of therapeutic 
privilege to thwart patient self-determination. As noted by McLean, ‘[i]t is 
paradoxical that once embraced by the professions, the importance of 
respect for autonomy seems to have been taken more seriously by them 
than by the law’105. Given the sources from which this guidance has come, it 
is likely to be adopted by the courts. As the law currently stands, however, 
therapeutic privilege remains an intrinsic element of the consent model. 
 
 
What is the way forward? 
 
So far, ways in which the consent model could be limited in its ability truly 
to protect the patient’s right to self-determination have been discussed.  
Two perspectives have been explored briefly: firstly, the difficulty in 
ensuring that the operational paradigm of consent matches the theoretical 
paradigm which is rooted in the principle of respect for self-determination; 
secondly, the deconstruction of the principles of consent by the courts. If 
consent, despite its increasing sophistication in the 20th and 21st centuries, 
is still not fully protective of patient self-determination, what is the way 
forward?  
 
There is no shortage of suggestions.106 The emphasis has been on the need 
to move from the professional standard of disclosure to the prudent patient 
standard – but, as discussed in Chapter 3 (page 92), this would only be 
substantial if the subjective rather than objective prudent patient standard 
is applied, and that comes with problems of its own. Some107 have suggested 
that therapeutic privilege should be abolished – but as stated above, the 
impact of this factor is diminishing anyway, given the strict professional 
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regulatory guidance. Twerski and Cohen108 suggest that self-determination 
could be protected by allowing patients to recover for a violation of their 
right to participate in decision-making. It would appear that currently the 
law focuses more on bad outcomes attributable to undisclosed risks rather 
than on the patient’s traduced rights. However, the legal mechanism for 
attaining this remedy is yet to be articulated.                                            
 
Almost all the suggestions for a way forward summarised above have one 
thing in common: they entail tinkering with the formulation and practice of 
consent. Perhaps what is needed is to give consideration to alternative 
models for protecting self-determination. Schultz109 has argued the case for 
development of a new course of action to protect self-determination as a 
distinct legal interest, but she falls back on traditional contract and tort 
analysis for the new course of action and, approaching a quarter of a 
century since her paper was published, there has been no movement in this 
direction. Over 20 years ago, the President’s Commission 110  in the USA 
suggested that ‘the traditional monolithic legal model of informed consent 
may require re-thinking’111. Although the inadequacies of the consent model 
have long been identified, concrete suggestions of alternatives have been in 
short supply. For example, the psychiatrist, Katz,112 has been a prominent 
critic of consent law in the US, but other critics113 have pointed out that 
‘despite [his] position as the most prominent theorist and critic of informed 
consent law, he has never formulated a comprehensive legal alternative to 
the current system’114. It is, therefore, refreshing that Manson and O’Neill115 
and Maclean116 have recently advanced new conceptions of consent. For new 
conceptions to make a difference, however, they have to offer more than 
modest increments to the huge scholarship on consent. More importantly, 
they should be not just intellectually stimulating ethical manna but tangible 
conceptions capable of enactment into the law to protect self-
determination.  Further, as noted earlier, it may be more productive to 
consider novel approaches instead of trying too hard to make the 
unworkable work. 
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Conceptual limitations in the consent model 
 
Although Manson and O’Neill say that their approach ‘is not novel or 
unfamiliar’117 their recent critique of consent is groundbreaking. Theirs is 
not merely an incremental advancement on previous ideas for ensuring that 
the consent model serves its intended purpose; rather, they take an original 
as well as nuanced approach to the subject.  They 118  identify two 
‘distortions’ in the way informed consent is currently conceptualised:  the 
first is the grounding of consent in individual autonomy; the second is the 
framework for information and communication in consent. 
 
They criticise consent, as currently operationalised, for concentrating on 
the content of communication – what information is disclosed – rather than 
the process of communication, and propose instead ‘a less exorbitant and 
more plausible account of consent’ 119 . Successful communication, they 
emphasise, is the transfer of meaning and calls for intelligibility, accuracy, 
honesty, and relevance. These attributes cannot be achieved with what 
Manson and O’Neill 120  describe as the ‘container-conduit’ model of 
communication which underlies the current approach to consent. This model 
focuses on disclosure of information: the patient makes an informed choice 
on the basis of this disclosure, and his/her right to self-determination is thus 
exercised. Information is seen as content, it is reified. The emphasis on full 
disclosure is misplaced, because communication is context-based. It is not 
‘how much’ but ‘how truthful, how relevant and how responsive to the 
needs of this patient’ (my parentheses). Thus the container/conduit 
metaphor has its uses but hides the richness of communication transactions.  
As an alternative to the container/conduit model, they advocate an ‘agency 
model’. 121  This model draws on each party’s background knowledge and 
inferential competencies. The agent-based model augments the 
container/conduit view by emphasizing that communication is a norm-
governed activity between agents. The difference between the two models 
is best captured in this passage: 
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 When information is discussed in terms of the conduit/container 
 model, it is thought of in abstraction from agents and from the 
 speech acts by which they communicate. When we rely on this 
 model, we think of information as ‘flowing’ or being ‘transferred’ 
 between agents, who are thought of quite abstractly as ‘originating’ 
 or ‘receiving’ messages. The message or content is highlighted, but 
 the act of communicating is hidden. 
 By contrast, when we view informing or communicating in terms of 
 the agency model, we focus not only on content, but also on the 
 speech acts by which agents communicate proposals, understand 
 others’ proposals, and respond to them. The agency model takes 
 account both of what is said (the speech content) and of what is done 
 (the speech act).122 
 
 
From these two models, the authors derive two accounts of informed 
consent:  a disclosure-based model which is based on full disclosure of 
information to the patient and ‘ignores the importance of reciprocal 
communication,’ 123  and a transactional model of consent which ‘defines 
better the justification, scope and standards of consent’.124 
The disclosure-based account requires that those seeking consent should 
disclose relevant information to those who have to decide whether or not to 
consent to the proposal but, according to Manson and O’Neill125, hides much 
of what is essential to giving or refusing genuine consent.  
 
Consent is a transaction126, and both the person asking for consent and the 
person giving consent should respect the norms for successful 
communication. This means that doctors should communicate truth-claims 
that are intelligible, relevant and adequately accurate, and patients should 
respond in ways that are intelligible, relevant and adequately accurate. 
Without these, purported consent is defective.127 
 
Manson and O’Neill may be over-emphasising or exaggerating the issue of 
full disclosure required in the ‘disclosure-for-decision-making model of 
consent’128. The law of consent in the UK does not require the provision of 
maximal information or oblige doctors to obtain ‘fully specific or fully 
explicit’ 129  consent ; it simply requires that sufficient information be 
provided to enable the patient make an informed decision,130 and it is the 
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court that ultimately decides what sufficient information is. All that is 
required for a valid consent is that the patient is able to understand in 
broad terms the nature and purpose of the proposed treatment.131 
 
Manson and O’Neill were not the first to suggest a focus on communication 
rather than standards of disclosure. Referring to the problems with consent, 
Faden and Beauchamp132 suggested that: 
 
[T]he solution lies not in reformulations of conventional or proposed 
legal disclosure standards, but rather in the adoption of a different 
approach to understanding informed consent – an approach that 
focuses more broadly on issues of communication, while dispensing 
with abstract and disembodied issues about proper standards of 
disclosure….133 
 
 
Maclean 134  also asserts the importance of communication, although as 
discussed above, he distinguishes between consent itself and the process of 
obtaining consent: 
  
…consent must be placed in the context of the professional-patient 
 relationship and…the approach to consent helps define that 
 relationship. A good relationship requires mutual trust and respect, 
 which includes an obligation to respect the other’s autonomy.† This 
 mutual respect requires open and honest communication allowing 
 both parties to play their role within the relationship. If healthcare 
 professionals are to respect their patients’ autonomy, they must 
 believe that the patient is consenting before they act. This belief can 
 only be reliably achieved by communication of the consent.135 
 
 
Professional bodies also acknowledge that there is more to consent than 
simply providing loads of information. The guidance and standards set by 
professional bodies136 for obtaining consent are consistent with Manson and 
O’Niell’s transactional model. The British Medical Association137 states that 
‘[i]nformation is useful only if it is provided in a manner that is accessible 
and intelligible to the patient, and is given at a pace at which the recipient 
can understand’.138 It also says that ‘consent is not a one-off event, but 
                                                 
†
 This point is emphasized in the discussion of medical professionalism below. 
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involves a process of information giving and explanation that facilitates 
informed decision making’. 139  This followed a report of a working party 
which concluded that:  
 
 Greater emphasis needs to be placed on the initial explanation given 
 to the patient, with provision for continuing opportunity for 
 discussion in order that the patient can raise any concerns and/or 
 questions.140 
 
It is important that the patient understands the information provided by the 
doctor, and the transactional approach facilitates understanding. An 
alliterative demonstration of what amounts to a transactional model as 
proposed by Manson and O’Neill can be found in Clements’ exhortation141: 
 
 To communicate choice effectively, we must first listen so as to 
 gather data, so as to understand the patient and to develop a rapport 
 and be able to respond to the patient’s emotional needs. 
 Communication in this context consists of: 
  Engaging; 
   Empathising; 
  Educating; 
   Enlisting. 
 Engaging with the patient includes greeting and introduction, seating 
 and body language, history taking, and determining her expectations. 
 Empathising means having imagination for the needs of others ‘To 
 know what kind of person has a disease is as essential as to know 
 what kind of disease a patient has.’ 
 Education includes the imparting of technical information in a form 
 and in language the patient can readily understand.  
 Finally enlisting: only at this point in the interview does the clinician 
 ask the patient to exercise choice and to indicate which treatment is 
 preferred. It will always be appropriate to record that decision.142.  
 
The main objections to the disclosure model are that the subjective needs 
of the patient are subjugated and that the patient is exposed to the risk of 
cognitive overload, both of which are inimical to self-determination. Some 
critics 143  are concerned that full disclosure leads to some patients 
unnecessarily refusing treatment and suffering unnecessary anxiety and 
sometimes dying as a result of untreated disease but, as discussed earlier, 
this claim gives a nod to paternalism. 
The difficulty in establishing what constitutes the optimal amount of 
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information, as discussed in Chapter 3 (page 88), bedevils the legal doctrine 
of informed consent. In the United States, ever-increasing amounts of 
information are being off-loaded onto patients and there is evidence that 
this information overload detracts from the value of consent. 144  The 
response of the patient to varying quantity, quality, and formatting of 
information has been likened to the logarithmic dose-response relationship‡ 
seen in pharmacology:  disclosure of too much information results in 
drowning of the message.145  
 
Schwartz and Bergus146 pose the question: 
 
Because human beings have cognitive limitations on the amount of 
 information they can process, informed consent processes can 
 present only a subset of the information available about the trial 
 interventions without overwhelming patients – which subset should be 
 selected?147 
 
These observations all underscore the need to shift focus from amount of 
information disclosed to ensuring that the patient has adequate 
understanding of the information that has been provided.  
 
The General Medical Council148 exhorts doctors: ‘[y]ou should check that the 
patient understands the terms that you use, particularly when describing 
the seriousness, frequency and likelihood of an adverse outcome’149.  
Simpson150 also would like to see more emphasis on patient understanding 
than on physician disclosure. The physician would have the burden of 
ensuring that the patient understands the information disclosed. Clearly 
such a prescriptive obligation, if regulatory, could work against patients’ 
interests, as a doctor will not proceed with treatment if he has no way of 
being absolutely certain that the patient understands the information that 
has been provided. In any case, legal enforcement of such an obligation 
could be impracticable. What is legal enforceable is a requirement that 
doctors should be seen to have made a reasonable attempt to check that 
                                                 
‡
 When the dose of drug exceeds the therapeutic range, no additional therapeutic effect is achieved and 
there may be adverse effects or harm from the excess dose. 
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the patient understands information that has been given – in other words, 
that they have complied with the guidance given by their regulator, the 
General Medical Council. 
 
The problem remains that efforts to make consent absolutely protective of 
patient self-determination could potentially mean that actual patient 
medical care is compromised. Furthermore, some argue, 151  despite the 
importance of self-determination, that it may be that some patients want or 
need a measure of paternalism and it is possible that the courts will 
recognise this. This is the position taken by critics who stress that the 
enforcement of the legal doctrine of consent should not cause patient harm 
instead of improving well-being152. These critics believe that many patients 
are unable to handle medical information in a way that results in meaningful 
decisions. They also say that patients often make decisions with very little 
reference to the information they have been given.153  
 
 
If emphasis shifts from simply providing information to ensuring that the 
patient understands what has been said, then more attention will be 
focused on communication skills, on the way information is provided and on 
checking that the patient understands the meaning and implication of the 
information provided – just as would normally be the case in a property 
transaction.  Emphasis on understanding is a central element of the social 
construction theory of consent:154 
 
…decisions may involve a process of voluntariness or unwillingness, 
with complex desires and resistances. Desires and feelings can 
confuse understanding but also enrich it. Initially, patients often 
want to reject dangerous, unpleasant treatments. Before they can 
willingly consent, they have to journey from fear of the treatment 
into greater fear of the untreated condition, with growing trust in 
their health carers……………….. 
Positivism tends to see patients’ abilities as fixed personal attributes. 
Social construction sees them partly as responses in relationships, 
influenced by the professionals’ abilities to explain, respect, and 
support.155 
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One of the implications of placing emphasis on the quality of communication 
in consent, in other words accepting the transactional approach, is that 
more attention will be paid to the obligations of both parties to the 
transaction – doctor and patient. As mentioned above, the consent model 
tends to focus on the obligations of the doctor while saying very little about 
the obligations and responsibility of the patient. In Chapter 9 (page 257) I 
will explore the potential of the property model for achieving the right 
balance of rights and obligations between patients and doctors. 
 
Manson and O’Neill’s observations on the disclosure model and argument for 
a transactional approach are important. Indeed these reach to the roots of 
the principle of self-determination. It appears, however, that they apply to 
Categories 2 and 3 paradigms of consent, not necessarily to Category 1 
consent. One of the criticisms leveled against Category 1 conceptions of 
consent is that they demand too much subjectivity, so it would be 
paradoxical if these conceptions were to subscribe to, or support, disclosure 
of large amounts of irrelevant and incomprehensible information. A lot of 
what the two scholars offer is new but, as shown above, closer scrutiny 
shows that quite a bit of what they suggest is reaffirmation of suggestions 
previously expressed by others within and outside ethics.  
 
There are other criticisms of the model proposed by Manson and O’Neill.  
Maclean 156  says that while Manson and O’Neill prioritise consent as 
communication, they do so primarily by focusing on the obligations of the 
healthcare professional, which in turn means that attention shifts back to 
disclosure and truthful disclosure rather than to interaction between both 
parties.157  He also makes the point 158  that Manson and O’Neill have not 
addressed how their model would work in practice, given the institutional 
constraints (such as those discussed above, I presume) ‘that have caused the 
liberal model of consent to mutate into a consumerist caricature’. 159 
Incidentally it is this caricature that Manson and O’Neill mistake for the true 
model in their rethinking of consent, as I have discussed above. 
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Some of the criticism of the Manson/O’Neill account is, arguably, either 
unfair or based on wrong conclusion. For example, Maclean160 jumps to a 
wrong conclusion when he says that ‘their assertion that autonomy is not 
the ethical justification for consent…means that they are not concerned 
with whether the person makes a good decision’161. The fact is that in their 
book and its forerunner, O’Neill’s Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics162, it is 
argued that there should be no ethical justification for individual decision-
making without taking account of the outcome (that is, whether it is good or 
bad) of the decision.  
  
Maclean’s 163  relational consent, another effort to overcome perceived 
shortcomings of the consent model, shares some attributes with the genuine 
consent model proposed by Manson and O’Neill. Notably, both parties 
emphasise the importance of communication and context in consent 
transactions. They differ in their conceptual foundations, however, because 
while the latter dismiss the justification of consent based on autonomy, the 
former asserts autonomy as the primary justification164. The core element of 
Maclean’s model seems to be that the agency and obligations of both the 
doctor and the patient are brought into play. This is based on the 
assumption that the libertarian model and the Manson/O’Neill model fail to 
find the right balance between agency and obligations in respect of both 
doctor and patient.  In this model, consent is a permissive state of mind 
that waives the right to bodily integrity and can be denoted as consentP.
 165
 
The process leading to consentP includes negotiation or shared decision-
making between doctor and patient, during which each party respects the 
other’s autonomy. Following negotiation, agreement is reached between 
both parties, and this can be denoted as consentA. The patient then gives 
permission, consentP. The signaling of consentP is an event distinct from, but 
integrated with, the process leading to it. 
 
Any proposed alternative to the current conception of consent should not 
only have the potential of providing enhanced protection of self-
determination, but should also ideally not be any more complex than what 
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already exists. As it is, there is enough confusion about the meaning and 
scope of consent, and adding complexity will not make it easier to 
implement respect for self-determination. So when Maclean says that 
‘consent as agreement, while not an essential part of the theory of consent, 
should be incorporated as an attribute [of consent]’ 166 , he introduces 
ambiguity and complexity that make his model susceptible to 
misinterpretation in clinical practice. If doctors don’t know enough167 about 
consent as currently described by the law, what are the prospects that they 
will distinguish clearly between consent as agreement and consent as 
permission, within one transaction? In any case, if agreement needs to be 
‘incorporated’ why is it not part of the theory of consent? And if agreement 
is not essential, should negotiation be part of the process - surely the 
expectation when negotiations begin is that agreement can, should or will 
be reached. Expectations may differ, so the stage is set for conflict even 
before negotiation starts. If agreement is not reached, this could have an 
effect on trust in the relationship, and the negotiation may turn out to be 
an ill-afforded waste of time. It is difficult to imagine that negotiation does 
much for protection of patient self-determination in a situation where the 
informational (and often social) gradient between the parties is steep. 
 
The problems associated with negotiation are accentuated by the model’s 
advocacy of persuasion. The situation where the doctor may think of 
persuading a patient is when the patient’s decision is different from the 
doctor’s preference. What professionalism and respect for self-
determination require in this situation is not for the doctor to persuade the 
patient but for him/her to explore the ramifications and implications of the 
decision and then leave it to the patient to make an informed choice. 
Anything more than this would be open to abuse – there is no sharp 
demarcation of where persuasion ends and coercion begins.  
For the reasons outlined above, it is concluded that Maclean’s approach to 
consent is too complex to find ready implementation in clinical and legal 
practice. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
There are difficulties in translating the theoretical principles of consent into 
clinical practice. These difficulties have resulted in an operational model of 
consent that differs from the theoretical model and which suffers the 
deficiencies that Manson and O’Neill have identified. The value of the 
Manson/O’Neill conception of consent (or any other) will, however, be 
measured by the extent to which it finds application in the law. Applying 
their model in law may not be easy and the authors themselves have given 
an eloquent bioethical treatise, but relatively little idea of implementation 
in law and in clinical practice. 
 
A working party of the British Medical Association168 stated in 2001 that ‘the 
whole process of obtaining patient consent must be thoroughly 
reassessed’ 169 . Manson and O’Neill 170  have tried to do that, as has 
Maclean 171. In doing so they sought a radical departure from prevailing 
approaches. It is argued in this thesis, however, that while their efforts are 
rich in intellectual content, they are too complex for application in clinical 
practice and for implementation in law. Perhaps it is time to consider 
alternative models to the consent model. In the subsequent chapters of this 
thesis, a fresh approach – property analysis – is examined as an alternative 
framework for protecting patient self-determination. 
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Chapter 6 
PROPERTY AND PROPRIETARY RIGHTS  
 ‘The meaning of ‘property’ varies according to its function in a particular context, and 
so we might conclude that it simply has no general meaning1
‘Property is a socially constructed concept; and former perceptions of property as a 
monopolistic right of control and exploitation have long since been eroded by wider 
conceptions of the public good’2 
 
 
What is property? 
 
The first step in propounding a property approach is to be clear what we mean 
by property, but this is a first step on slippery ground for, as Gray and Gray3 put 
it, ‘[f]ew concepts are quite so fragile, so elusive and so often misused as the 
notion of property’4. As with autonomy, property is not a monolithic concept. 
Property may be defined in layman’s terms and in economic, social and legal 
terms.  To the layman, property is tangible – land, house, car, book, and so on.  
In the economic sense property is a means of distributing wealth. In the social 
sense property is a means of protecting liberty and autonomy – for example, the 
child asserting its identity by proclaiming that a toy is hers.  In this thesis we are 
concerned primarily with property in the legal sense of the word. However, the 
legal and social dimensions of property sit by side: 
 
Countless assumptions and claims are informed by the idea of property 
without reference to official agencies of the law. Furthermore the open-
ended nature of many proprietary principles entails that, even when 
embodied in law, their official interpretation and implementation often 
interact with current social understandings of them5. 
 
 
The social dimension to the legal meaning of property is expressed in Demsetz’s 
affirmation that ‘[i]n the world of Robinson Crusoe property rights play no role’6 
and in similar imagery by Underkuffler7: 
 
The idea of a man’s coconuts being his property makes no sense if he is 
stranded, irrevocably, on an uninhabited island; property has meaning 
only when human relations, or conflicting claims among people, are at 
stake8.  
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This point is expanded by Gold9: 
…it is no good for me to claim ownership of a pen against the demands of 
a martian because the martian does not live by and under the rules 
imposed by our society. The pen is an instantiation of a norm – the 
exclusive rights of use and possession – that we, as members of this 
society at this time, have agreed or acquiesced in following. When we 
grant property rights to each other –assuming that we grant property 
rights for certain nonarbitrary reasons – we do so on the basis of  one or 
more ways of valuing the object or the individual to whom we grant the 
rights. That is, the determination of who should get which rights to which 
object depends on how we, in society, value the object – as beautiful, as 
a luxury, or as a commodity – and the recipient of the right – as deserving, 
as having highly developed tastes, or as a consumer10. 
 
 
This social dimension to the legal concept of property, the idea that we consider 
property not in isolation but in the context of the owner’s relationships with 
others, parallels the observation made in Chapter 2 (pages 27-30) that the 
individual’s right to self-determination exists not in a vacuum but in the context 
of relationships with other persons. This is the contextual emphasis that is 
captured by the ecological paradigm adopted in Chapter 1. 
 
 
An underlying reason for (or perhaps a consequence of) the looseness of 
definitions in this subject is that the legal theory of property is dynamic. As 
Gray11 puts it, ‘the definition of ‘property’ is constantly on the move’12. In the 
same vein, Grubb13 states that ‘the categories of property are never closed or 
static and shift with societal norms’14. Matthews15 proclaimed that: 
 
…the ambit of “property” had broken its bounds, and there was no 
stopping it. Debts… became “property”, governed by the same 
principles. So did rights of action. Intellectual property was 
invented, and subsumed into the property framework. Shares in 
companies, confidential information and goodwill, all were taken 
under the property wing. In the twentieth century we see energy as 
property, and other forms of information, and maybe personality 
and image as well. 16 
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Property as a thing 
 
The popular perception of property is that it is a ‘thing’17. This perception, the 
reified notion of property, dates back to two centuries ago when William 
Blackstone18 described property rights as comprising: 
 
that sole or despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises 
over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right 
of any other individual in the universe.19 
 
 
In contemporary society hardly anyone would argue that property confers 
absolute dominion. Property rights are subject to restrictions, for example, on 
what may be built where, and how the rights may or may not be enjoyed. This is 
more fully discussed later in this chapter.  
 
A century ago, Strahan20  affirmed that property must be a physical object and 
categorically stated that debts, patent and copyright were not property. At 
about the same time, however, Madison* produced this insightful conception of 
property:  
 
…In the former sense, a man’s land, or merchandize [sic] or money is 
called his property.  
In the latter sense, a man has property in his opinions and the free 
communication of them. 
He has a property of peculiar value in his opinions and the free 
communication of them. 
He has property of peculiar value in his religious opinions and in the 
profession and practice dictated by them… 
He has property very dear to him in the safety and liberty of his person. 
He has an equal property in the free use of his faculties and free choice of 
the objects on which to employ them. 
In a word, as a man is said to have a right to his property, he may be 
equally said to have property in his rights.21 
 
 
Despite the long existence of this broader concept of property, there are 
scholars who still uphold the narrower definition of property as a thing.22  While 
Gray23 asserts that property is not a thing but a concentration of power over 
things (see below), Penner24 maintains that ‘property is what the average 
citizen…thinks it is: the right to a thing’25. He argues that the concept of 
                                                 
*
 Fourth President of the United States of America. 
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property as a bundle of rights (that is, not as a thing but as defining the 
relationship between two persons) lies at the root of property’s identity crisis; it 
falls short of defining a particular legal relation and is not helpful to judges. For 
example, he asks, which of the rights in the bundle are essential, and is a 
critical number of rights essential?  
He cautions against defining property in isolation: 
 
…property is a creature of its environment, the legal system. We 
make a mistake if we think we can just wrestle it to the ground, 
take its measurements and fingerprints, and set it on its way again, 
satisfied that we have done all we need to understand it. We must 
be ecologists, and see how it behaves in its environment, 
interacting with its fellow creatures. But we cannot go too far in 
the opposite extreme, either. Property is not just its interaction 
with others. If we are inattentive to the categories themselves, 
these interactions may make us lose a sense of where property 
ends and other legal concepts begin.26 
 
 
In this quotation, Penner basically reiterates his point referred to earlier in this 
chapter, that the social and legal dimensions of property are intertwined. By 
warning of the consequences of going ‘too far in the opposite extreme’, he 
draws attention to the need for a conceptual framework which defines property 
in the legal sense. 
 
Penner’s advice that to understand property we must be ecologists echoes the 
ecology paradigm chosen for this thesis in Chapter 1 (page 17). He associates 
property with a right to things, this right being defined by the ‘exclusion thesis: 
the right to property is a right to exclude others from things which is grounded 
by the interest we have in the use of things’27. In his view, it is the concept of 
exclusion, not use, which is central to the definition of property:  
 
The right to property is thus a right to a liberty, the liberty to dispose of 
the things one owns as one wishes within a general sphere of protection. 
It is not the right to any particular use, benefit, or result from the use of 
property. The duty in rem of property correlates with the right to a 
liberty to dispose of property, not to a specific right in the value of 
property, or a right to any goal one may set on one’s use of it, and so 
on.28 
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Penner supports this view by referring to the court’s position in common law 
when faced with claims to property in news, events or information. In such cases 
the court does not ask whether the claimant has the right effectively to exclude 
the putative trespasser from the supposed property; rather, it asks whether the 
putative trespasser has a duty to exclude himself from it. 
 
If property is a thing and property rights are rights to things, what ‘things’ can 
be property? Penner29 provides an answer in the separability thesis which he 
expresses as follows: 
 
Only those ‘things’ in the world which are contingently associated with 
any particular owner may be objects of poverty; as a function of the 
nature of this contingency, in theory nothing of normative consequence 
beyond the fact that the ownership has changed occurs when an object of 
property is alienated to another.30 
 
 
In other words, to be conceived of as an object of property a thing must first be 
considered as separable and distinct from (i.e. “contingently associated” with) 
any person who might hold it, and is for that reason rightly regarded as 
alienable’31. Thus, our talents, personality, eyesight and friendships cannot be 
property. Similarly, rights such as the right to marry cannot be property rights – 
because they are not separable from the person. A taxi licence is property 
because it is freely alienable but a licence to practice medicine is not property 
because it is not separable from the holder.32 Applying this thesis to body parts, 
it could be argued that one’s kidney is not property whilst it is in vivo, but 
becomes property when it has been removed from the body. On the same 
analogy, sperm would be an object of property once it has been ejaculated. In 
the same vein, the patient’s right to self-determination cannot be property, 
since it is not separable from the patient. 
 
Penner’s analysis helps to clarify various attributes of property but is unlikely to 
withstand the tide of change that has been creating new objects of property, 
many of which are not tangible things. 
 
In English law, property is classified as real or personal33. Real property is land. 
Personal property (or personalty) is all the property that is left once real 
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property has been subtracted. Personal property may be chattels real 
(principally leasehold interests in land) or chattels personal (all other personal 
property). Chattels personal are divided into choses in possession and choses in 
action.  
 
Choses in possession are tangible, movable things, and are called ‘goods’ when 
they are the subject of a sale. Proprietary interests in tangible personal property 
are defined in terms of possession and ownership, but these terms are not well 
defined. Proudhon34 ventures a comparison: ‘a lover is a possessor, the husband 
a proprietor’35. A possessor may have property rights but no ownership. 
Proudhon36 states that the right in a thing (jus in re) rests with the possessor, 
but one does not have to be in possession to have the right to a thing (jus ad 
rem)37.  In contemporary law, the gap between personal and proprietary 
entitlement appears to be narrowing, and it has been suggested that human 
rights law bridges the gap between the two. The provisions of the European 
Convention on Human Rights38 relating to liberty and security (Article 5) and to 
private and family life and home (Article 8) have legal implications for what can 
or cannot be done with realty so, Gray and Gray39 argue, could be seen ‘as 
creative of new forms of proprietary entitlement’.40  
 
Unlike choses in possession, choses in action are intangible and cannot be 
physically possessed. Examples of choses in action are debts, shares in 
companies, and intellectual property. According to Holdsworth41, the term was 
originally used to cover rights associated with a personal action, such as 
trespass; only later was it applied to real action. In the 16th century, choses in 
action ‘were extended from a right to bring an action to the documents which 
were necessary evidence of such a right’42 - so bonds and, later, stocks, 
insurance policies and similar intangibles became choses in action.  
A chose in action is a property interest that can be enforced only through legal 
action (not by taking physical possession). Over a century ago, it was argued that 
a right of action in tort could be regarded as a chose in action.43 In Chapters 8 
and 9 (see pages 230 and 284 ), it will be argued that the patient’s right to self-
determination can be protected as a chose in action. 
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Property as commodity 
 
Some commentators portray property not only as a thing but as something that 
can be bought and sold in a market. Steinbock44 describes this attribute as ‘a 
very important element of property’45. However, while property may have this 
element, this is not necessarily or inevitably the case. Giving a dissenting 
judgement in the US case of International News Service v Associated Press46, 
Justice Brandeis said that the fact that a product had a value for which others 
were willing to pay was not sufficient to endow it with the legal attribute of 
property.  
Steinbock appears to be taking property as synonymous with commodity 
(something that can be turned to commercial or other advantage). In fact, 
property is sometimes but not always a commodity. This distinction is germane 
to any consideration of body or body parts as property. Some judges have 
dismissed property claims on the basis of inalienability of the object being 
claimed.47 Radin48, on the other hand, discounts the notion that market 
alienability is inherent in the concept of property. 
 
In National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth49, Lord Wilberforce described the 
hallmarks of a property right, stating that it must be ‘definable, identifiable by 
third parties, capable in its nature of assumption by third parties, and have 
some degree of permanence or stability’50. This may have been helpful in 
distinguishing between property and personal rights, but it promotes the 
obsolete image of property as something commerciable. Property need not 
necessarily be alienable, nor does it have to be tangible. 
 
Academic and judicial thinking which requires that an object be alienable in 
order to be regarded as property predates the biotechnology boom. In today’s 
world, property does not have to be alienable – so the right to sufficient 
information and to make one’s own informed decision  cannot be excluded from 
the class of property simply on account of its inalienability. This right has 
assumed such high premium in contemporary Western society that it arguably 
deserves the protection traditionally afforded to property. 
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It is arguable whether a core attribute of property is value; we would not usually 
attribute property rights to something that society does not value. To borrow a 
good illustration, a dead leaf fallen from a tree is not property but an 
accumulation of leaves in a compost pile is property.51 On the other hand, 
Moses52 argues that ‘[q]uestions of value will affect whether anyone cares that 
something is classified as property, but value ought not be treated as essential 
to the very concept of property’53.  
Generally, the more valuable the object becomes, the more precisely the 
property rights associated with it are defined and the more vigorously these 
rights are exercised. This is illustrated by the growing propertiness†of 
intellectual property.54  This core attribute of property underlies Proudhon’s55 
famous assertion that ‘property is theft’56: property rights or interests protect 
value; that which has no value cannot be property or object of property rights. 
The multitudinous perception of property in everyday discourse, however, led 
Gray57 to say that:  
 
Proudhon got it all wrong. Property is not theft—it is fraud. Few other 
legal notions operate such gross or systematic deception. Before long I 
will have sold you a piece of thin air and you will have called it property. 
But the ultimate fact about property is that it does not really exist: it is 
mere illusion. It is a vacant concept—oddly enough rather like thin air.58 
 
 
Property as relationship with a thing 
 
Another approach to property is to see it not as a thing but as a relationship 
between a person and a thing. Some theorists, notably Margaret Radin,59 see 
property as forming part of our personality and social relationships. According to 
her ‘property for personhood’ theory, the control that one has over 
environmental resources is part of one’s personality.  Property for personhood 
defines a relationship that is essential to self-identification. She distinguishes 
between personal property (property that is bound up with a person) and 
fungible property (property that is held purely instrumentally). The former 
‘could be described as simply a category of property for personal autonomy or 
liberty’,60 and, she argues, should have greater legal protection. A wedding ring 
                                                 
†
 A word increasingly used in property law, referring to the spectrum of attributes that is used to characterise 
an object as property  
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in a jeweler’s shop is fungible property but a wedding ring on the finger of a 
loving wearer is personal property because it is constitutive of the wearer’s 
personality. Extending that analogy, the body is personal property because it is 
also constitutive of the individual’s personality. She goes on to say ‘[t]his line of 
thinking leads to a property theory for the tort of assault and battery: 
Interference with my body is interference with my personal property’.61 
As will be seen in Chapter 7 (pages 208-216), this idea of property is used in 
arguments about commodification of the body. A weakness of the theory is that 
personality is defined in terms of relationship with objects rather than 
relationship with other persons. 
 
Property as rights against others or rights in, to or over a thing 
 
In everyday conversation, we usually speak of ‘property’ rather than ‘property 
rights’ but the contraction is misleading if it tends to make us think of property 
as things rather than as rights. A more modern view sees property not as a thing 
or a relationship between a person and a thing, but as rights against other, in or 
over things62. In other words, property can be seen as defining the obligations of 
persons with respect to a tangible or intangible object. When viewed in these 
terms – that is, property seen in terms of rights against others, rather than as a 
thing of commercial value – the concept of property rights in the human body 
would seem to have a more acceptable face. Intangibles to which property rights 
or interests have been attributed in contemporary discourse include welfare 
benefits,63 franchises,64 whiteness,65 racial identity,66 personhood,67 university 
degree68 and air space.69 Some have gone further to say that property 
establishes a legal relationship between persons, not necessarily with reference 
to things.70  
 
A property interest indicates not necessarily that the holder owns something, 
but that someone owes him an obligation. Unlike contractual rights, which are 
enforceable against a particular person or persons (rights in personam), property 
rights are enforceable against the whole world (rights in rem). Rights against 
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others can be seen as negative rights,
 as expressed in Matthews’ view of 
property: 
 
The common law sees property as essentially negative, the right to 
exclude others from something, or from some aspect of something. 
This negative right may be absolute, as for example “This is my 
pen”. I can exclude everyone from every thing in relation to it. Or 
it may be limited – even isolated as in for example “I have a right 
to light over (your) land”. I can prevent you from building in a 
certain way on your land. Sometimes the negativity imposes a 
positive obligation on another person, as in “You owe me £10”71. 
  
The concept of property as rights against others owes its place in the annals of 
property law to the seminal work of Wesley Hohfeld72. He described four types 
of ‘right’: claim-rights (A has a claim upon B and B has a reciprocal duty to A); 
liberty rights (A has the freedom to act in a certain manner or to enjoy a facility 
if he so desires, free of encumbrance from B, C or D); powers (A is statutorily 
empowered to act in a particular way); and immunities (A is ‘immune’ from the 
powers of B). It has been pointed out that these categories of rights are not 
mutually exclusive. Thus, A’s rights to a particular property could include a 
claim-right restraining B from using that property without A’s permission, a 
liberty-right allowing A to freely use the property, the power to sell the 
property, and immunity from the power of B to arbitrarily dispose of the 
property. Claim-rights are categorised as ‘positive’ or ‘negative’. Positive claim 
rights require an act of commission from the duty-bound party. For example, a 
right to be consulted before disposal of one’s cryopreserved gametes is a 
positive right. On the other hand, negative claim rights simply require non-
interference. Applying this to the doctor-patient relationship, it can be said that 
the patient has a negative claim right on the doctor not to be treated without 
his/her permission, or a positive claim right on the doctor to obtain his/her 
permission before proceeding with treatment. The patient who opts to die 
rather than undergo an amputation may be said to be exercising a liberty right 
which allows him/her to manage his/her body in the way deemed fit. 
 
Honore73 utilised the Hohfeldian classification of rights as a framework to define 
ownership of property. Ownership is established by the presence of a clutch of 
                                                 

 In Chapter 7, I reiterate the point that property rights could generate positive claims 
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‘incidents’, including the claim-rights to possess, use, manage, and receive 
income; the powers to transfer and exclude, the liberty to consume or destroy; 
immunity from expropriation; the duty not to use harmfully. The ‘bundle of 
rights’ definition of property is rather broad and does not distinguish between 
legal ownership and beneficial ownership as applies when items of property are 
held on trust. It also leaves open the categories of tangible and intangible things 
that could be objects of property, and some core attributes or rules could help 
restrain the subject. Grubb74 describes three such rules that define a proprietary 
relationship: user entitlements (which allow a person to exploit or enjoy the 
thing), exclusionary control (which prevents others from dealing with it), and 
dispositional liberties (which allow him to transfer it by gift, selling or other 
means).  
 
A different approach to defining ‘the “propertiness” of property’ is taken by 
Gray75 for whom the key criterion is ‘excludability’: 
 
…a resource can be propertised only if it is … excludable. [It] is 
excludable only if it is feasible for a legal person to exercise 
regulatory control over the access of strangers to the various 
benefits inherent in the resource76. 
 
 
He goes on to say that a resource may be non-excludable for physical, legal or 
moral reasons, and a resource cannot be propertised if, on any of these grounds, 
it lacks the quality of excludability: 
 
.….“property” resides not in consumption of benefits but in control 
over benefits. “Property” is not about enjoyment of access but 
about control over access. “Property” is the power-relation 
constituted by the state’s endorsement of private claims to 
regulate the access of strangers to the benefits of particular 
resources. If, in respect of a given claimant and a given resource, 
the exercise of such regulatory control is physically impracticable 
or legally abortive or morally or socially undesirable, we say that 
such a claimant can assert no “property” in that resource and for 
that matter can lose no “property” in it either. Herein lies an 
important key to the “propertiness” of property77. 
 
 
If property is about control over access, then the right to bodily integrity can be 
regarded as a property right. It is not morally, socially or legally undesirable for 
persons to have control over their body so, on Gray’s analysis, a person can 
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assert property rights over their body. In the context of doctor-patient 
communication, ‘control over access’ should entail being in a position to make 
an informed decision based on adequate information about the diagnosis of 
proposed treatment. Control over access should manifest as having the final say 
about whether information should be provided. The patient may not wish to 
know the diagnosis or the risks of treatment, and can exercise his/her right to 
self-determination by asking the doctor not to disclose this information. Thus 
the patient, in property terms, retains control over access, and his/her property 
right – or the right to self-determination - is upheld. 
More recently, Gray has (with his co-author)78 described property as being ‘not a 
thing but a power relationship - a power relationship of social and legal 
legitimacy existing between a person and a valued resource (whether tangible or 
intangible)’.79 They further characterize property as not only a relationship but 
also one of socially approved control: 
 
Once property is recognised as a relationship of socially approved control, 
it becomes infinitely more accurate to say that one has property in a 
thing rather than to declare that something is one’s property. To claim 
‘property’ in a resource is, in effect, to assert a strategically important 
degree of control over that resource. ‘Property’ is simply the word used 
to describe particular concentrations of power over things and resources, 
and every claim of ‘property’ comprises the assertion of some quantum 
(or amount) of socially permissible power as exercisable in respect of 
some socially valued resource. The implications of this perspective are 
significant.80 
 
This description captures to an extent an underpinning concept of this thesis: 
while property is commonly viewed as a thing, as something tangible, it is more 
helpful to see it as the relationship between two or more parties with respect to 
a tangible or intangible object which has social value. While this distinction is 
important for our purpose, however, it is not enough. A more robust and 
comprehensive definition is needed. The law cherishes certainty, and the 
challenge is to synthesise a conceptual framework that will define property for 
today’s as well as tomorrow’s world. 81 Two attempts at formulating such a 
framework will now be discussed briefly. 
 
Writers attempting to ‘wrestle property to the ground’82 tend to use a canvas 
that reflects their own specialisms83 and Harris84  is not different in this regard. 
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The title and context of his work reflects his specialization in legal philosophy. 
The aims of his study related to justifications for property institutions and 
questions of resource allocation, but it was essential as a starting point, to 
define the features of property institutions. He posits that a property 
institution85 has two essential elements: trespassory rules and the ownership 
spectrum. He defines ‘trespassory rules’ as 
 
…any social rules, whether or not embodied in law, which purport to 
impose obligations on all members of a society, other than an individual 
or group who is taken to have some form of open-ended relationship to a 
thing, not to make use of that thing without the consent of that individual 
or group.86 
 
 
Thus, for example, trespassory rules protect a patented idea from unauthorized 
use. The degree of trespassory protection afforded a property is dependent on 
the ’property-specific justice reasons’ underlying that object, natural rights 
attracting extensive trespassory protection. Some things, such as sunlight and 
air, have no trespassory rules applied to them and are not property or the 
subject of proprietary rights. 
 
The ownership spectrum is the range of open-ended relationships protected by 
trespassory rules, and any relationship along the spectrum is an ‘ownership 
interest’. At the lower end of the spectrum is ‘mere property’, and at the upper 
end is ‘full-blooded ownership’. At the lower end, there are open-ended use-
privileges and open-ended powers of control over uses made by others, but with 
restrictions on transmissibility. At the upper end, there is a prima facie 
assumption that the holder of the proprietary right is ‘entirely free to do what 
he will with his own, whether by way of use, abuse or transfer’87.  The 
ownership privileges are unlimited only in so far as they do not conflict with any 
property-independent prohibition or property-limitation rules88.  Ownership 
interests are also subject to expropriation rules such as may be applied by the 
judicial system through the doctrine of proprietary estoppel89 or by the legal 
system through a variety of legislation90. Similarly ownership interests are 
subject to appropriation rules, for example rules of succession to the property of 
deceased persons in certain circumstances. 
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In summary the Harris model of property can be depicted thus: 
 
 
 
 
 
Harris’ trespassory rules are more or less conceptually identical to Penner’s 
exclusion thesis. His ownership spectrum is not poles apart from Penner’s 
separability thesis, but there are basic differences. In the separability thesis, 
property is intrinsically alienable. In the ownership spectrum, it is only interests 
in the upper half of the spectrum that are transmissible. 
 
One problem with the Harris model is that the term ownership is ambiguous. 
Harris himself acknowledges that ‘[a]ll attempts in the history of theorizing 
about property to provide a univocal explication of the concept of ownership, 
applicable within all societies and to all resources have failed’91. Also, while 
ownership is central to the meaning of property in everyday language, there are 
some proprietary interests that do not entail ownership92. 
 
Any framework meant to define the meaning and scope of property should 
address the following key questions: What determines the extent to which one’s 
property rights are protected? If the right to property is a right to exclude others 
from things, is this exclusion absolute for all time? To what extent is this 
protected in the face of competing public interests? Harris’s93 definition of 
property addresses some but not all of these questions. A more comprehensive 
framework, which is also consistent with the ‘ecologic’ ethos of this thesis, is 
provided by Underkuffler94. 
 
 
Underkuffler: property has four dimensions 
 
Laura Underkuffler’s framework95 for defining property is elegant as well as 
comprehensive. She establishes that property has four dimensions. Reference 
has been made above to property as rights – such as rights to possess, use or sell, 
right to commercial gains, right of protection, right to exclude. These, including 
 
Property  = trespassory rules + ownership interest   
 property-limitation rules 
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Penner’s exclusion thesis, constitute the first dimension, which Underkuffler 
terms ‘a theory of rights’96. Reference has also been made to property as a 
thing, the object to which the theory of rights applies – for example land, body 
parts, trade secret. This is the second dimension, or the ‘spatial dimension’97 of 
property98. The third dimension is ‘stringency (of protection)’99 – not all property 
rights are given equal treatment, some are more protected than others. The 
right to exclude is almost absolute, but the right to sell is given little protection, 
the interest in anticipated gain and the right to use are also less protected. 
Similarly, some things are less protected than others: money less than real 
property. Also property involving same rights and things may be afforded 
different protection under different circumstances. The fourth dimension of 
property is time – at what points in time are the above dimensions determined, 
and once determined is the right fixed or does it vary, potentially, thereafter?100 
To what extent are the property rights I acquire today protected against changes 
in legislation or perceived public interest tomorrow? 
 
In demonstrating how this four-dimensional model of property can be applied, 
Underkuffler distinguishes between two conceptions of property in law, the 
‘common conception’ and the ‘operative conception’101.  The first two 
dimensions of property are common to both conceptions, but there are 
fundamental differences in relation to the other two dimensions.  In the 
common conception, an assumption is made for equal protection of all property 
rights, and protection of individual interests against collective change is 
established for all time, bar a dire threat to public safety. In the operative 
conception, all property rights are not protected equally, and rights to exclude, 
use or transfer may be curtailed if deemed necessary for the public interest.   
Which of these two conceptions we choose will affect what ‘property rights’ 
mean in law: the common conception strongly protects the individual’s interest 
against competing public claims, the operative conception does not102. 
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Table: The Underkuffler model of property 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Underkuffler’s model, summarized in the table above, is adopted in this thesis. 
This quaternary model has been chosen because it encapsulates the various 
conceptions and dimensions of property and provides a straightforward 
framework for what is a complex subject. It also provides the flexibility that 
allows new categories of property that may not necessarily be tangibles. When 
property analysis is deployed to explore the nature of the relationship between 
persons, in this case the relationship between doctor and patient, the more 
useful model is not that which simply reifies property but that which regards 
property as defining a relationship between two parties with respect to a 
tangible or intangible entity. Also, as the face of medicine is rapidly changing 
with advances in biotechnology, and as the range of objects regarded as objects 
of property is constantly changing, it is advantageous to have a model that takes 
into account both time and the stringency of protection accorded to objects of 
property, as this provides for adaptability without abandoning consistency.  
 
 
Is the search for a definition of property futile? 
 
What emerges from all this is a realisation that the jurisprudence of property is 
cloudy. It may be argued that the search for a definition of property (and quasi-
property) is futile, going by Paul Kohler’s103 observation: 
 
We might well have views as to whether or not human body parts 
should be regarded as property but that is not because we have a 
definition of property to which they do or do not correspond but 
because we have certain views on the efficacy or otherwise of 
making them subject to such a regime. In other words it is not 
towards the definition of the subject matter, but the consequences 
of the categorization that we look, when we debate whether 
Dimension       Common conception      Operative conception 
 
Theory of rights  Explicit   Explicit 
Spatial dimension  Explicit   Explicit 
Stringency of protection Equal protection  Unequal protection 
Time    Frozen in time   Fluid in time 
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something should or should not be regarded as property. Thus 
society might in the near future recognize some form of property in 
in situ kidneys and whether or not is does have nothing to do with 
any definition of property to which it might subscribe but with the 
moral and practical consequences of adopting such a stance.104 
 
Kohler’s observation is exemplified by Steinbock’s105 remarks: 
 
Cases like Hecht require judges to ask whether sperm is property because, 
if it is not, then it cannot be bequeathed by will. This suggests that we 
should first decide what property is, determine whether sperm is that sort 
of thing, and then conclude whether sperm can be bequeathed. However, 
this approach is backward. Whether sperm is property depends on what 
we think may permissibly be done with it. If there is a strong moral 
argument against allowing individuals to store sperm for the purpose of 
posthumous reproduction, then sperm should not be considered property 
for that purpose. If there is no such argument, sperm is rightly regarded 
as an asset that can be bequeathed by will.106 
 
This position may be considered to be more in keeping with a social than a legal 
approach to property. On the other hand, it highlights the fact that sometimes 
legal rules and decisions have to follow public policy, a theme that recurs in this 
thesis. If what the law is prepared to accept as property simply reflects extant 
moral and ethical values, then the more sacrosanct the right to self-
determination becomes, the more likely it is to be accorded the status of 
property – and as Chapter 9 (see page 253) seeks to establish, the right to self-
determination has in recent times been regarded [more or less] as sacrosanct in 
English law. 
 
Quasi-property 
 
Difficulties in defining property have led to the notion of quasi-property. There 
are some interests or resources that are currently regarded as property, but 
which have not always been so regarded. In their transition from non-proprietary 
to proprietary status, many of these evolved through a category known as ‘quasi-
property’107. This category has been described as: 
 
…a means of identifying things which whilst not property in the 
absolute meaning of the term, display (from certain perspectives at 
least) enough of a proprietary aspect to make the property parallel 
a useful tool of analysis.108 
Edozien LC, 2013, Chapter 6 
 183 
 
 
Most intellectual property passed through this category. In International News 
Service v Associated Press109, the majority judgement upheld the notion of a 
quasi-property in news. Under the consent provisions of the Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Act 1990110, persons undergoing fertility treatment are granted 
some dispositional control over their sperm, eggs and embryos – and this may be 
regarded as quasi-property interest. 
 
The concept of quasi-property has, however, been described as ‘a legal 
fiction….. a judicial contrivance that provides a legal basis for judicial 
remedy’111 and as ‘something evolved out of thin air to meet the occasion’ 112.  
 
Rather than resort to legal fiction, this thesis adopts a Madisonian approach to 
property. The notion of property as a thing is discarded; Underkuffler’s 
framework is adopted. Applying this framework to the context of this thesis, the 
rights to self-determination and bodily integrity belong to the first dimension 
described by Underkuffler, and the body itself is the second dimension. The 
right to self-determination is highly cherished by society and by the courts113, so 
will probably be given greater protection than some other property rights, but 
rights to exclude, use or transfer may need to be curtailed if and when deemed 
necessary for the public interest (third dimension). Finally, rapidly evolving 
bioethics and swift advances in biotechnology necessitate a protection of 
property that is fluid in time (fourth dimension).  
 
 
Property and human rights  
 
In Chapter 2 (page 41) the dominance of rights thinking in today’s world was 
identified as one of the drivers of the retreat from paternalism. Just as rights 
discourse is on the ascendancy, so is the rhetoric of property. It has been 
observed that: 
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...the rhetoric of property has significant political purchase….The 
successful characterisation of a thing as an object of property, a process 
which takes place in everyday language, in law, and in political discourse, 
can be of immense strategic value both in engineering and retarding 
social change.114 
 
Underkuffler115 states that property has ‘symbolic meaning and rhetorical 
power’116, and that ‘it is the desire to capitalize on this symbolic meaning and 
rhetorical power that has motivated attempts to broaden the range of individual 
rights included within the concept of property’.117 
 
In democratic societies, the right to own property is regarded as a basic right, 
but this has not always been the case. It was John Locke118 who famously put 
forward the theory that individuals had a natural right to property. It must be 
stressed, however, that Locke took a broad view of property: it included not 
only one’s possessions but also one’s life and liberty.  There is a close 
relationship between property, rights and self-determination. As Underkuffler119 
observed, the historical (going back to Locke) view of property ‘was tied to the 
notion of human beings as masters of themselves’.120 
 
Some theorists argue that ownership of property is a fundamental human right 
that should be entrenched in a bill of rights, but others disagree121. In any case, 
property rights and personal rights interdigitate. Harris122 showed that there is a 
sense in which property may be said to be a human right, ranking below life but 
alongside liberty. In Lynch v Household Finance Corp123, Justice Stewart declared 
the dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights a false one. 
Indeed, property rights arguably derive their legitimacy from personal rights: 
 
Property is not thought to be a right because it is an enforceable claim; it 
is an enforceable claim only because and in so far as the prevailing ethical 
theory holds that it is a necessary human right.124  
 
On some occasions rights have been in conflict: in National Provincial Bank v 
Ainsworth,125 the property rights of the husband were allowed to override the 
personal rights of the deserted wife, but in Davis v Johnson126, Lord Denning 
declared: ‘Social justice requires that personal rights should, in a proper case, 
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be given priority over rights of property’127.  Increasingly the conflict is being 
resolved in favour of personal rights, on the basis of collective visions of the 
social good. Justice Murphy said in Dornan v Rogers128 that property rights were 
limited by ‘the interfaces between accepted and unaccepted social claims’129. 
Similarly, Gray130 asserted that: 
 
It has always been one of the fundamental features of a civilised society 
that exclusory claims of property stop where the infringement of more 
basic human freedom begins….The law of property has always said more 
than is commonly supposed about the subject of human rights.131  
 
He132 also remarks that the borderline between rights in rem and rights in 
personam is crucial:  
 
…for it expresses an important social judgement. The designation of a 
right as ‘proprietary’’ is a kind of social accolade which signifies that a 
certain importance is attached to the entitlement in question.133 
 
 
The eminent rights scholar Joseph Raz134 objects to an individualist approach to 
rights: 
 
It regards rights as being by their very nature a way of protecting 
individual interests against the interests or claims of the public or 
collectivity, or against whatever reasons there are to promote the general 
good. The individualist view of rights is confrontational: Rights set the 
limits of the public sphere, in which each individual is sovereign over his 
or her own affairs, as against the public domain, where the public 
interest, as determined by political action prevails. Rights protect 
individuals against demands that they contribute to the public good, or to 
the welfare of other individuals.135 
 
Favouring a broader approach, he goes on to argue that: 
 
[T]he reason for caring about the violation of any one’s right to property 
therefore transcends concern for the interest of that person in his 
property. Moreover, it transcends concern for the interest of all property 
owners in their property…….My right in my property is based on my 
interest in having that property. But the weight given to my interest, the 
degree of protection it deserves, and the form that protection should take 
are morally determined by considerations which transcend concern for my 
interest in itself. They reflect the interest of other people in the common 
good of respect for property.136 
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Such public interest reasons are not difficult to identify, for as observed by the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey, ‘property rights serve human values. They are 
recognised to that end and are limited by it’137. Thus if property rights were to 
be claimed over one’s body, the boundaries of those rights will be influenced by 
society’s vision of common good as well as by the rising tide of rights thinking. It 
will also be influenced by the observation that:  
 
…increasingly the courts fashion proprietary rights in order to give effect 
to what are thought to be the ‘legitimate’  moral expectations of litigants 
or the demands of conscionable conduct in their dealings.138 
 
 
A narrow conception of property will be as atomistic as the narrow conception of 
self-determination that has bedeviled bioethical discourse. Advocating the more 
comprehensive concept of property, Underkuffler139 states that it: 
 
…recognizes the individual’s need to develop the capabilities of self in the 
context of relatedness to others; it stresses that individual autonomy and 
social context are in fact deeply intertwined. By viewing a collective 
context as necessary for the definition and exercise of individual rights, 
the comprehensive approach to property forces us to rethink the 
relationship between the community and individual rights.140 
 
Against the background of the above, and in keeping with the ecological 
metaphor adopted at the outset, it is submitted in this thesis that personal and 
proprietary rights must be defined and exercised in the context of public policy. 
It follows that the concept of property adopted in this thesis is available to the 
courts even where they have to take public policy into consideration when 
deciding cases concerning the patient’s right to be involved in decision-
making.141 
 
The rise of rights thinking combined with the increasing strategic value of the 
property rhetoric, as discussed above, means that there is fertile ground to grow 
the seeds of a property model in healthcare decision-making. The question 
remains whether the courts will go with the tide, and this will be discussed in 
Chapter 9 (page 273). 
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Conclusion 
 
Whilst the right to own property is fundamental in western democratic societies, 
the definition of property varies from one context to another. Definitions of 
property advanced by various legal scholars have been described. At various 
times and in various places property has been taken to be a thing, a relationship 
with a thing or a relationship with other persons characterized by rights against 
others to or over a thing. For the purpose of this thesis, the notion of property 
as a thing is rejected and a proprietary right is taken as defining a relationship 
with other persons characterized by rights against them to or over a fungible or 
infungible object. Underkuffler’s framework142 is adopted for two reasons: it is 
based on a broad conception of property and it has a robustness that facilitates 
legal certainty. In Chapter 9 (page 253), this framework will be applied to the 
principle of self-determination and to leading consent cases. 
 
Since the definition of property is constantly on the move, our chosen 
framework should ideally provide both certainty and flexibility. The dominance 
of rights thinking will lead to more proprietary rights being fashioned, and 
Underkuffler’s framework accommodates this. The language of rights and the 
language of property have in common the command of strong socio-political 
force. Inevitably this force will come to bear on patient self-determination in 
healthcare.  
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Chapter 7 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE BODY 
‘In any legal system operating in  a society which respects personal autonomy 
we would expect the law to allocate exclusive physical control over our own 
bodies and body parts to us’1 
 
 
In the last chapter, an attempt was made to show that while property may have 
a spatial dimension, it is primarily about relationships. Also, the rights protected 
as property do not necessarily have absolute protection, nor are they necessarily 
protected for eternity. These four attributes are captured by the Underkuffler2 
framework which was adopted as the model of property for this thesis. 
 
In applying property analysis to the subject of self-determination in healthcare 
decision-making, there are two possible approaches. The more obvious one is to 
consider one’s body as one’s own property. There is considerable reluctance on 
the part of ethicists and the courts to regard the living human body, or parts of 
it, as property, primarily because of the fear of commodification.  
An alternative approach is to regard the patient’s right to make decisions about 
their treatment as a proprietary right. This is a much less traveled road, if not a 
novel approach, which will be explored in this thesis (see next Chapter).  
 
The association of property discourse with commodification of the human body 
will be a stumbling block in any attempt to promote a property model in doctor-
patient consultations.  To dispose of this obstacle, as well as cover the spatial 
dimension of the Underkuffler framework, this chapter elucidates the issue of 
property rights in the human body and in body parts and particles. 
 
Lacks, Moore and property rights in the human body  
 
Henrietta Lacks3 was a poor, young black woman who died of cervical cancer in 
1951 in a segregated ward for black patients at the Johns Hopkins Hospital, 
Baltimore, USA. In the course of her treatment a sample of her cervical cells 
was, without her consent, sent to a research laboratory that was trying to grow 
human cells in culture. The cells became the first human cells to be discovered 
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to multiply outside the body. Fifty years later, her cells continue to live on as 
the HeLa cell line. HeLa cells have contributed to numerous biomedical 
discoveries and can be ordered from tissue culture supply catalogues4; they have 
traveled the world and been shot into space (to determine whether human cells 
could survive zero gravity). They have been used to develop a vaccine for 
polio, in numerous other research studies (relating to cancer, AIDS, 
radiation, and gene mapping), and to test human sensitivity to cosmetics 
and other products. The cells have given rise to a multi-billion dollar industry, 
yet her family was never compensated, and they were unable to look after her 
unmarked grave.  
 
Today, it would generally be accepted that to obtain the tissue without her 
consent was unethical5. The question arises whether she or her family are 
entitled to proprietary rights over the cell line. Her family did not test this in 
court, but someone else in a similar situation picked up the gauntlet. 
 
John Moore6 had hairy cell leukaemia which necessitated removal of his spleen 
at the University of California Medical Centre, Los Angeles. Moore signed the 
customary consent form for splenectomy. He was not informed that his 
extirpated spleen was going to be used for research. His surgeon, Dr Golde, 
working with other colleagues, undertook research on Moore’s T-lymphocytes, 
resulting in the development of a cell line and the Regents of the University of 
California were granted a patent for the method of producing this cell line as 
well as the use of this method to produce lymphokines. During the period of the 
research, samples of blood, skin and bone marrow were taken from Moore. The 
Regents contracted with the Genetics Institute Inc and Sandoz Pharmaceuticals 
Corporation to commercialise the research findings, the products of which were 
worth an estimated US$3 billion.  In 1983, seven years after Moore’s diagnosis 
was made, Moore was asked to sign a consent form permitting use of his body 
products and transferring rights in the products to the Regents. He declined and 
subsequently issued proceedings for inter alia, breach of fiduciary duty and 
conversion. He lost the claim of conversion but won on appeal, the Court of 
Appeal holding by a majority decision that Moore had property rights in his body 
part.7  While acknowledging that there were relevant policy considerations in 
this regard, the court held that there was no reason to believe that this 
                Edozien LC, 2013, Chapter 7 
 195 
proprietary right would hinder medical research.8 On appeal to the Supreme 
Court of California, a majority reversed this decision.9 Moore was given leave to 
sue for failure to obtain consent and for breach of fiduciary duty, but not on the 
basis of the ‘property’ claim. One of the reasons for given by the majority for 
taking this position was that granting Moore’s property claim would hinder 
biotechnological development: 
 
In effect, what Moore is asking us to do is to impose a tort duty on 
scientists to investigate the consensual pedigree of each human cell 
sample used in research. To impose such a duty, which would affect 
medical research of importance to all of society, implicates policy 
concerns far removed from the traditional, two-party ownership disputes 
in which the law of conversion arose. Invoking a tort theory originally 
used to determine whether the loser or the finder of a horse had the 
better title, Moore claims ownership of the results of socially important 
medical research, including the genetic code for chemicals that regulate 
the functions of every human being's immune system.10 
  
 
Another reason was that Moore's interest in his bodily integrity and privacy are 
protected by the requirement of informed consent, so there was no need to 
apply property analysis: 
 
…one may earnestly wish to protect privacy and dignity without accepting 
the extremely problematic conclusion that interference with those 
interests amounts to a conversion of personal property. Nor is it necessary 
to force the round pegs of "privacy" and "dignity" into the square hole of 
"property" in order to protect the patient, since the fiduciary-duty and 
informed-consent theories protect these interests directly by requiring 
full disclosure.11 
 
A third reason was that the scope of property rights in the body were better 
addressed by statute (‘legislative resolution’12) rather than case law. 
 
It is interesting to note that years before the Moore case, an American university 
regarded cell lines as its property. Leonard Hayflick,13 whose research was 
funded by the taxpayer, used an aborted fetus’s cells to create a commercially 
profitable cell line (W!-38). When he tried to sell the cell line, his university 
accused him of stealing public property and called in the police.  
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Whole communities have also suffered experiences similar to those of Lacks and 
Moore. An example is the case of the Tristan islanders14 who, on account of the 
extremely high prevalence of asthma in this remote South Atlantic island, were 
lured into providing blood samples to foreign researchers.  Subsequently genes 
associated with asthma were identified and patented and the patent rights were 
sold for $70 million. The islanders had no property rights to their genes. In a 
similar case15, a gene which might protect against HIV was extracted from blood 
samples taken from indigenous people in the Solomon Islands and New Guinea 
under the pretence of testing for diabetes, and only public pressure in the US 
forced the researchers to withdraw the patent of a gene. 
 
Mrs Lacks’s forebears, as slaves, were regarded as the property of their masters. 
Slavery was abolished in 177216 but even in the 21st century the ‘ownership’ of 
human beings is widespread in practices such as baby-selling and sex slavery.17 
The opprobrium associated with ancient and modern slavery, and with cases 
such as those of Lachs and Moore, has influenced the wider debate about 
property rights to the body and body parts.  As Alexandra George18 put it, images 
of slavery, exploitation and the degradation of humanity have a ‘rhetorical 
force’ that is ‘at least partly responsible for driving the confused and 
inconsistent principles that govern this area of the law’.19            
 
Self-ownership 
 
While it is now established that no-one can have property rights over another 
human, it remains contentious whether property rights can be claimed over 
one’s own body or its parts, in life or after death20. Morgan21 asserts that ‘[t]he 
‘property in his own person’ is less a metaphysical statement declaring self-
ownership, more a political statement denying ownership by another’. 22 
 
In activities such as prostitution and surrogacy, the body is used as if it were 
one’s property. It could be argued that men and women exercise property rights 
over their body and body parts when they part with their gametes in exchange 
for a sum of money, as happens in some surrogacy arrangements and gamete 
‘donation’ programmes and in so-called ‘rent-a-womb’23 surrogacy 
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arrangements. A sociopolitical activist even filed an application for a patent on 
herself.24 
 
Kant25 deplored the notion of property in oneself: 
Man cannot dispose over himself because he is not a thing; he is not his 
own property; to say that he is would be self-contradictory; for in so far 
as he is a person he is a subject in whom the ownership of things can be 
vested, and if he were his own property, he would be a thing over which 
he could have ownership. But a person cannot be property and so cannot 
be a thing which can be owned, for it is impossible to be a person and a 
thing, the proprietor and the property.26 
 
 
It will be noted here that Kant saw property as a thing – a notion of property 
rejected in this thesis. Locke,27 who affirmed that a person should be free from 
possession by others, thought of property in terms of the product of one’s 
labour, and it is not surprising that his position differs from that of Kant: 
 
Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet 
every man has a property in his own person: this nobody has any right to 
but himself. The labour of his body, and the work of his hand, we may 
say, are properly his.28  
 
 
The term self-ownership is applied to the sovereignty that individuals have over 
their body, skills, talents and labour. Jon Christman,29 who asserts that ‘insofar 
as my body moves or acts, I should be the one who has the ultimate say over 
what it does and where it goes’,30 champions this sovereignty. He argues31 that 
there are two construals of this term: 
 
One can be called Lockean and the other Hegelian, referring to the bodies 
of thought that these positions most closely resemble. The Lockean 
defense of self-ownership expresses the idea that self-ownership is 
necessary as a kind of protection, in particular against invasions by the 
state into the private and personal aspects of one's life. The Hegelian 
view is that self-ownership is more than a mere negative barrier against 
intrusion, but rather a positive good that manifests a person's extension of 
her personality and will into the world. Self-ownership, on  this view, is 
an expression of the person's embodiment in her own body and talents, 
and it is valuable because it is necessary for the self-expression that is 
constitutive of a truly human life.32  
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These two construals can be respectively described as 'self-ownership as non-
interference' and 'self-ownership as self-control'. It is noteworthy that these two 
construals are respectively similar to the narrow and broad conceptions of 
property and also to the narrow and broad conceptions of individualism 
discussed earlier in this thesis. Christman33 argues that rights to trade one's 
talents are more difficult to justify on the basis of self-ownership when that 
principle is understood as the manifestation of a person's interest in self-control 
than when viewed as non-interference.  If self-determination in healthcare is 
simply about mere avoidance of unauthorized touch (battery) then the first 
construal will permit the application of property analysis to the protection of 
self-determination. Adopting as has been done in this thesis a definition of self-
determination that is consistent with the ecological paradigmmetaphor, the 
second construal ('self-ownership as self-control') enables application of property 
analysis, with Madison’s broad conception of property being operative. This 
construal underlies the statement that ‘[t]he body is more than a utilitarian 
object: it is also a social, ritual, and metaphorical entity, and the only thing 
many people can really call their own.’34 
  
The language of self-ownership could have the advantage of establishing that, at 
least in this respect, all persons are equal irrespective of gender, race or social 
standing, but this advantage is outweighed by disadvantages. While the notion of 
self-determination adopted in Chapter 2 unites one’s values and aspirations with 
the physical self, forming one personality, the concept of self-ownership 
suggests a division between the physical body and the non-physical personality, 
with the latter claiming ownership of the former. This division also makes the 
body (the physical part of the person) an object of property; in other words, a 
thing. As discussed in Chapter 6, the notion of property as a thing is rejected in 
this thesis and the notion of property as defining relationships is preferred. 
Dwelling on self-ownership would only help perpetuate and reinforce the 
perception of property as a thing, a perception which leads judges intuitively to 
link property in the body to commodification.* Also, owning one’s self could be 
seen as one step towards owning another. The case for a property model 
advanced in this thesis is therefore based, not on self-ownership discourse, but 
on the property-as-defining-relationships-with-others concept of property. 
                                                 
*
 See glossary for a definition of commodification 
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The increasing application of property analysis to body parts and particles
 
 
Increasingly, property analysis is being applied to the body and (especially) body 
parts and particles.35 Attempts to exercise property rights have been extended 
to embryos, with divorcing couples seeking to exert claims on frozen embryos as 
if they were property.36 
 
One driver for ascribing property to the body and body parts is the ascendancy 
of rights thinking (discussed in Chapter 2). If self-determination is a state in 
which individuals have control over material conditions which shape their 
character, then property, as seen in Chapter 6, offers a strong means of having 
and exercising control rights. Rights thinking, however, is arguably not the main 
driver for the increasing application of property analysis to body parts and 
particles. Although self-determination is an important enough principle to drive 
claims to property in the body or body parts, it is commercial interests in 
biotechnology that currently appear to be the principal driver.37 
 
Biotechnology 
 
With burgeoning biotechnology, the value of human tissue has increased 
astronomically and many more stories like that of Lacks may emerge. Several 
hospitals in the United States are forming partnerships with biotechnology 
companies to provide them with human tissue for research, treatment and drug 
development purposes.38 Such arrangements raise concerns not only about 
compensation for the donors but also about commodification of the body and 
body parts. Perhaps it is such concerns that underlie the desire of some 
celebrities to acquire intellectual property rights in their own DNA.39 Most 
importantly from a legal point of view, the increasing value of body parts raises 
questions about property rights to those parts. The patenting of genes and other 
biological materials derived from the human body essentially creates property 
rights in human material.40 
 
Matthews41 sees this trend as part of a changing world:  
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…all the societal pressures which a century ago pointed away from 
lawfully possessing and using human tissue now point towards it. The non-
property solutions of yesterday are inadequate to the task of today.42 
 
 
Richardson and Turner43 point out the ‘paradoxical fictionalisation and 
reification’44 of the human body: the body is fictionalised by its fragmentation to 
genetic codes, but at the same time reified by becoming a commodity in 
capitalist exchange relationships. They state that: 
 
Changes in contemporary biological sciences and their commercial 
application invite us to make a distinction between three levels of law 
and embodiment. In modern societies, law will in principle have to 
distinguish between: 
(1) rights to whole bodies (in practice therefore to persons) 
(2) rights to buy or to sell or to store parts of bodies (as in organ 
transplants) 
(3) rights over “particles” of bodies (such as DNA codes, genetic 
material and material relevant to human reproduction, for 
example eggs and sperm), that is to phenomena below the 
whole organism.45 ’ 
 
Munzer46 on the other hand does not see any advantage in distinguishing 
between body and body parts or particles, referring to this as the 'fallacy of 
division'.47 If persons lack property rights in themselves it does not follow that 
they lack property rights in their parts and particles.  
 
Posthumous reproduction 
The more acceptable posthumous reproduction becomes, the more likely it is 
that society will recognise property rights in gametes and embryos. For this 
reason, it is important to clarify the moral status of posthumous reproduction.  
In the UK, the direction in which the ship of public opinion is sailing was 
revealed by the widely publicised case of R v Human Fertilization & Embryology 
Authority, ex parte Blood.48 Stephen and Diane Blood had been in a relationship 
for 13 years, the last four as a married couple. Stephen was pronounced 
clinically dead on 2 March 1995, four days after contracting meningitis. At 
Diane’s request, two samples of semen were retrieved from Stephen by electro-
ejaculation while he was in a coma. These were cryopreserved at a second 
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hospital, Diane Blood intending to use them to have her husband’s child in due 
course. Her intention was frustrated by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority (HFEA) on the grounds that the retrieval, storage and use of the sperm 
were unlawful. The court accepted Diane Blood’s statement that she and her 
husband had decided to try for a baby, but had no difficulty in agreeing that the 
storage of the sperm contravened the consent provisions of the 1990 Act49 - 
Stephen’s written consent had not been obtained - and was unlawful.  
Given that the use of her husband’s sperm was unlawful in this jurisdiction, 
Diane Blood sought to have the sperm exported overseas where she could have 
treatment. For this to be possible, the HFEA would have had to make specific 
directions to the clinic holding the sperm.  Section 24(4) of the 1990 Act grants 
HFEA the discretion to give general and specific ‘directions’ on the export of 
gametes.50 The HFEA declined to give the required specific directions, and Diane 
Blood sought judicial review of this decision. 
 
The Court of Appeal accepted the argument that HFEA’s decision not to give 
specific directions allowing the export of the sperm infringed Mrs Blood’s rights 
under Articles 59 and 60 of the Treaty of Rome. These articles prohibit member 
states from imposing restrictions on rights to receive services, except where 
such a restriction is deemed necessary for sound reasons of public policy. The 
court held that HFEA’s decision in the Blood case was not founded on the public 
interest, and referred the case back to the authority for review. Subsequently 
the HFEA withdrew its objection, and Mrs Blood has since had two children by 
her husband posthumously. It can be said that Diane Blood thwarted the consent 
provisions of the 1990 Act by gaining approval to export a property.  
 
Storage and use of human tissue 
 
The Nuffield Council51 proffered the consent model as the appropriate approach 
to the acquisition and supply of human tissue. Ignoring or rejecting notions of 
tissue as property, the Council called for changes in the manner of obtaining 
consent for the removal of human tissue during treatment. While, however, 
consent is concerned primarily with the taking of tissue (as confirmed by the 
decision in Moore52), property analysis addresses of the taking as well as 
subsequent use and control of tissue. 
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English law provides significant protection to individuals’ self-determination – by 
recognising a right to bodily integrity – such that the taking of any tissue from a 
competent adult person would be unlawful without the consent of the source. 
The law is, however, solely concerned with the ‘taking’ rather than the ‘use’ of 
extra-corporeal organs or tissue. By contrast, property law would have 
something to say about subsequent use and control. 
 
The Council of Europe53 tried to extend consent into the realms of further use 
and control when it declared that: 
 
When in the course of an intervention any part of the body is removed, it 
may be stored and used for a purpose other than that for which it was 
removed, only if this is done in conformity with appropriate information 
and consent procedures.54 
 
In practice this is not easy. At the time the body part is removed, the donor may 
not be in the right frame of mind to look beyond the immediate purpose for 
which the part was removed – and this may vitiate any purported consent to 
future use. Further, some options for use of the tissue or organ may arise after it 
has been removed. 
 
Although consent is important, the problems relating to the removal and use of 
human tissue cannot be resolved until proprietary rights are clarified.  
This is further illustrated by the tangle the Nuffield Council got into when it 
tried to use the doctrine of abandonment to confer ownership of extirpated 
tissue on the hospital authority55 - the Council suggested that where tissue is 
removed during treatment, the tissue should be regarded as abandoned, a 
concept that applies to property. 
 
The common law position 
 
As acknowledged by Gage J,56 the common law position regarding property in 
the body or its parts is not firmly established. Alexandra George57 describes the 
legal position regarding control of the body and body parts as ‘a contradictory 
jumble of legal principles’.58 There is substantial literature59 on property in the 
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corpse, but a detailed review of the subject is unnecessary for the purposes of 
this thesis, which is about the living person’s right to self-determination. 
Although it can be argued that the way the law treats the corpse gives an 
indication of how it will treat the living body, this is not necessarily so. Even in 
ordinary life the former is regarded differently from the latter. Take the case of 
a person who suffers a heart attack in a public facility, for example. If this 
person was taken to the hospital alive, the newspapers will report that ‘Mr [or 
Mrs] Smith was taken to hospital’. If the person died, it will be reported that 
‘the body was taken to’ (or ‘deposited at’) the hospital – what was previously a 
person becomes a thing to be deposited somewhere. The focus here will 
therefore be primarily on the living body, with only a few references to case law 
concerning the non-living body or body parts where appropriate. 
 
According to obiter dicta in Dobson v North Tyneside Health Authority,60 the 
body of a living person cannot be property. Nevertheless, case law in English, 
American, Canadian and Australian jurisdictions has given human body parts and 
particles some of the attributes of ‘property’.61 Body parts such as hair,62 blood63 
and urine64 have been regarded as property stolen from the person in possession, 
although it is not always certain whether it was the tissue itself or the container 
in which it was held that was treated as property. If it was the tissue rather than 
the container that was treated as property, then the courts are using 
separability as the criterion for defining property. As Radin65 said: 
 
The idea of property in one's body presents some interesting paradoxes. In 
some cases, bodily parts can become fungible commodities, just as other 
personal property can become fungible with a change in its relationship 
with the owner: Blood can be withdrawn and used in a transfusion; hair 
can be cut off and used by a wigmaker; organs can be transplanted. On 
the other hand, bodily parts may be too "personal" to be property at all. 
We have an intuition that property necessarily refers to something in the 
outside world, separate from oneself. Though the general idea of property 
for personhood means that the boundary between person and thing 
cannot be a bright line, still the idea of property seems to require some 
perceptible boundary, at least insofar as property requires the notion of 
thing, and the notion of thing requires separation from self. This intuition 
makes it seem appropriate to call parts of the body property only after 
they have been removed from the system.66 
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In the case of R v Kelly and Lindsay67 it was held that parts of a dead body may 
be ‘property’. Kelly, an artist, had conspired with Lindsay, a technician, to 
remove anatomy specimens from the Royal College of Surgeons in London. They 
were both convicted of theft and appealed on the grounds, inter alia, that under 
common law the specimens did not constitute ‘property’.  In upholding their 
conviction, the Court of Appeal ruled that property lies in body parts that have 
acquired different attributes by virtue of the application of skill. Lord Rose 
speculated that, given the flexibility of the common law, property rights could 
be recognized in unaltered body parts in future cases. 
 
The decision in Kelly mirrors that in the Australian High Court case of 
Doodeward v Spence68 where it was held that a stillborn ‘monster’ that had been 
preserved with spirits for 40 years had become property. In this case, Griffiths 
CJ said that: 
 
When a person has by the lawful exercise of work or skill so dealt with a 
human body or part of a human body in his lawful possession that it has 
acquired some attributes differentiating it from a mere corpse awaiting 
burial, he acquires a right to retain possession of it….  
…the common law does not stand still. It may be that if, on some future 
occasions, the question arises, the courts will hold that human body parts 
are capable of being property for the purposes of s4, even without the 
acquisition of different attributes, if they have a use or significance 
beyond their mere existence.’ 69(Emphasis mine). 
 
 
His choice of words is instructive and it is open to speculation whether Griffiths 
CJ would have reached a different conclusion if the body or body part were that 
of a living person (with the dignity they are entitled to), not that of a ‘mere 
corpse’ (emphasis supplied). Nonetheless his position was cited with approval in 
AB v Leeds Teaching Hospital NHS Trust.70  Both Doodeward and Kelly drew from 
the work of Locke who, per the quote earlier in this chapter, reasoned that 
property arises when a person invests effort in a thing that initially lacked value 
or existed in a natural state. 
 
In the case of Hecht v Superior Court71, the California appellate court ruled that 
frozen sperm was part of a deceased person’s estate, able to be bequeathed like 
his other assets – in other words, that sperm was the object of a proprietary 
right. Deborah Hecht and William Kane cohabited for 5 years. Mr Kane, who was 
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contemplating suicide, ‘assiduously’ deposited vials of his semen with California 
Cryobank, Inc., with the knowledge and intention that Ms Hecht could have a 
child by him after his death. He made his intention clear in his will, his sperm 
banking directive, his final letter to his grown-up children (by a previous 
marriage) and his suicide note to Ms Hecht. His children contested the will. The 
judge at first instance decided in favour of the children, but was over-ruled by 
the Court of Appeal of California which concluded that he had decision-making 
authority over the use of his sperm and that this was sufficient to constitute 
property. This contrasts with the decision of the California Supreme Court in 
Moore. It would appear that the judge in Hecht was bound by public policy 
considerations not to thwart what was clearly Mr Kane’s testament and 
intention.  This is a clear example of the court adopting the property approach 
in order to meet a policy imperative. Notably, the Court of Appeal of California 
did not appear to regard the earlier decision of the California Supreme Court in 
Moore as binding. 
Property rights in stored sperm have recently also been recognized by courts in 
the UK72 and Australia73, with an English judge saying that: 
 
…developments in medical science now require a reanalysis of the 
common law’s treatment of and approach to the issue of ownership 
of parts or products of a living human body, whether for present 
purposes (viz an action in negligence) or otherwise.74  
 
In Chapter 9 (page 281), it will be argued that the property model is one that 
the court could have used to meet the policy considerations that underlie its 
judgement in Chester v Afshar75. 
 
The statutory position 
 
Although discussion of body parts as property usually focuses on case law, 
ascription to human body parts and particles of some of the attributes of 
‘property’ can also be found in statutes. The Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990 confers user entitlements and dispositional liberties on 
patients undergoing fertility treatment, in relation to the gametes they have 
provided and the embryos arising from same.76 It must be stressed that 
‘property’ is used here in the broader sense, and there is no suggestion that the 
legislators intended to confer property rights on gametes and embryos or that 
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they did consider these to be property. On the contrary, there is no indication 
that lawmakers disagreed with the position of the Warnock committee77 which 
was opposed to treating embryos as property: 
 
 Until now the law has never had to consider the existence of embryos 
 outside the mother’s uterus. The existence of such embryos raises 
 potentially difficult problems as to ownership. The concept of ownership 
 of human embryos seems to us to be undesirable. We recommend  that 
 legislation be enacted to ensure that there is no right of ownership in a 
 human embryo.78    
 
 
An opportunity for legislative clarification of the issue of property rights to the 
body and its parts was spurned when the Human Tissue Act 2004 was enacted.79 
The act does not establish for certain whether or not body parts can be property 
but appears to acknowledge (in s 32(9)) the common law position that body parts 
could be property if they have been subjected to special skills.  
 
 
Arguments against treating body parts and particles as property 
 
As can be seen from the common law cases discussed above, there is resistance 
to endowing property in the body and body parts. The courts have not always 
been articulate in explaining the case against treating the body and its parts and 
particles as property, but the main factor appears to be fear of 
commodification. Commodification aside, it could also be argued that treating 
the body as property is simply demeaning and affronts dignity, leads to 
fragmentation of the person, and goes against public policy.80 The basis for 
finding that the body is or could be property may be questioned. There is also 
the argument that our bodies, being interdependent with other bodies and the 
environment, do not just belong to us.81 Each of these arguments will now be 
addressed. 
 
Dignity 
One school of thought holds that treating the body as property is affronts human 
dignity.82 This argument can be turned 180 degrees – there is a case for arguing 
that a denial of proprietary rights in our body or body parts affronts human 
dignity. On the basis that respecting dignity entails respect for the agent’s 
capacity to make informed choices, Beyleveld and Brownsword83 argue that 
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‘respect for human dignity is, if anything, an argument in favour of, rather than 
against, biocommerce’84 in human body parts.   
  
In the same vein, Mosk J giving his minority judgement in Moore, said that 
dignity is undermined when researchers profit from a person’s body part to the 
exclusion of that person.85 
 
Fragmentation 
 
If persons have property rights to their bodies then, as discussed under self-
ownership above, this implies a division between the physical body and the non-
physical personality, with the latter claiming property rights to the former. This 
fragmentation of the body is a possible reason for opposing the idea of body as 
property. Radhika Rao86 articulates the position of this school of thought as 
follows: 
 
 Property produces a fragmented relationship between the body and its 
 owner, the person ‘inside’ the body, in contrast with privacy, which 
 creates an indivisible corporeal identity. By uncoupling the body from the 
 person and undermining the unity of the physical being, the property 
 paradigm facilitates fragmentation of the body itself, both literally and 
 figuratively.87 
 
 
The fundamental problem with this argument has been discussed above: the 
argument is based on the notion of property as a thing, a notion which has been 
rejected in this thesis. A counter-argument is adduced here. If property is seen 
as defining the relationship between persons, then property analysis actually 
preserves and mandates unity of body and personality. Also, most (if not all) of 
the sticks in the bundle of incidents by which property is defined can be enjoyed 
only by the integral person, not by the mere physical body. 
 
The other difficulty with this argument, as far as right to self-determination is 
concerned, is that the alternative model, consent, does not always address 
Rao’s ‘indivisible corporeal entity’. For example, battery (non-consensual 
touching) addresses the physical self, not necessarily the body-and-mind 
combination. As explained in the discussion of torts (Chapter 3), mere 
unauthorized touch is all that is required to establish liability in battery. 
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Definition of property 
 
It could be argued that the body does not meet the pre-requisites to qualify as 
property, as defined by some scholars. These pre-requisites, discussed in 
Chapter 5, include alienability and separability, but it has been argued in this 
thesis that property rights in the body are consistent with Underkuffler’s 
framework of property.  Also the idea of a thing having been processed or 
altered by the application of skill (an attribute of property developed in common 
law) does not apply to the living body.  
 
Alexandra George88 argues that control over the human body and its parts should 
not be based on assumptions about the existence of property in the body; rather 
lawmakers should first decide the degree of control they wish to bestow, then 
use property if necessary, to enforce decisions about control. This is an 
interesting point because the court in Moore appeared to be pre-occupied with 
whether there was property in the spleen, when it should have concentrated in 
the first instance on Mr Moore’s right to self-determination, then applied 
property analysis afterwards.  
 
Commodification 
 
Possible commodification of the body is the central plank in the case against 
treating body parts and particles as property. If ascribing property to the body 
leads to commodification, this would be the opposite of what we wish to 
achieve, self-determination. Possible commodification of the body appears to be 
the main fear of those who are against treating body parts and particles as 
property. This is reflected in the views expressed by Arabian J in Moore89:  
 
 Plaintiff has asked us to recognize and enforce a right to sell one's own 
 body tissue for profit. He entreats us to regard the human vessel -- the 
 single most venerated and protected subject in any civilized society -- as 
 equal with the basest commercial commodity. He urges us to comingle 
 the sacred with the profane. He asks much.90  
 
 
He went on to ask rhetorically: ‘Does it uplift or degrade the "unique human 
persona" to treat human tissue as a fungible article of commerce?’91 
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Andres and Nelkin,92 champions of the anti-commodification campaign, 
demonstrate the variable manifestation of commodification in the following 
observations: 
 
 The language of science is increasingly permeated with the commercial 
 language of supply and demand, contracts, exchange, and  compensation. 
 Body parts are extracted like a mineral, harvested like a crop, or mined 
 like a resource. Tissue is  procured – a term more commonly used for 
 land, goods, and prostitutes. Cells, embryos, and tissue are frozen, 
 banked, placed in libraries or repositories, marketed, patented, bought or 
 sold. Umbilical cords, whose stem cells are used for therapeutic 
 purposes, are described as a “hot clinical property”. The physician 
 who patented John Moore’s cell line apparently referred to his patient’s 
 body as a “gold mine”.93 
 
 
Some fear that in attaching property rights to human body or body parts, we 
may ‘come to discover the price of everything but discover that we know the 
value of nothing’.94 Concerns like this are pithy when we pause to consider what 
has happened to the brain of Albert Einstein (he wanted his body cremated so 
that people would not come to worship at his bones but the pathologist who 
conducted his autopsy removed the brain and has since been treating it as 
personal property)95 and the bones of Alistair Cooke (which were stolen and sold 
to body parts dealers) 96. 
 
The Council of Europe’s Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine97 
stipulates that ‘(t)he human body and its parts shall not, as such, give rise to 
financial gain’98. This refrain is also to be found in UNESCO’s Declaration on the 
Human Genome and Human Rights99 (‘The human genome in its natural state 
shall not give rise to financial gains’100) and a range of other sources.101  These 
prohibitions are founded on the premise that commercialisation of the body or 
its parts102 affronts human dignity. Objectors to the patenting of human genetic 
material employed similar arguments.103 There are two problems with this 
argument. The first is that, as stated in Chapter 6 (page 172), not all property 
rights are commercial property rights; property is sometimes but not always, a 
commodity.  
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Underlying the objection to commercialization of the body or body parts is the 
idea that the body is different from other things, and its special status is defiled 
by placing a price on it. If all body parts were to be given equal treatment, this 
idea would be difficult to sustain, for if there is no objection to selling hair (a 
renewable body part), why should there be objection to selling blood (also a 
renewable body part). Commodification is not intrinsically evil; it only assumes 
that negativity when exploitation is present. 
 
Apart from any intrinsic moral problem with commercialization of human body 
parts, there is concern about the effect that financial inducement could have on 
vulnerable persons104, including pregnant ones.105 This fear relates to the Kantian 
maxim, that the vulnerable may be seen not as ends in themselves but as means 
to an end. It is argued, for example, that if women were to have property 
interests in their fetal tissue, they might be induced to abort their fetuses for 
pecuniary advantage rather than carry them to term.106 Such abortion-for-profit 
is a public policy concern that would outweigh the benefits of unfettered 
property rights. It is also argued that allowing women to sell their fetal tissue 
directly, or to exercise their right to share in profits resulting from commercial 
development of their fetal tissue, would be counter to the public interest. 
Similarly, trade in human organs generates the image of impoverished persons 
converted to organ farms to be harvested by the rich.107 
 
Again, the problem with this line of argument is that where the self-
determination of the individual is given prime consideration, a contract is not 
invalidated simply because some persons (or even the majority) consider the 
transaction harmful.108 As the Court of Appeal said in respect of a pregnant 
woman declining treatment, whether or not her own life or that of the unborn 
child is at risk, ‘her right is not reduced or diminished merely because her 
decision to exercise it may appear morally repugnant’.109 
 
There is also an inconsistency in the argument: a person is allowed the self-
determination to refuse blood transfusion or other treatment and die as a result, 
but not allowed the self-determination to sell a spare kidney. This inconsistency 
has arisen because the public interest considerations have been prioritized over 
individual self-determination. It is submitted in this thesis that public policy 
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cannot be excluded from any analysis relating to the individual’s right to self-
determination in healthcare, and the aim of the thesis is to find a model that 
allows optimal exercise of self-determination while also accommodating public 
policy imperatives. 
 
Ironically, while fear of commercialisation is the driving force of the anti-
propertisation school, Moore shows that body parts can be commercialized even 
whilst discountenancing property rights in them: while disavowing a property 
approach, the court recognized that the claimant was entitled to a commercial 
interest in his body part. In other words, if it is the fear of commodification that 
we are concerned about, it is not rejection of property in the body that will 
allay our fears. Conversely, ascription of property rights to the body (or parts or 
particles) does not necessarily imply commodification. 
 
In the final analysis, the answer to the commodification problem may lie 
somewhere in the middle, as acknowledged by some commentators: 
 
We do not see this issue as usefully approached as if it was all or nothing. 
Rather, we submit, it seems clear that some forms of commercialization 
will (and should) be allowed, some should absolutely be forbidden, and 
the real issue is which forms of commercialization, between these 
extremes, will be allowed or forbidden, and according to which principles 
or considerations.110 
 
Sorting out which forms of commercialization should be allowed is, however, 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
Interconnection of bodies 
 
Herring and Chau111 advocate a model which reflects, supports and respects the 
following nuances: ‘our bodies are ours; are in relationship with others; are in 
constant flux; and yet central to our identity of ourselves’112 From intrauterine 
life through our entire life to death our bodies are interconnected with other 
bodies: examples include placenta, feto-maternal blood transfusion at birth, 
breastfeeding, and shared genetic constitution and interdependence between 
carer and cared for. We are reminded that: 
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Many of the things we most greatly value in life involve the sharing 
and interconnection of bodies: sex, sports, massage, shaking hands, 
to name but a few. It is in the meeting, intermingling and 
interaction of our bodies  that many of life’s  most meaningful 
events occur.113 
 
Also the interaction of the body with the wider environment - for example, 
through food, air and commensal bacteria - is essential to human life.  The 
authors also refer to the mutability of our bodies: ‘[o]ur bodies are constantly 
changing [and] [b]y the time we die, there is little of us that is biologically the 
same as when we were born’.114 
 
On the basis of the above – interconnection, interdependence and mutability – 
the authors argue the case for a moral obligation to allow one’s bodily material 
to be used for the benefit of others.  Each person owes this obligation to the 
world from which they benefit throughout their life. Also the body is not just 
that of the individual but the product of the interaction between this body, 
other bodies, and the wider environment – so ‘any argument that [the spleen] 
was just Mr Moore’s should be resisted’.115  
 
The affinity between this approach and the ecology paradigm espoused in 
Chapter 1 is immediately recognized at first glance, but getting to the root of 
the argument we meet with disappointment. The authors accept that ‘our 
bodies are ours’ (see above), then go on to say that there should be no property 
in the body. They do not offer any real reason why the body cannot be property; 
their analysis does not show that the body is not or cannot be property. Rather, 
what they have actually argued is that the body should belong not to the 
individual person but to the world at large. This is idealistic communitarianism, 
divorced from the practicalities of life. Without individuals there can be no 
interdependence. Without individual nuances and characteristics, without a 
diversity of individual attributes and preferences, there cannot be the 
biological, genetic and social heterogeneity essential for sustenance of the 
environment – without diversity there is no ecology. Even the examples they give 
of interconnection between humans - sex, sports, massage, shaking hands – all 
require the consent (self-determination) of the partaking individuals.  
A pragmatic rather than aspirational approach has been taken from the outset in 
this thesis. Just as the concept of absolute self-determination is rejected, so is 
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the idea that the world is all about communities, with no individuals units at all. 
Accordingly the theory put forward by Herring and Chau116 is discountenanced. 
 
Other public policy considerations 
 
Before looking at the other side of the coin, one must mention that public policy 
considerations other than commodification may be employed in arguing against 
property rights in body parts or particles. For example, objection to posthumous 
transfer or use of semen may be the basis for denying proprietary rights to 
stored sperm.117 Conservative commentators and scholars could argue that it is 
not in the public interest to encourage postmortem human reproduction.118 As 
taking sperm to be the object of property facilitates postpartum reproduction, it 
is argued that sperm cannot be property. One problem with this argument is 
that, even if opposition to postpartum reproduction is a public policy matter 
(arguably, it is not), there are more direct ways of restricting it other than a 
denial of the concept of property in gametes.  
                                     
Arguments for treating body parts and particles as property 
 
In the next few paragraphs it will be argued that people should benefit from 
exploitation of material derived from their body and that treating body parts 
and particles as property could foster self-determination and protect against 
commodification. It is argued that property generates positive obligations, and 
this is advantageous for protecting self-determination. It is also argued that the 
idea of quasi-property in the body is a fudge. 
 
Self-determination 
 
The moral argument for treating the body and body parts, including genetic 
material, as property rests on the principle of self-determination – people should 
be allowed to use their body and body parts as they please, so long as others are 
not harmed. As Lord Tebbitt119 asserted: 
 
My body is mine. It may not be a very good one. Bits have been knocked 
off it and other bits have been broken. Parts have been removed to repair 
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damage elsewhere, and it is held together with plastic reinforcement. It 
is past its best. If it were a car, it would not make a lot on a trade-in, but 
it might be cannibalized for spares. Nonetheless I own it. It does not 
belong to the state, the community or the BMA [British Medical 
Association]. So it is evident to me that I, and I alone, have the right to 
dispose of it, all or in part, before or after my death.120 
 
 
A woman’s right to abortion has also been defended on the principle that her 
body is her property.121 On the other hand, a proprietary right in the body does 
not have to be established in order to uphold self-determination: without 
resorting to a property analysis, the common law in England has established that 
an adult of sound mind may refuse medical treatment even if such refusal could 
cost him his/her life.122 Thus while property analysis is an appealing approach to 
the enhancement of self-determination, it is not the only (or until proven 
otherwise, preferable) one. The property model is compared with the consent 
model in Chapter 9.  
 
People should benefit from exploitation of material derived from their body 
 
In relation to body parts, however, the common law has not found a way to 
grant continuing rights to the source of a body part or particle once it has been 
removed from the person. The law upholds the principle of bodily integrity 
through the requirement that consent be obtained before the tissue is taken 
from the patient. Once the tissue has been removed, however, the patient has 
no rights over subsequent use. The implication is that other parties are able to 
profit financially from property rights to the body part or particle, to the 
exclusion of the patient from which the material was obtained. This does not 
appear to be justice for all, but ethical justification for this position has been 
advanced.123  
 
Property rights in one’s body parts or particles would enable donors to share in 
the profits derived from commercialisation. However, while this may be of 
benefit to the individual, it may have deleterious effects on altruistic organ 
donation124 and hinder scientific research and development. In Moore the 
Supreme Court of California said: ‘The theory of liability that Moore urges us to 
endorse threatens to destroy the economic incentive to conduct important 
medical research’.125  
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It may be argued that all organ or tissue donation should be altruistic, that 
nobody should be allowed to make financial gains from their body parts. This 
was the preferred position of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 
(HFEA).126 The Brazier Committee127 on surrogacy also adopted this position 
when it compared paid surrogacy to the sale of blood. A requirement for all 
organ or tissue donation to be altruistic would, however, be based on moral 
rather than legal principles, and may not be a pragmatic approach where there 
is a dearth of donors - despite its moral stance, the HFEA opted to continue 
paying sperm and egg donors, given the effect that a total ban on payments 
would have on the availability of donated gametes and embryos.128 We may 
abhor the idea of making money from such donations, but that is not to say that 
anyone wishing to profit in this way should be criminalized, as is the case in 
Australian jurisdictions where donors are prohibited from trading in their own 
tissue in the absence of ministerial permission.129  
 
It is only fair that donors of genetic material should have some property right in 
their genetic material, and have a chance to benefit in some measure from 
financial benefits accruing from that material – after all, in relation to other 
objects that qualify as objects of proprietary rights the principle of equitable 
tracing will be applied.  
 
Society stands to benefit from research in biotechnology, however, and it would 
be counter-productive if property rights in genetic material were to constrain 
research. If property rights were attached to body parts or tissue, then there is 
the possibility that donors could restrict the use of these resources and so 
hamper research or inhibit equitable and altruistic medical intervention. This 
appeared to have been the policy consideration behind the decision in Moore. 
This argument underestimates the public’s thirst for, and appreciation of, 
scientific advancement.  For what is a pittance compared to the sums of money 
involved in biotechnology patents, the public readily volunteer to participate in 
clinical trials that entail bodily invasion, sometimes with near tragic 
complications.130 
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Protection against commodification 
 
Another argument for recognising property in body parts is that doing so 
minimises (paradoxically, it may seem) the potential for commodification of the 
body. This was the argument of Mosk J131 in his minority judgement in Moore: 
failure to recognise a man’s property rights in his body or body parts leaves 
these objects vulnerable to ownership or exploitation by others.  In other words, 
while many scholars argue that recognizing property rights in the body and its 
parts or particles opens the door to commodification, Mosk argues that it is a 
failure to recognize such property rights that actually opens this door. 
 
Relaxation of moral or ethical restraints relating to commodification will 
certainly be a factor in the increased recourse to, and acceptability of, the 
property model, but a more enabling factor would be the more embracing 
definition of property. The less we think of property in terms of ‘commodity’, 
the more easily we are able to accommodate a view of gametes and embryos as 
property.  In Chapter 6, a more embracing view of property was presented, 
emphasizing that property is not necessarily a commodity, something 
commerciable. The arguments advanced above in support of property rights in 
the body and its parts assume that propertisation does not necessarily imply 
commodification but even the latter has its advocates, as noted by the late 
historian Roy Porter132: 
 
The case for regarding (the body and its parts) as a commodity has been 
advanced by some American utilitarian philosophers: rational choice and 
market forces, they argue, would create an optimum trade in body 
commodities such as sperm, embryos, wombs and babies. A ‘futures 
market’ in organs has been proposed.133  
 
 
Quasi-property and ‘limited property’ analysis – - fudge 
 
Sandwiched between the ‘property’ and ‘no-property’ approaches is the ‘limited 
property’ analysis put forward by Munzer134 who remarks that: 
  
Too many incidents are lacking to say that persons own their bodies. 
Restrictions on transfer and the absence of a liberty to consume or 
destroy, for example, indicate that persons do not own their bodies in the 
way that they own automobiles and desks.135 
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He recognises that, as people can donate or sell their body parts, it is not quite 
right to say they have no property rights in them, but suggests that the rights to 
use, manage, dispose of, exclude others from, or transfer a body part should be 
seen as limited property rights, rather than ownership.136 There are problems 
with this viewpoint. Firstly, it is not quite right that ‘too many incidents are 
lacking’, but even if this were correct, there is no minimum number of incidents 
required for property to be established. Secondly, the fact that a person can 
refuse blood transfusion137 or a life-saving Caesarean section138 belies ‘the 
absence of a liberty to consume or destroy’. Finally it seems counterintuitive to 
accept that ‘rights to use, manage, dispose of, exclude others from, or transfer’ 
could all add up to no more than ‘limited’ property rights. One cannot help 
feeling that this designation is simply a means of avoiding the dreaded word 
‘ownership’. 
 
Thinking along the same lines as Munzer, Remigius Nwabueze139 proposes a 
‘limited but market-inalienable’140 type of property right. ‘Limited property 
rights’ appears to be just another term for the so-called ‘quasi-property’ rights.† 
Mason and Laurie’s141 discussion of quasi-property shows that this is no more 
than a comfort zone for the middle-of-the-road traveler: 
 
To recognise a ‘quasi-property’ claim to material is to support  a 
normatively  strong connection to that material and, accordingly, to 
establish strong, justiciable legal interest; by the same token…...‘full’ 
property rights  will only be recognised where there is little or no 
prospect of exploitation or other harm, which can include the ‘harm’ of 
disrespect for the dignity of the human organism.142 
 
The advocates of a limited or quasi-property category have not elaborated an 
adequate theoretical basis to justify this category. The category appears to be 
no more than a sanctuary for those who recognise the value of property analysis 
but cannot face the reality of applying property discourse to the human body. 
In a nutshell, quasi-property is a fudge. 
 
 
                                                 
†
 See glossary for a definition of quasi-property. 
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Conclusion 
 
On the basis of the foregoing arguments, it is concluded that body parts and 
particles and the body as a whole can be treated as property. The safeguard of 
legislative checks could be introduced as may from to time be agreed by society 
to restrain commercial trafficking. Given all the concrete and potential 
advantages of recognising property in the body, there is at least a prima facie 
case for doing so. Indeed it is the existence of a prima facie case that has kept 
the debate alive despite strong feelings and fears about commodification.  
 
The analysis presented above shows that all of the reasons for rejecting the idea 
of property in the body have as their common denominator the reification of 
property – that is, the notion of property as a thing. This notion of property, 
however, is obsolete. Clinging on to Blackstone’s concept of property in the 21st 
century will continue to fuel an emotional rather than rational approach to the 
matter of property in the body. Such emotional constraints are understandable 
given the history of slavery, exploitation and unethical, dehumanising medical 
experimentation. The mission to accelerate the abandonment of ‘thingification’ 
and entrench the modern notion of property calls for leadership. Unfortunately 
the law is slow to drive social change and some would say that it is not the role 
of the law to do so; that the purpose of the law is to reflect and protect social 
mores rather than to shape them. As far as driving the modern notion of 
property is concerned, both common law and the legislature have either 
explicitly rejected or implicitly spurned the opportunity to do so. The legislators 
had an opportunity to adopt a different approach when enacting the Human 
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Tissue Act but fought shy of doing so. When legislators are tardy, the common 
law could show the way. As an editorial143 said: 
  
Sometimes, of course, courts do need to intervene to force morally and 
 constitutionally necessary changes – such as mandating school integration 
 and overturning bans on interracial marriage – when voters or their 
 elected representatives won’t do so.144 
 
  
Regarding recognition of proprietary rights in the body, it does not appear that 
judges are keen to intervene and the task of driving the law on this subject falls 
on the shoulders of academic lawyers and commentators.  
 
The interest we wish to protect is self-determination and it has been shown in 
this chapter that a valid notion of property can be applied to the body and its 
parts. The question arises, why is it necessary to consider applying a property 
analysis for protecting the right to self-determination in healthcare? The answer 
to this question is that the current approach, the consent model, has significant 
limitations that make it necessary for alternative or complementary models to 
be considered. These limitations were discussed in Chapter 5 (page 129) and the 
proposed model is discussed in Chapter 9 (page 253). Meanwhile attention is 
focused on a novel application of property analysis to healthcare decision-
making; one that has not previously been elaborated – property rights in the 
patient’s expectation from a clinical consultation.  
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Chapter 8 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE PATIENT’S LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS 
 
‘If we examine the modern legal meaning of property, we can see its enduring 
appeal as a means of asserting the autonomy of the individual’1 
 
‘As a man is said to have a right to his property, he may be equally said to have 
property in his rights’2 
 
Introduction 
 
In the first few chapters of this thesis, it was seen that the doctor-patient 
relationship and the assertion of patients’ right to self-determination have been 
influenced by, and evolved in tandem with, the ascendance of rights thinking 
and consumer advocacy. The relationship between consumers and the providers 
of goods and services is regulated by laws of contract, tort and property. The 
place of tort in the protection of patient self-determination has been discussed 
in Chapter 3. The place of contract has not been discussed, but its place in the 
UK medico-legal arena is limited to the relatively small size of the private 
sector, where doctors providing services privately are deemed to have a 
contractual relationship with their patients and can be sued in contract.3 In the 
NHS, doctors do not legally have such a contractual relationship with their 
patients4 although, as seen in Chapter 2 (page 59), one model of doctor-patient 
relationship could be described as contractual in nature5.  
 
The subject of this thesis is the application of the third regulatory modality – 
property – to the doctor-patient relationship. One way of applying this is by 
treating a person’s body as his/her property, and on this basis treat the right to 
bodily integrity as a right to property. The arguments against this approach have 
been discussed in the previous chapter, and it has been concluded that the 
concept of property adopted in this thesis does not permit the commodification 
or other arguments to hold sway.  
 
Once these arguments are disposed of, it would be logical for Lord Tebbitt’s 
assertion (‘my body is my property’)6 to be backed by the law. On its own, 
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however, the body-as-property approach would be inadequate for establishing a 
property model for protecting patient self-determination. One reason for saying 
so is that concentration on ‘body as property’ supports a narrow conception of 
property, whereas the case has been made in Chapter 6 (pages 166-187) for a 
broad, ‘Madisonian’7 conception. Secondly, a model founded solely on body-as-
property will continue to elicit vocal opposition from those who maintain the 
commodification argument, thus stalling any moves to implement the property 
model as an alternative to the consent model. Thirdly, this approach based on a 
narrow conception of property will not fit easily with the Underkuffler 
framework that has been adopted in this thesis, and will therefore not have the 
advantages offered by this framework, such as the ability to define stringency of 
protection. 
 
A key point is that property (as understood in this thesis) defines a relationship, 
not a thing. Moving away from the reification of property, a novel theory of 
property rights in the doctor-patient consultation is developed in this chapter. 
This theory ascribes property rights to the patient’s expectations from the 
doctor-patient consultation, and the correlative duties of the doctor are 
regarded as fiduciary and at the core of medical professionalism.  If the 
patient’s legitimate expectations are accorded proprietary rights, they have the 
protection that property law offers, and this may have advantages over the 
consent model in securing self-determination. By thinking of legitimate 
expectations as giving rise to proprietary rights we move away from the notion 
of property as a thing and follow the alternative notion of property as defining 
relationships. This stance is also consonant with a social relational approach, 
which in turn is consonant with the ecological paradigm (discussed in Chapter 1, 
page 17).  
 
Protecting the vulnerable 
 
It is not unusual for the law to protect the expectations of consumers. Consumer 
expectations are protected in product liability law. For example, the European 
Council Directive on General Product Safety8 2001/95/EC states that the 
conformance of a product to a general safety requirement shall be assessed 
taking in to account ‘reasonable customer expectations regarding safety’9 
Edozien LC, 2013, Chapter 8 
 228 
(among other considerations). Consumer protection law commonly upholds 
consumer rights by requiring providers to disclose detailed information about 
their goods and services, particularly where safety or public health is an issue.  
In general, the law tends to protect the interests of the more vulnerable party 
by imposing obligations on the more powerful party. Academic commentators 
have made the case for the use of property rights to protect the interests of 
those affected by the closure of industrial plants in the USA,10 the interests of 
individuals who are victims of takings,11 and the interests of employees in a 
publicly traded firm12. The case for these pleadings is based on the need to 
legally protect these interests and recognition of the security associated with 
property rights.  
 
Fundamentally, there is little difference between these interests and patient’s 
interest in being able to make informed decisions about his/her treatment; they 
all relate to basic human and consumer rights and it would not be out of place 
for the law to protect the patient’s interests in the same way that it protects 
the vulnerable party in the examples given above. In transactions between two 
parties, what each party gets out of the transaction is usually a function of its 
power relative to the other. In the doctor-patient consultation, the patient is 
the more vulnerable party and, as argued in previous chapters, the consent 
model has proved incapable of offering the vulnerable party adequate protection 
in the face of a steep power gradient between doctor and patient. This gradient 
is partly responsible for the gap between the theoretical and the operationalised 
paradigms of consent and for the prevalence of Category III consent. 
 
If the consent model is not fit for purpose in this regard then, as argued earlier, 
the solution is not to tinker with this model but to explore alternative models. 
The starting point for one such approach is to recognise the patient’s interest in 
making decisions on his/her own treatment; the right tool for protecting this 
interest can then be sought and applied. The patient has a legitimate 
expectation that the doctor will, in the course of the consultation, recognise and 
respect his/her right to self-determination. Respect for this right entails 
engagement with the patient, provision of tailored information, taking 
reasonable steps to ensure comprehension, and accepting the patient’s decision.  
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This right to self-determination should be protected as a legal right in itself.1 
The legitimate expectation which flows from that right should be protected as a 
distinct legal interest. Property analysis has the potential to come to the rescue 
here: the legitimate expectation can be protected as a proprietary right. 
Property, as discussed in Chapter 6 (pages 174-177), defines the relationship 
between parties, and proprietary rights offer a means of protection to an 
otherwise vulnerable party in a transaction or relationship13.  The patient’s 
legitimate expectations from a consultation with the doctor constitute a chose 
in action. As discussed in Chapter 6 (page 171), a chose in action is a property 
interest that can be enforced only through legal action; the term was originally 
used to cover rights associated with a personal action, and it was argued a 
century ago that a right of action in tort could be regarded as a chose in action. 
It is, therefore, not anomalous to suggest that the patient’s legitimate 
expectation could be regarded as a chose in action. 
 
Treating the patient’s expectation as property would be similar to what happens 
with intellectual property and other intangible valuables:   
 
…the owner of patent rights in a machine owns neither a particular 
machine nor the model or drawings of the machine submitted to the 
patent office, but rather the rights to control the use of his or her 
design for the machine. Immaterial, or even “non-existent” entities can 
be subjugated to property regimes, if they are believed to have value, 
if they can be clearly conceptualized, and if they can be ”constructed” 
in such a way as to make property rights in them administrable. For 
example, the laws of slander and libel have been made to protect 
something as immaterial as a businessman’s “property in reputation”.14 
 
In other words, there is nothing extraordinary in treating patient expectation as 
property and, as it meets the criteria outlined in this quote, there is no legal 
reason why it cannot be treated as such. In the following paragraphs the 
principle of property rights in expectation and how this principle could be 
applied to the doctor-patient transaction are explored. The central role of trust 
in this transaction is emphasised and, as one of the criticisms of the consent 
model is that it negates trust, the possibility that recognizing the doctor’s duties 
as fiduciary can help build trust is also explored. In the property model proposed 
                                                 
1
 The argument for this is made in the next chapter 
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in this thesis, the patient’s legitimate expectations are accorded property rights 
and, correlative to this, the doctor has fiduciary duties which include the duty 
to respect the right to self-determination. If this model works, therefore, it will 
enshrine trust while also upholding self-determination. 
 
  
Expectation as property 
 
Expectation interest (the interest of a party to a breached contract in receiving 
the benefit of the bargain by being put in a position as good as that which would 
have resulted had the contract been performed) and reliance interest (the 
interest of a party to a breached contract in being compensated for detriments 
suffered in reliance on the agreement) are firmly embedded in contract law15. 
Reliance interest is also established in divorce law16. The idea that expectation 
should in certain circumstances be protected by the law is therefore not new. 
 
The idea that expectation could be treated as property is also not entirely new – 
what is new is its application to self-determination in healthcare and 
particularly, to the doctor-patient consultation. Jeremy Bentham17 declared 
that ‘[p]roperty is nothing but a basis of expectation’18 Powell19 noted that the 
law ‘has recognised and protected even the expectation of rights as actual 
property’20. Demsetz21 theorized that property rights are an instrument of 
society, and posits: 
 
In the world of Robinson Crusoe property rights play no role.  Property 
rights are an instrument of society and derive their significance from the 
fact that they help a man form those expectations which he can 
reasonably hold in his dealings with others. These expectations find 
expression in the laws, customs, and mores of a society.22 
 
 
Patent law is now firmly established, but at its heart lies a recognition of 
property in the expectation of the patent holder.23 Harris24 argued that 
expectations grounded on the privileges of being a white person amounted to 
property. Further, Nwabueze25 has speculated that ‘the need to protect certain 
societal expectations may lead to the emergence of new forms of property’26.  
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Expectation has also featured in the personhood theory of property (briefly 
discussed in chapter 6, page 173). Radin27, an exponent of this theory, said: 
 
This view of personhood [as a continuing character structure 
encompassing future projects or plans, as well as past events and 
feelings] also gives us insight into why protecting people's "expectations" 
of continuing control over objects seems so important. If an object you 
now control is bound up in your future plans or in your anticipation of 
your future self, and it is partly these plans for your own continuity that 
make you a person, then your personhood depends on the realization of 
these expectations. This turn to expectations might seem to send 
property theory back toward Bentham, who declared that "the idea of 
property consists in an established expectation." But this justification for 
honoring expectations is far from Benthamite, because it applies only to 
personal property.28 
 
An opportunity for a judicial test of the proposition that expectation could be 
property arose in the American case of Local 1330, United Steel Workers of 
America v. U.S. Steel Corp29. The claimant was a labour organization 
representing the workers of a steel mill. The defendant, United States Steel 
Corporation, had been running a steel mill in Youngstown, Ohio, for many years 
but decided, in view of the age of its machinery and developments in technology 
and marketing, to shut down the steel mill. This was certain to lead to the 
economic demise of the community. The company declined the workers’ offer to 
buy the plant. The labour union went to court on the matter. At the pre-trial 
hearing the judge said: 
 
 Everything that has happened in the Mahoning Valley has been happening 
 for many years because of steel. Schools have been built, roads have 
 been built. Expansion that has taken place is because of steel. And to 
 accommodate that industry, lives and destinies of the inhabitants of that 
 community  were based and planned on the basis of that institution: 
 Steel. 
 We are talking about an institution, a large corporate institution that is 
 virtually the reason for the existence of that segment of this 
 nation….. It would seem to me that when we take a look at the whole 
 body of American law and the principles we attempt to come out with-
 and although a legislature has not pronounced any laws with respect to 
 such a property right, that is not to suggest that there will not be a need 
 for such a law in the future dealing with similar situations -it seems to me 
 that a property right has arisen from this lengthy, long-established 
 relationship between United States Steel, the steel industry as an 
 institution, the community in Youngstown, the people in Mahoning County 
 and the Mahoning Valley in having given and devoted their lives to this 
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 industry. Perhaps not a property right to the extent that can be remedied 
 by compelling U.S. Steel to remain in Youngstown. But I think the law can 
 recognize the property right to the extent that U.S. Steel cannot leave 
 that Mahoning Valley and the Youngstown area in a state of waste, that it 
 cannot completely abandon its obligation to that community, because 
 certain vested rights have arisen out of this long relationship and 
 institution30. 
 
 
Subsequently, the steelworkers sought an injunction, claiming that their long 
dependence on the plant entitled them to property rights in the plant. Their 
claim was unsuccessful, despite the views expressed by the judge at the pre-
trial hearing. The district court denied relief, holding that the refusal to sell the 
plant to the workers did not constitute an antitrust violation; that the workers 
could not assert a property interest in their jobs31. The workers filed an appeal 
with the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals32, and this appeal was supported by 
amicus curiae from the Center for Constitutional Rights which argued that 
companies such as the steel giant that received substantial public funding should 
be constrained by judicial control to act in the best interests of the community.  
 
The appeal court expressed sympathy for the community interest that was the 
subject of appeal but ruled that there was no legal authority to support a 
property claim as advanced by the workers.33 A couple of years after this ruling 
the steel plants were destroyed. This case is similar to the Moore34 case in that 
the courts recognised the disadvantaged position of the claimant but felt 
uncomfortable with the idea of ameliorating this through application of property 
analysis. It appears that in both cases, the court’s decision was strongly 
influenced by policy considerations (in the former, the impact of restraining an 
industrial company from moving its operations as dictated by economic factors; 
and in the latter, the impact of the court’s decision on scientific and 
technological innovation). 
 
The decision in this case has been robustly criticised by Singer35. In a 
comprehensive analysis of what he called a property in reliance interest, Singer 
argued that, contrary to the statement of the court in US Steel Workers, there 
was legal support for the property claim made by the workers. He cited public 
trust doctrine, adverse possession, easements by estoppel, easements by 
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necessity and public rights of access as legal doctrines which provide relevant 
precedent for the property right described by Judge Lambros at the pre-trial 
hearing. He argues36 that: 
 
The doctrines of adverse possession, prescriptive easements, easement by 
estoppel and easement by necessity all stand for the same proposition: 
Where a non-owner of property comes to rely upon access to property, 
the law sometimes recognizes the non-owner's vulnerability and shifts 
some or all of the property rights from the title owner to the non-owner. 
The rules in force therefore protect the non-owner's reliance on her 
relationship with the owner that made  access to the land possible37 
 
 
Interestingly, the doctrines which he refers to as providing the legal precedent 
to establishment of property in legitimate expectation are legal doctrines that 
apply in situations where the parties concerned are strangers to each other, in 
the sense that they did not have a preexisting agreement. A parallel could be 
drawn between this situation and the situation in clinical practice described as 
‘Strangers at the Bedside’38. 
 
Although the court did not recognise a property interest in this particular case, 
Singer’s comprehensive analysis is convincing enough to support a belief that 
there are reasonable prospects of the courts upholding this right in future cases, 
bar countervailing policy considerations. In any case, the doctrines of easements 
are evidence that, regardless of the court’s decision in a particular case, 
expectation and reliance interests may be regarded as property rights in law. 
The challenge is to show how and why this can be extended to the doctor-
patient relationships 
 
Expectation and reliance interests associated with the doctrines of easement 
have developed in the course of a continuing relationship between both parties.  
In the case of doctor and patient, the expectations that may be subject of 
property rights arise a priori from the covenant between both parties. 
Underlying this covenant is medical professionalism. Medical professionalism 
specifies the duties of the doctor, and the patient, relying on professionalism, 
expects the doctor to act in accordance with professional norms. This reliance is 
an act of trust. 
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Medical professionalism 
 
Medical professionalism is the framework of values, attitudes and behaviour that 
defines the relationship between doctors and patients, in the context of 
society.39 Medical professionalism is what distinguishes medicine as a profession 
from medicine as a commodity.40 It is the bedrock of the trust implicit in a 
traditional patient-doctor relationship where it is normative that the doctor will 
always act in the best interest of the patient. The patient is, by virtue of illness 
and of inferior technical knowledge, in a vulnerable position, and reposes trust 
in the doctor to act in his or her best interests. The Tuskegee, 41 Willowbrook42 
and Shipman43 disasters referred to in Chapter 2 (page 58) are failures of 
medical professionalism. 
 
 
When it comes to promoting patient self-determination in clinical practice, 
however, it is important to adopt the right strategy.  Jones44 drew attention to 
the importance of looking at the shop-floor when exploring the law of consent 
and its application. It has been shown in empirical studies45 that clinicians’ 
perception of what the law of consent requires is often different from what the 
law actually says. The protection of patient self-determination may start with 
the law but it is operationalised in the consultation rooms, so it goes to the 
heart of medical professionalism. 
 
The doctor must a priori see the patient as an individual, with his/her own 
values, attitudes, beliefs and knowledge. Wright46 and colleagues showed that 
patients wanted ‘to be afforded the dignity and rights associated with being “a 
human being, somebody who has an opinion”’47. Having elicited in a qualitative 
study the views and needs of patients, they said that:  
 
 When individuals feel vulnerable in the face of major threats, they seek 
 attachment figures to help them feel safe. Only a doctor who was 
 believed to be expert, to value the patient as an equal, and to be 
 committed to the patient in a unique relationship could fulfil this role. 
 The starting point for study and training of clinical communication should 
 therefore be patients' vulnerability and dependence on doctors.48 
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Medical professionalism should be taught at undergraduate, postgraduate and 
continuing education levels and the property model, enshrined in medical 
professionalism, should be part of the curriculum.  
 
While there has been no difficulty in recognising the value of medical 
professionalism, there has been less certainty about what it actually entails. 
Traditional notions of professionalism have construed it in terms of trusteeship 
and altruism: Rosen and Dewer49 describe the traditional image of medical 
professionalism as that of ‘a selfless clinician, motivated by a strong ethos of 
service, equipped with unique skills and knowledge, in control of their work and 
practising all hours to restore full health to ‘his’ or ‘her’ patients’50 but some 
more recent notions have focused on delivery of technical expertise51. Also some 
older notions have been built on clinical autonomy, while newer definitions have 
been patient-centred.52  It was once said that ‘perhaps professionalism is like 
pornography: easy to recognize but difficult to define’53.  This difficulty (in 
defining professionalism) has been removed by recent work54 which made 
explicit the domains and required standards for medical professionalism. 
The following55 are now established as core principles of medical 
professionalism: 
 
 Principle of primacy of patient welfare. This principle is based on a 
 dedication to serving the interest of the patient. Altruism contributes to 
 the trust that is central to the physician–patient relationship. Market 
 forces, societal pressures, and administrative exigencies must not 
 compromise this principle.  
  
 Principle of patient autonomy. Physicians must have respect for patient 
 autonomy. Physicians must be honest with their patients and empower 
 them to make informed decisions about their treatment. Patients' 
 decisions about their care must be paramount, as long as those decisions 
 are in keeping with ethical practice and do not lead to demands for 
 inappropriate care.  
 
 Principle of social justice. The medical profession must promote justice in 
 the health care system, including the fair distribution of health care 
 resources. Physicians should work actively to eliminate discrimination in 
 health care, whether based on race, gender, socioeconomic status, 
 ethnicity, religion, or any other social category.  
 
 
The General Medical Council’s guidance, Good Medical Practice,56 sets out the 
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principles and values on which good practice is founded; these principles 
together describe medical professionalism in action. The guidance is addressed 
to doctors, but it is also intended to let the public know what they can expect 
from doctors.  ‘Relationships with patients’ is one of the seven headings of Good 
Medical Practice (the others being Good clinical care, Maintaining good medical 
practice, Teaching and training, Working with colleagues, Probity and Health). 
 
The guidance specifies the duties of a doctor registered with the General 
Medical Council as follows57:  
 
 Make the care of your patient your first concern 
 Protect and promote the health of patients and the public 
 Provide a good standard of practice and care  
  Keep your professional knowledge and skills up to date 
  Recognise and work within the limits of your competence 
  Work with colleagues in the ways that best serve patients' interests 
 Treat patients as individuals and respect their dignity  
  Treat patients politely and considerately 
  Respect patients' right to confidentiality 
 Work in partnership with patients  
  Listen to patients and respond to their concerns and preferences 
  Give patients the information they want or need in a way they can 
  understand 
  Respect patients' right to reach decisions with you about their  
  treatment and care 
  Support patients in caring for themselves to improve and maintain 
  their health  
 Be honest and open and act with integrity  
  Act without delay if you have good reason to believe that you or a 
  colleague may be putting patients at risk 
  Never discriminate unfairly against patients or colleagues 
  Never abuse your patients' trust in you or the public's trust in the  
  profession. 
 
Respect for the patient’s right to self-determination is thus central to medical 
professionalism. Respecting the patient’s right to self-determination is not an 
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isolated process; it is part of a wider hallmark of professionalism that embraces 
recognition of the patient’s values, expectations, fears, plans and social 
identity. Furthermore, certain expectations flow from the core principles of 
medical professionalism. The authors of a project report58 produced by the 
King’s Fund stated: ‘We have acknowledged the legitimacy of patients’ 
expectations: their interests should lie at the heart of modern 
professionalism’59. It is submitted in this thesis that these expectations can be 
regarded as, and indeed are, property rights. Put in other words, the doctor’s 
duty correlative to the patient’s property rights (derived from legitimate 
expectations) is at the heart of medical professionalism. The property model 
thus harmonises the law and medical professionalism whereas, as argued in this 
thesis, there is a gap between the consent model and modern dictates of 
medical professionalism. 
 
 
Legitimate expectations from the doctor-patient consultation 
. 
The patient’s expectation and the importance of mutual trust between doctor 
and patient are reflected in the following vistas provided by Oxman60 and 
colleagues: 
 
 The patient: 
 If you expect me, as your patient, to accept the treatment you are 
 prescribing for me, it is only fair that I inform you about my 
 requirements. Firstly, I expect you to have consulted systematic reviews 
 of reliable evidence about the relative merits and demerits of the various 
 treatment alternatives available to me………I expect you to use the clinical 
 skills, judgment, and intangible personal resources that characterise a 
 thoughtful, reflective, evidence based practitioner. 
 
 
 The doctor: 
 Patients vary in the amount of information that they want to give to and 
 from their doctors. Most patients seem to get less information from their 
 doctors than they want, but others would rather not be told some of the 
 things that some doctors assume that they must want to know. Because 
 you and I don't know each other yet, I'm going to need your help in 
 learning how much information you want about your problem, and about 
 the possible treatment options. …….. You also need to know that I will 
 never lie in response to a straight question from you, and if I don't know 
 the answer I will do my best to find it for you.61 
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Doctors cannot be said to offer patient-centred care unless they actively seek to 
understand and meet patients’ expectations. Most patients go into a medical 
consultation with explicit expectations62. The expectations relate to themes 
such as involvement in their care, the doctor’s interpersonal manner, 
information about diagnosis and prognosis, and communication and clinical 
competence.63 It is known that when these expectations are met, higher levels 
of satisfaction with health care are recorded.64 Patients want not just more 
information but greater involvement in decision making.65 They want 
information that is adequate and accurate enough to enable them make 
informed choices from treatment options.66 They should be told why a particular 
intervention is offered, since ‘the wide variations in practice, especially in 
operative procedures, are not related to need but to the advocacy and skill mix 
of local doctors’67.  
 
Studies68 of patients’ expectations of general practitioners show that 
‘explanation of the problem’ is at the top of patients’ values. Unfortunately 
explanations are not always forthcoming and there is often a wide gap between 
patients’ expectations and their experience69. Studies conducted in America 
show unmet expectations relating to doctor-patient communication were cited 
by one in six patients who attended outpatient consultations.70  
When assessed using a 40-item questionnaire that covered the bio-physiological, 
functional, experiential, ethical, social and financial dimensions of patient 
knowledge, surgical patients reported that they received less knowledge than 
they needed 71 Almost 50% of women contributing to a survey for the UK National 
Sentinel Caesarean section Audit indicated that they would like more 
information on risks and benefits of Caesarean Sections.72 Involvement in 
decision-making has a high impact on satisfaction with childbirth experience.73 
Surveys have pointed to the need for further research into ways by which 
doctors can elicit, measure and prioritize patients’ expectations.74 
 
 
Thus, while medical professionalism, as defined by the medical establishment, 
leads the patient to expect that his/her right to self-determination will be 
respected and that he/she will be provided with appropriate information and be 
Edozien LC, 2013, Chapter 8 
 239 
involved in decision-making, the reality on the ground is that these expectations 
are often unfulfilled. As discussed in Chapter 5, the operationalised paradigm of 
consent lets the patient down in this respect. A more compelling approach is 
needed. 
 
Treating expectation as property endows a positive right 
 
Whereas the right to do as one wishes with one's body is a right in rem, the 
expectation of truth-telling and involvement in decision-making in healthcare 
can be regarded as a right in personam, i.e. it is a right held against a specific 
nameable person or persons. Consent (valid consent) does not confer any 
positive right on the patient.  Rather, it confers immunity on the doctor (from 
litigation, and correlative disability on the patient). If any positive right is 
conferred by consent, it is a right of the doctor to breach patient's bodily 
integrity. It could be said that consent confers a negative right on the patient (a 
right to another person's forbearance). Whereas a right not to be touched 
without consent is a negative right, a property right in the expectation that one 
will be involved in decisions about one’s own healthcare is a positive right, 
demanding positive action from the health care provider.  
 
Generally, the rights associated with the consent model are negative rights and 
a right in rem. Consent does not generate positive obligations, except in cases of 
refusal of treatment. Thus the property model potentially carries an advantage 
over the consent model, because while the latter could act as a shield, it cannot 
function as a sword.  
 
The rights associated with the principle of body-as-property are also negative 
rights. These rights constrain the doctor from treating the patient without her 
consent but do not demand positive action from the doctor to involve the 
patient in decision-making. The demand for positive action can be formalized if 
the expectation of the patient from a medical consultation, his/her expectation 
that relevant and sufficient information will be provided and s/he will be 
engaged in all decisions about their care, is regarded as property. As this will be 
a positive right, however, it may be more difficult to justify and its limits will 
have to be very clearly defined. 
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Also, liability in battery may be established in consent cases only where there 
has been touching. Similarly with the model where the body is treated as 
property, trespass to the property can only occur where there has been bodily 
invasion.  In other words, claims under battery and body-as-property would not 
apply unless the doctor has actually touched the patient. Treating the patient’s 
legitimate expectations from a medical consultation as property allows the 
patient legal redress if these expectations are not met, regardless of whether or 
not the doctor has touched him/her. 
 
If a doctor fails to inform a 37-year old pregnant woman of the option of having 
a diagnostic test (amniocentesis) and the baby is found at birth to have Down 
syndrome, the woman has been denied an opportunity to be involved in making 
decisions about her care. In particular, the woman has been denied the chance 
to decide whether to undergo amniocentesis and, in the event of an abnormal 
karyotype result, to decide whether to have the pregnancy terminated. This was 
the story in an American case, Karlson v Guerinot.75 The claimant brought an 
action based on denial of consent but the court rebuffed this line of action on 
the basis that consent analysis was ‘limited to those situations where the harm 
suffered arose from some affirmative violation of the patient’s physical integrity 
such as surgical procedures, injections or invasive diagnostic tests’.76 This was 
yet another manifestation of the consent model’s inadequacies in protecting 
patient self-determination. Had property analysis been the basis of the action, 
and accepted by court, the claimant would have had a better chance of 
obtaining redress for the breach of her right to self-determination. At the age of 
37 years, she had the legitimate expectation that her doctor would provide 
evidence-based information about the risk of having a baby with a chromosomal 
abnormality. This expectation, it is argued in this thesis, should be protected as 
a proprietary right. 
 
Thus where there has been no touching, the patient cannot be protected by 
consent analysis (via battery). Where there has been a failure to offer treatment 
(as in the amniocentesis case described above), the patient could bring an action 
in negligence but would not be able to rely on consent. Consent will, however, 
offer protection where treatment has been given but the availability of an 
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alternative and potentially preferable alternative was not disclosed to the 
patient (this equates to a lack of valid consent).77  
 
  
Support for the idea of treating the patient’s legitimate expectations as a 
property right can also be derived from analysis of the case of Janet Birch v 
University College London Hospital NHS Foundation Trust.78 The Claimant was a 
55 year old diabetic woman admitted to Watford General Hospital with 
suspected third nerve palsy. An urgent MRI scan was recommended to exclude 
the two differential diagnoses, posterior communicating artery aneurysm and 
cavernous sinus pathology. As there were no scanning slots available, she was 
transferred to the Defendant's hospital, the National Hospital for Neurology, 
London. There, neurosurgeons decided to perform a catheter angiogram (the 
diagnostic test for an aneurysm) instead of an MRI scan. The risks of a catheter 
angiogram were explained to Mrs Birch, including the 1% risk of a stroke, and 
written consent was obtained. Unfortunately this risk materialised. The claimant 
alleged that the decision to perform a catheter angiogram instead of an MRI scan 
was negligent but Cranston J, citing Bolam and Bolitho, found in favour of the 
defendant. 
 
The claimant also alleged that she had not been provided with full information 
regarding the risk of a catheter angiogram compared with that of an MRI scan, 
and on this point Cranston J found for the claimant. He stated that although 
there was no requirement that a doctor should discuss alternative treatments in 
every case, special circumstances in this particular case warranted this 
discussion. On causation, the defence argued that had the claimant undergone 
an MRI scan she would still have had to undergo a catheter angiogram afterwards 
but, as in Chester v Afshar79, the court prioritised the patient’s right to self-
determination over medical opinion.  
On the face of it, this looks like a triumph of the consent model. Examined 
critically, however, there is little or no reason to believe that a similar outcome 
will be reached if a similar case should reach the English courts, as there are key 
facts which distinguish this case. The most notable of these was that the 
claimant had been offered an MRI scan at the referring hospital. 
Also, had rules of causation been strictly applied, the decision may have 
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favoured the defendant, for the claimant acknowledged that the doctor knew 
best, and there was merit in the defence that even if an MRI scan had been 
performed, the claimant would still have needed an angiogram.  
 
This case, based on the consent model, does not establish a general duty for the 
doctor to discuss alternative treatments with the patient. This is a blow to 
patient self-determination. A patient could not be said to have made a self-
determining choice if the doctor has withheld information on alternative 
treatments – and it is not uncommon for doctors to exclude some options before 
presenting a patient with residual alternatives to choose from.  
 
Applying the property model to this case would have yielded the same outcome 
for the claimant, but the legal precedent would have been a stronger, more 
certain one – there would have been greater legal certainty and no debates 
about this decision resting on the special circumstances of the case. Mrs Birch 
had a legitimate expectation that the doctors would explain to her the relative 
risks of an angiogram and an MRI scan, and explain why an angiogram was being 
proposed instead of an MRI scan. The court clearly placed high premium on this 
expectation and, had the case been argued on the basis of property analysis, it 
would have been reasonable for the court to recognise this as a proprietary 
right.  
Also, had there been a transactional approach of the type implicit in the 
property model rather than application of the usual institutionally-valid 
paradigm of consent, Mrs Birch would have been informed of the comparative 
benefits and risks of both treatment options. The consent model focused on the 
duty of the doctors, and if an MRI scan had not previously been on the cards, it 
may well have been the case that the doctors did not have a duty to discuss this 
with Mrs Birch. The property model focuses on the claimant’s right to make an 
informed choice regarding treatment options, and this right would apply 
whether or not an MRI scan had been discussed earlier. This positive right is 
complemented by a correlative fiduciary obligation on the doctor to provide the 
information required for making an informed choice.  
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Proprietary rights and the doctor’s fiduciary role 
 
In the above paragraphs, an attempt has been made to show that medical 
professionalism spells out certain duties expected of the doctor, and these 
include respect for self-determination. Further, the patient is entitled to a 
legitimate expectation that the doctor will fulfill these duties or obligations – 
that, after all, is the essence of professionalism. When the patient consults a 
doctor in the context of these legitimate expectations, there is a bona fide 
relationship of trust. Against this background, it is argued below that the doctor 
owes the patient fiduciary obligations that relate to patient self-determination, 
and that these obligations can be protected by the property approach. 
 
A fiduciary relationship is a relationship of trust between two parties, A and B, 
where A (the principal) is in a comparatively vulnerable position and entrusts B 
(the fiduciary) with the management of property. B is obliged to act at all times 
in good faith and in the interests of A. The latter specifically reposes 
confidence, faith and trust in the former, and the former accepts this. The 
fiduciary duty owed to A by B is considered the highest standard of care in law, 
more demanding than the duty of care prescribed in the law of tort. Although 
fiduciary relationships most commonly arise in relation to the management of 
property (in particular, trusts of property), there are non-property situations 
where a fiduciary duty has been ascribed to one party: teacher-student; lawyer-
client; priest-parishioner80. 
 
Beauchamp and Childress81 state that  
 The patient-physician relationship is a fiduciary relationship — that is, 
 founded on trust or confidence; and the physician is therefore necessarily 
 a trustee for the patient’s medical welfare82. 
 
Various other academic commentators83 agree with this opinion but, in general, 
the courts have not embraced it.84 Canada is the only common law jurisdiction in 
the world that recognises the doctor-patient relationship as a fiduciary one.85 In 
Australia and other parts of North America, however, the courts have variously 
found that a fiduciary relationship arises from some but not all of the doctor’s 
duties to the patient.86 These fiduciary duties relate to financial transactions, 
procurement of gifts, sexual relationships and disclosure of confidential 
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information.87 In one case88, however, the duty to provide adequate information 
was regarded as a fiduciary duty: 
 
 The duty of the doctor to inform the patient is a fiduciary duty. The 
 patient is entitled to rely upon the physician to tell him what he needs to 
 know about the condition of his own body. The patient has the right to 
 chart his own destiny, and the doctor must supply the patient with 
 material fact the patient will need in order to intelligently chart that 
 destiny with dignity.89 
 
 
Also, in Moore90 Panelli J. stated that the doctor had a fiduciary duty to enable a 
competent patient make self-determining decisions about his/her care. 
The English common law position on the matter was stated in Sidaway v Board of 
Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital 91 where 
Lord Scarman92 dismissed without giving any explanation the appellant’s 
argument that the relationship between doctor and patient is of a fiduciary 
character: 
 
  There is no comparison to be made between the relationship of doctor 
 and patient with [sic] that of solicitor and client, trustee and cestui qui 
 trust or the other relationships treated in equity as of a fiduciary 
 character.93  
 
 
It must be noted that Sidaway was not primarily about fiduciary duties, and to 
that extent cannot be the complete authority on fiduciary duties in the doctor-
patient relationship in the UK. Despite Lord Scarman’s statement, it is arguable 
that the doctor owes fiduciary duties to the patient in respect of the principle of 
self-determination. This argument is based on two observations. Firstly, when 
the duties of a doctor, as spelt out by the professional bodies cited above, are 
compared with the recognised duties of a fiduciary, it is difficult not to conclude 
that the former are within the ambit of the latter. Secondly, it is arguable that 
the term fiduciary should not be applied to particular relationships (e.g. doctor-
patient, solicitor-client) but to particular duties expected of parties to the 
relationship.94 
Rahaim95 states that a fiduciary must discharge duty with care, skill, prudence, 
diligence, and up to date knowledge.  Berumen96 formulated the general duties 
of a fiduciary as follows:  
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 To take into account the reasonable expectations and interests of the 
‘fiduciaree’. 
 To ensure they are sufficiently competent and knowledgeable to  carry 
out their duties to professional standards 
 To disclose to relevant parties any conflicts of interest, limitations or 
impediments that may interfere with their fiduciary responsibilities 
 Not to misuse information or take undue advantage of their relationship 
or betray the confidences of the fiduciaree. 
 
These general duties are similar to those prescribed by the English Law 
Commission.97 Significantly, these duties cover the same grounds as some of the 
duties outlined by the General Medical Council and the medical establishment, 
as shown above. The duty to act at all times in the best interests of the patient 
is clearly a fiduciary one. The duties of a doctor to respect the dignity of the 
patient, to work in partnership with patients and to respect their right to be 
involved in decision-making about their own care are duties that can be 
subsumed under the fiduciary duties listed above. In Canada, the courts have 
said that the doctor has a fiduciary duty to disclose medical error98, and it is 
argued by some commentators99 elsewhere that the doctor indeed has a 
fiduciary duty to disclose any mistakes s/he has made that has resulted in an 
adverse incident. 
 
If a fiduciary duty is recognised, the doctor will not be free to withhold 
information from the patient simply because he/she feels that this would 
influence the patient’s decision. If the law and professional standards emphasise 
that the doctor has a fiduciary duty to disclose information to the patient, then 
doctors are likely to be more open with patients and the impact of the 
information gradient between doctor and patient will be reduced. Recognising 
the duty to respect patient self-determination as a fiduciary duty will also have 
a major implication for cases where the doctor has allegedly failed to fulfill this 
duty. The burden of proof will shift from the patient to the doctor, who will 
have to establish that he/she has competently performed the fiduciary duties.  
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Conclusion 
 
Vulnerability in the face of a steep informational (and sometimes social) 
gradient between doctor and patient is a major threat to patient self-
determination. Protection of the right to self-determination will remain 
inadequate for as long as vulnerability is not adequately addressed. The law has 
stepped in to protect the vulnerable party in various arenas, such as product 
liability and consumer protection, and a similar approach could be made 
regarding patient self-determination. Property rhetoric intrinsically carries 
greater security, and patient self-determination gets stronger protection through 
a property model that recognizes a proprietary right in the patient’s expectation 
of engagement in decision making. In this context, engagement means a 
transaction in which the doctor is aware of the patient’s goals provides tailored 
information that enables the patient make a self-determining decision. 
 
Where one party is particularly vulnerable, trust assumes greater significance. 
When the patient consults a doctor in the context of legitimate expectations 
generated by the medical establishment’s own definition of medical 
professionalism, there is a bona fide relationship of trust. The doctor therefore 
can be argued to have a fiduciary duty to provide the patient with adequate 
information and to take into account the reasonable expectations and interests 
of the patient. This fiduciary duty is an essential element of the proposed 
property model; it is the correlative duty to the patient’s right to make 
decisions about his/her treatment.  
 
The concept of legitimate expectations constituting a chose in action fits with 
the concept of property as defining a relationship between persons. Recognition 
of a proprietary right in the patient’s legitimate expectation from a consultation 
is not a huge leap forward, once the concept of property as defining 
relationships between persons (rather than between a person and a thing) is 
accepted. As argued in this thesis, the definition of property has to move with 
the times, and the legal concept of property as a thing or as defining the 
relationship between a person and a thing are obsolete. 
 
It is worth recalling at this juncture Underkuffler’s ‘four dimensions involved in 
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any legally cognizable conception of property’100. The first of these dimensions is 
a theory of rights; the second is the spatial dimension.  In Chapter 7 the concept 
of the body as object of property was discussed; this is the spatial dimension. 
This chapter has introduced the concept of property rights in the patient’s 
expectations from consultation with the doctor, expectations which are 
legitimized by the dictates of medical professionalism and the duties prescribed 
by medical regulatory bodies. This constitutes Underkuffler’s first dimension, a 
theory of rights.  
The third and fourth dimensions – stringency of protection and time – are less 
problematic in the context of this thesis and will be addressed in subsequent 
chapters which attempt to show how the property model compares with the 
consent model. 
 
 
 
 
. 
. 
 
.  
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CHAPTER 9 
 
JUSTIFICATION OF THE PROPERTY MODEL FOR  
PROTECTING PATIENT SELF-DETERMINATION 
 
‘Part of the imbalance between doctor and patient is due to the patient’s lack of 
information, and, on one view, it is the function of the law to redress the imbalance by 
providing patients with the ‘right’ to be given that information, or perhaps more 
accurately imposing a duty on doctors to provide it.’1  
 
 
In Chapter 3 (pages 74-109), it was shown that the mechanism by which the law purports 
to uphold the patient’s right to self-determination in medical decision-making is the law 
of consent. It was also shown that the consent model suffers from a number of 
weaknesses which limit its suitability for achieving what it is meant to achieve. One of 
the weaknesses is that, as applied in English courts, consent law protects the interests 
of a ‘homogenised’2 patient rather than those of the index patient. By definition, self-
determination is referenced to the particular patient in question, not to a hypothetical 
person. Accordingly, consent cannot truly and effectively protect the patient’s right to 
self-determination.  
 
Traditionally, the English courts were not particularly keen on asserting the rights of the 
patient in medical decision-making; rather, they deferred to medical opinion – which 
made it difficult for the claimant to establish breach of duty in negligence cases brought 
against doctors. Gradually, they became more committed to upholding patient self-
determination, but their efforts in this regard were hampered by the bluntness of the 
tool at their disposal – the traditional consent model, which was problematic, not least 
because the claimant had to establish not only breach of duty but also causation. The 
inadequacy of this tool in the wake of contemporary judicial thinking became most 
glaring in Chester v Afshar3 where the court resorted to jurisprudential contortions in 
order to protect the patient’s right to self-determination. Had an alternative model 
been available, the court could have reached the same decision through a more logical, 
less revisionist and less controversial analysis; one that is capable of being applied 
consistently in future cases and that does not entail departure from established legal 
principles of causation. Property analysis is presented as this alternative. The property 
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model holds sacrosanct the patient’s right to self-determination and imposes a duty on 
doctors to engage proactively with patients in decision-making. 
 
 This chapter seeks to identify the benefits that could flow from property analysis. With 
reference to two landmark consent cases decided in English courts – Sidaway v Board of 
Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital 4 and Chester - and 
other case law, the chapter discusses the extent to which the principles (in particular, 
property analysis) enunciated in this thesis are consistent with principles espoused by 
Court of Appeal and House of Lords (Supreme Court) judgements.  
 
It will be argued that the property model makes the doctor’s duty to disclose 
information to the patient an affirmative one, precludes limitations imposed by the 
objective test applied in consent cases, hybridises the strengths of ‘real consent’5 and 
‘informed’ consent, limits reliance on therapeutic privilege, and fits with the courts’ 
apparent shift towards a rights-based approach. Together, these attributes make the 
property model potentially better suited than the consent model to genuine protection 
of the patient’s right to self-determination. It must be stressed here that the property 
model and the consent model are not mutually exclusive models; they share a lot in 
common but the property model has attributes, outlined above and tabulated below 
(page  291), which make it potentially better suited for what the law aims to achieve. 
 
The property approach to protecting self-determination 
  
In chapter 2 (pages 29-30), the concept of self-determination underpinning this thesis 
was discussed. It is this principle of self-determination that the law of consent is meant 
to protect. For the avoidance of doubt it is stressed again that this is different from the 
notion of the patient having a right to choose or demand treatment regardless of cost, 
medical indication or other public-interest considerations. It is simply the patient’s right 
to be the ultimate, informed decision-maker in respect of what should be done to his or 
her body. In essence, therefore, self-determination is a rights issue. It is about the rights 
of the patient, and the correlative duties of the doctor.  
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In the property model, the patient’s right to self-determination is regarded as a 
proprietary right. Traditionally, the law and society at large have regarded proprietary 
rights as trumping most rights. So from the outset, adopting the property model signals 
the paramountcy of the patient’s right to self-determination. The stringency with which 
this right is protected may vary from case to case, as the right is not absolute, but there 
is a default presumption that this right trumps most others. The theoretical 
underpinnings of this proprietary right and its structure have been discussed in the last 
three chapters. Essentially, the patient’s bodily integrity is protected from unauthorised 
invasion and his/her legitimate expectation to be provided with the relevant information 
and opportunity to enable him/her make an informed choice or decision regarding 
treatment is taken to be a proprietary right. The term ‘proprietary right’ is preferred to 
‘property right’ in this thesis as, despite the arguments outlined in Chapter 6 (pages 
173-174), ‘property’ carries the connotation of tangibility, ownership and 
commodification.  
Two essential elements of the property approach are now described: the transactional 
approach to doctor-patient communication and the bilateral distribution of 
responsibility between doctor and patient. 
 
Effective communication 
 
Rights are meaningless without correlative duties, and the property model compels a 
fiduciary duty for the doctor to communicate effectively with the patient. This 
communication entails not only the provision of relevant information but also the taking 
of reasonable steps to ensure that the patient understands the information provided and 
that an informed decision is made by the patient. For this to happen, the doctor-patient 
consultation becomes a transactional activity rather than a unidirectional flow of data 
across a steep informational and sometimes social gradient. This transactional activity 
and the fiduciary duty that underlies it are embedded in medical professionalism as 
enunciated in this thesis (Chapter 8, pages 234-237) and by medical regulatory bodies. 
 
Both judges6 and academicians7 have commented on the doctor’s duty to check that the 
patient understands. Morland J8 said:  
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When recommending a particular type of surgery or treatment, the doctor, when 
warning of the risks, must take reasonable care to ensure that his explanation of 
the risks is intelligible to his particular patient. The doctor should use language, 
simple but not misleading, which the doctor perceives from what knowledge and 
acquaintanceship that he may have of the patient (which might be slight), will be 
understood by the patient so that the patient can make an informed decision as 
to whether or not to consent to the recommended surgery or treatment. 9 
(Emphasis mine) 
 
A quarter of a century ago, O’Neill10 asserted that: 
 
The onus on practitioners is to see that patients, as they actually are, understand 
what they can about the basics of their diagnosis and the proposed treatment, 
and are secure enough to refuse the treatment or to insist on changes.11   
 
This duty tends to be overlooked in the consent model, as the model focuses on the 
amount of information disclosed rather than on what the patient actually understands 
(i.e. focus on content rather than the process of communication). If the focus shifts to 
ensuring that the patient understands what has been said, then clinicians will be legally 
obliged to pay more attention to communication skills, to the way information is 
provided and to checking that the patient understands the meaning and implication of 
the information provided – just as would normally be the case in a property transaction. 
Other professionals dealing with clients are expected to adopt a similar approach; for 
example, financial advisers are asked to ‘sense check’12 their recommendations against 
the customer’s original objectives. By adopting the transactional, rather than the 
conduit, approach to consultation, the clinician is more likely to meet Judge Morland’s 
requirement to ‘take reasonable care’ to facilitate understanding. 
 
 
The doctor’s duty to disclose information to the patient: an affirmative duty 
 
Along with the duty to take reasonable steps to check the patient’s understanding, the 
property model imposes an affirmative duty on the doctor to disclose tailored 
information to the patient.  Regarding the doctor’s duty to disclose information, Lord 
Templeman13 stated: 
 
The duty of the doctor … is to provide the patient with information which will 
enable the patient to make a balanced judgment if the patient chooses to make a 
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balanced judgment …The court will award damages against the doctor if the court 
is satisfied that the doctor blundered and that the patient was deprived of 
information which was necessary for the purposes I have outlined.14 
 
In describing the requirement that the doctor be under a duty to inform his patient of 
the material risks inherent in the treatment, Lord Scarman (in Sidaway) sought to 
impose an affirmative duty on the doctor. He made this unequivocal by saying: 
 
I think that English law must recognize a duty of the doctor to warn his patient of 
risk inherent in the treatment he is proposing: and especially so, if the treatment 
be surgery.15 
 
 
It appears, however, that there is no juristic basis for this affirmative duty. That is 
because case law has relied entirely on the consent model. A basis for an affirmative 
duty to warn the patient of risks inherent in treatment can be provided by property 
analysis. Property analysis, as shown in this thesis, provides a legal as well as ethical 
basis for assigning rights to the patient and correlative duties to the doctor. 
 
To the extent that I have indicated, arguably English law should recognize a duty of the 
doctor to warn his patient of risk inherent in the treatment which he is proposing.  
 
 
Bilateral distribution of responsibility 
 
While the doctor’s duty to disclose information should be an affirmative one, the patient 
also has to take some responsibility for decision making.16  An example of how this 
applies is the issue of the patient’s understanding of information provided by the doctor. 
It has been held that the legal duty of a doctor extends to provision of adequate 
information but not to ensuring that the patient has understood this information.17 It 
must be acknowledged that imposing a duty on the doctor to ensure understanding could 
be both onerous and difficult to enforce. On the other hand, patient self-determination 
cannot be protected if there is no consideration of what the patient understands. It is 
submitted that one way of facilitating this is through a bilateral distribution of 
responsibility.  
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The right to self-determination should carry with it obligations not only on the part of 
doctor but also of the patient: the patient should take some responsibility for the 
treatment received, by communicating with the doctor, providing contextual 
information relevant to his/her decision making, and communicating his/her 
understanding to the doctor. Unfortunately (for various reasons, a discussion of which is 
beyond the scope of this thesis), this does not always happen. It is recognised that in 
consent discussions ‘[t]he patient can make things impossible by acting on fixed or 
superstitious opinions or by failing to participate responsibly in her management or its 
planning’.18  In Sidaway, Lord Scarman said that: 
 
... a patient may well have in mind circumstances, objectives and values which 
he reasonably may not make known to the doctor but which may lead him to a 
different decision from that suggested by purely medical opinion.19 
 
 
While it is the patient’s prerogative to withhold information about his/her objectives 
and values from the doctor, it is also reasonable that the patient should take 
responsibility for the consequences of doing so. Section 2b of the NHS Constitution20 lists 
the responsibilities of patients. These include the patient’s responsibility to provide 
accurate information about his/her health, condition and status. 
 
The implementation of a model of doctor-patient relationship that is rooted in mutual 
trust – such as the property model incorporating the interpretive style of consultation 
adopted in this thesis – will (because of enhanced trust) make it less likely for a patient 
to withhold from the doctor information that is relevant to his/her decision making. Also, 
unless the patient discharges his/her own responsibility, the doctor will have to make an 
essentially arbitrary assessment of the patient’s informational needs, which is the 
opposite of what the principle of self-determination seeks to protect.  
 
The consent model does not create the right environment for patients to take 
responsibility in the decision making process. One study21 found that at the point of 
signing a consent form, many patients are unaware that this is meant to be an exercise 
of their own right; they see it as an exercise to protect the doctor. The authors of the 
study state that: 
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….while medical professionals may recognise the desirability of a two-way 
transaction, it may not operate this way in practice if patients fail to understand 
that the purpose of the consent process is to respect their autonomy.22 
 
When obligations on both sides are addressed, tension between the patient’s legitimate 
expectations and the doctor’s duty is eased. This is the essence of a transactional 
approach to medical consultation. As stated in Chapter 5 (pages 150-154), a model 
which takes due account of the communicative transaction leading up to the decision, 
rather than just focusing on the final decision, will meet the imperatives of cultural 
sensitivity and uphold the principle of self-determination. 
 
The emphasis on both the doctor’s duty and the patient’s responsibility manifests the 
property model’s primary concern: the relationship between doctor and patient. The 
consent model does not take account of the bi-directional dynamics of this relationship, 
and has appeared to be an impediment to the relationship. The newer, nuanced 
conceptions of consent have not changed this. Maclean23 says, for example, that while 
Manson and O’Neill prioritise consent as communication, they do so primarily by focusing 
on the obligations of the healthcare professional, which in turn means that attention 
shifts back to disclosure and truthful disclosure rather than to interaction between both 
parties. 
 
 
 
Recognition of patient self-determination as a distinct legal right 
 
A fundamental weakness of the consent model is that its starting point is not the 
patient’s rights but the doctor’s duty. This is reflected in the following observation by 
Miller24: 
 
The 1980 case of Chatterton v. Gerson seems to be the first reported opinion to 
hold that a doctor "ought to warn of what may happen by misfortune, however 
well the operation is done, if there is a real risk of misfortune inherent in the 
procedure." This duty to warn was derived from the physician's general duty of 
care, however, rather than from the patient's right to receive information. The 
court found that the physician's duty stemmed from his professional obligation to 
exercise the care of a responsible doctor in similar circumstances, as set forth in 
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the landmark case of Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee. 25 
(References omitted). 
 
 
To afford optimal protection to patient self-determination, the starting point has to be 
the patient’s rights. One of the features of the proposed property model is that it seeks 
protection of the right to self-determination as a distinct legal right. Affording patient 
self-determination this degree of protection would be in keeping with Lord Munby’s26 
recent statement that rights issues ‘have to be more than what Brennan J in the High 
Court of Australia once memorably described as "the incantations of legal rhetoric"’.27 
While recognising the importance of patient self-determination, the law has not moved 
to protect this as a right per se, independent of the outcome of a trespass to this right.28 
Schultz29 argued for the legal recognition of patient self-determination as a distinct legal 
right. She drew a parallel between this argument and other legally protected rights such 
as the right to reputation. She further argued that legally protecting patient self-
determination in this way would reduce rather than expand litigation, for it would 
promote better communication between doctors and patients.  
Twerski and Cohen30 suggest that self-determination could be protected by allowing 
patients to recover for a violation of their right to make their own informed decision. 
They state the case as follows:31 
 
The classic tort model for informed consent litigation, while simple in theory, is 
seriously flawed in practice. The model depends on constructing a causal bridge 
between the absence of the information and the decision of the plaintiff to 
proceed with the therapy or use the product. Except in the most blatant 
situations, the causal relationship between inadequate information and plaintiff 
decision making is….not practically justiciable. The law does and can only 
consider the information the health professional or product vendor should deliver. 
It does not and cannot consider the multitude of factors that influence the way 
people actually make decisions. To decide causation without looking at the latter 
is wholly illusory. On the other hand, to insist on such inquiry would involve the 
courts in the kind of investigation of human behaviour that would seriously 
compromise the judicial process……Rather than focusing on personal injury 
damages flowing from the hypothetical “but for,” which seeks to determine what 
the plaintiff would have decided had the defendant provided the information, we 
suggest that the courts should identify and value the decision rights of the 
plaintiff which the defendant destroyed by withholding adequate information……. 
The legal system should protect these rights and provide significant recompense 
for their invasion, rather than continue its single-minded and ill-considered 
attention to personal injuries allegedly caused by the lack of information.’32   
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Other authors33 have also called for recognition of infringement of the right to self-
determination as an independent cause of action, and similar thoughts were expressed 
(albeit less forcefully) by Lord Hoffman34 in Chester: 
 
The remaining question is whether a special rule should be created by which 
doctors who fail to warn patients of risks should be made insurers against those 
risks. 
The argument for such a rule is that it vindicates the patient's right to choose for 
herself. Even though the failure to warn did not cause the patient any damage, it 
was an affront to her personality and leaves her feeling aggrieved.35 
 
 
There are two fundamental reasons why patient self-determination should be protected 
as a distinct right. The first one is that, as Kennedy36 said, it is of profound importance: 
 
…when we consider the duty of the doctor to inform his patients we are 
concerned with a profoundly important human right: the right to control one’s 
own destiny by knowing what it is that will be done by way of treatment, so that 
one may say no, if so minded.37 (Emphasis mine) 
 
In the same vein, Lord Steyn (in Chester)38 said: 
 
A patient’s right to an appropriate warning from a surgeon when faced with 
surgery ought normatively to be regarded as an important right which must be 
given effective protection whenever possible39 
 
 
The second reason is that this right originates independently of any harm that the 
claimant may suffer. As Jackson40 said: 
 
…we should remember why it is important to give patients information. Patients 
need information in order to make informed choices about their care, not in order 
to protect themselves against medical accidents.41 
 
Where there has been a failure to disclose risks and alternatives, the property model 
entitles the claimant to a remedy once breach of the duty of care is proven, without any 
requirement to prove causation. In other words, the property model treats interference 
with the patient’s right to self-determination as a cause of action in itself, as distinct 
from harm to the physical wellbeing of the patient.  
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Arguably, a disadvantage of recognising the patient’s right to make his/her own 
informed decision as an independent cause of action, not requiring any assessment of 
harm and its causation, is that damages awarded would be nominal.42 This should not 
necessarily be the case:  it is logical that the compensation for infraction of this right 
should reflect the reason why it was deemed worthy of special protection; which is that 
it is ‘a profoundly important human right’.43  This point is emphasised by the use of 
property analysis to secure the required protection; property rhetoric is powerful. In any 
case, the quantum of damages is not the key issue – what matters most is the vindication 
of the right rather than financial recompense. 
 
In the absence of physical harm, the patient may be left with nothing 
 
The impact of a requirement to prove causation is illustrated by Lord Bingham’s 
judgement in Chester. Lord Bingham allowed the appeal, on the ground that the ‘but 
for’ test was not satisfied: ‘a claimant is not entitled to be compensated, and a 
defendant is not bound to compensate the claimant, for damage not caused by the 
negligence complained of’44. He explains his decision not to allow the appeal by saying 
that the law should not hold a defendant liable where the defendant’s violation of the 
claimant’s right to be warned has not been ‘shown to have worsened the physical 
condition of the claimant’45.  In other words, he stuck to the conventional principle of 
causation. Unlike the majority, he did not appear prepared to bend this principle. The 
reason for this could not be that he did not appreciate the importance of the patient’s 
rights. He recognized this right but appeared to be more concerned about the quantum 
of damages: 
 
The patient's right to be appropriately warned is an important right, which few 
doctors in the current legal and social climate would consciously or deliberately 
violate. I do not for my part think that the law should seek to reinforce that right 
by providing for the payment of potentially very large damages by a defendant 
whose violation of that right is not shown to have worsened the physical condition 
of the claimant.46 
 
In deciding not to go with the majority Lord Bingham, like Lord Bridge, failed to make a 
clear distinction between the patient’s right to relevant information for informed 
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decision making (a right which in itself deserves protection) and the occurrence of harm 
of which the patient had not been warned.  
 
Lord Hoffman, who also decided for the defendant on the basis that the ‘but for’ test 
was not satisfied, appeared to distinguish between physical harm and infringement of 
personality: 
 
The remaining question is whether a special rule should be created by which 
doctors who fail to warn patients of risks should be made insurers against those 
risks. The argument for such a rule is that it vindicates the patient's right to 
choose for herself. Even though the failure to warn did not cause the patient any 
damage, it was an affront to her personality and leaves her feeling aggrieved. 
  I can see that there might be a case for a modest solatium in such cases.47 
 
 
A focus on physical harm detracts from protection of patient self-determination as a 
fundamental right. If the law truly seeks to protect patient self-determination, then a 
remedy should be available to the patient whose right has been breached, regardless of 
whether s/he has suffered demonstrable harm and, in the event that there is such harm, 
without the burden of proving that this harm would not have occurred but for the 
breach.  
 
Support for the recognition of patient self-determination as a distinct legal right could 
be drawn from Lord Hope’s48 assertion that the doctor’s duty was ‘unaffected in its 
scope by the response which Miss Chester would have given had she been told of these 
risks’49; this being the case, the doctor should be liable for any breach of the duty, 
regardless of what flows or results from the breach. The consent model fails in this 
regard, except in relation to battery where there is no requirement to prove harm – but 
battery is, as discussed in Chapter 3, considered an inappropriate form of action in cases 
relating to non-disclosure of information.  Lord Hoffman’s acknowledgement that ‘there 
might be a case for a modest solatium’50 in cases of affront to personality, however, 
opens a door by means of which an alternative model could be introduced with the aim 
of achieving what consent fails to deliver. 
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Personality as a legally recognised interest 
 
Recognition of the patient’s right to self-determination as a distinct right would not be 
unparalleled in jurisprudence; it would be akin to the protection afforded in some 
jurisdictions 51  to one’s right to honour and dignity. In South Africa, for example, 
personality is a legally recognized interest protected through a modern form of the actio 
iniuriarum52. The actio inuriarum is an action for negligent behaviour that affronts the 
dignity, reputation or bodily integrity of the claimant.53  Rooted in Roman law, it had by 
the 19th century fallen out of favour in jurisdictions (such as Germany) where it had 
hitherto featured prominently, but has recently made a comeback.54  As Zimmermann55 
put it, ‘[t]hrown out by the front door, the actio iniurarium has managed to sneak in 
through the back window – in the guise and under the cover of the general right of 
personality’56. It was recently applied in the Scottish case of Stevens v Yorkhill NHS 
Trust 57  in which a mother brought an action against the doctors who, without her 
consent, had removed (at a post mortem examination) and retained the brain of her 
baby.  Whitty 58  was not cited in Stevens, but had earlier argued that ‘the actio 
iniuriarum, in its modern form as a doctrine of rights of personality, provides a 
principled legal framework within which the Scottish post-mortem cases naturally, and 
indeed historically, belong’.59  
 
 
Adoption of property analysis: receptivity of the courts to new developments 
 
For property analysis to establish firm roots, the courts will have to be prepared to give 
it a chance. Given the courts’ reluctance to recognize property rights to the human body 
as discussed in Chapter 7 (pages 194-195), some degree of skepticism is tenable. On the 
other hand, Lord Scarman’s60 statement in Sidaway gives a ray of hope: 
 
The common law is adaptable: it would not otherwise have survived over the 
centuries of its existence. The concept of negligence itself is a development of 
the law by the judges over the last hundred years or so…. 
Unless statute has intervened to restrict the range of judge-made law, the 
common law enables the judges when faced with a situation where a right 
recognized by law is not adequately protected, either to extend existing 
principles to cover the situation or to apply an existing remedy to redress the 
injustice…..61 
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This leads one to believe that the apex court has left the door open for new 
developments – such as property analysis – but it must be borne in mind that Lord 
Scarman was one of the more liberal members of the that court.  
 
From Sidaway to Chester: the appellate courts in transition 
 
The position of the courts in relation to the patient’s right to self-determination has 
progressively shifted in the last couple of decades. It is important to trace this shift 
because it shows that the time may be right for consideration of the advantages that a 
property model potentially offers.  
 
For many years, the seminal UK case regarding the patient’s right to be adequately 
informed about her treatment has been Sidaway, the facts of which were discussed in 
Chapter 3 (pages 95-96). Although the court found in favour of the defendant, all of the 
judges recognised that the claimant had a fundamental right to decide whether to 
accept or reject any treatment proposed by the doctor. What differed between them 
was the distance they were prepared to travel in order to protect that right. The more 
adventurous Lord Scarman travelled the farthest, but even he found in favour of the 
defendant. 
 
Lord Scarman’s rights-based position 
 
Lord Scarman appeared to be well ahead of his time, and was recently described as ‘one 
of the greatest and most socially sensitive judges of his generation’62. He narrowed the 
issues at stake to these questions:  
 
Has the patient a legal right to know, and is the doctor under a legal duty to 
disclose, the risks inherent in the treatment which the doctor recommends? If the 
law recognizes the right and the obligation, is it a right to full disclosure or has 
the doctor a discretion as to the nature and extent of his disclosure?63 
 
 
These questions and the way Lord Scarman addressed them are underpinned by rights-
based thinking. He opined that the patient’s right to make his own decision ‘may be 
seen as a basic human right protected by the common law’64 and went on to say: 
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If, therefore, the failure to warn a patient of the risks inherent in the operation 
which is recommended does constitute a failure to respect the patient’s right to 
make his own decision, I can see no reason in principle why, if the risk 
materialises and injury or damage is caused, the law should not recognize and 
enforce a right in the patient to compensation by way of damages.65 
 
 
Lord Scarman acknowledged that in cases relating to informing the patient of the 
benefits, risks and alternatives of treatment, ‘the court is concerned primarily with a 
patient’s right’66 and that ‘[t]he doctor’s duty arises from his patient’s right’67. Still 
placing the patient’s rights in pole position, he goes on to say: 
 
If one considers the scope of the doctor’s duty by beginning with the right of the 
patient to make his own decision whether he will or will not undergo the 
treatment proposed, the right to be informed of significant risk and the doctor’s 
corresponding duty are easy to understand: for the proper implementation of the 
right requires that the doctor be under a duty to inform his patient of the 
material risks inherent in the treatment.68 
 
If the law accords primacy to protection of the patient’s rights, and in particular the 
patient’s right to adequate information and involvement in decision making, then 
property analysis is advantageous in so far as it protects the patient’s rights more 
stringently than the consent model does. Lord Scarman’s view of the patient’s right to 
make his own decision as a basic human right is consistent with the case made above for 
this right to be protected as a distinct legal interest under the property model. It is also 
encompassed in the concept, enunciated in Chapter 8, of property rights in the patient’s 
expectation of sufficient disclosure of information during a medical consultation.  
 
The other judges did not adopt the rights-based approach of Lord Scarman. There are a 
number of reasons for this, as reflected in the judgements. One reason was the then 
prevalent deference to the medical profession. The other was the prevailing social norm 
which did not prize individual self-determination in the way that contemporary society 
does.  
 
Deference to the medical profession 
 
Lord Diplock held that the Bolam test69 should be applied. In this regard, and in the tone 
of his judgement, he was diametrically opposite to Lord Scarman. In his view, the 
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doctor’s duty of care had always been and should continue to be ‘treated as single 
comprehensive duty covering all the ways in which a doctor is called upon to exercise his 
skill and judgment’70, and the entirety of this duty of care is subject to the Bolam test.  
He did not see any reason to distinguish the duty to inform the patient of risks from the 
more technical aspects of care, and pointed out that even the Bolam case itself included 
a claim of failure to warn: 
 
This general duty is not subject to dissection into a number of component parts to 
which different criteria of what satisfy the duty of care apply, such as diagnosis, 
treatment, advice (including warning of any risks of something going wrong 
however skillfully the treatment advised is carried out). The Bolam case itself 
embraced failure to advise the patient of the risk involved in the electric shock 
treatment as one of the allegations of negligence against the surgeon….71 
 
 
As the duty to warn is not, in Lord Diplock’s view, separable from diagnosis and 
treatment, expert evidence in this regard should be treated the same way – i.e. the 
professional standard applied: 
 
To decide what risks the existence of which a patient should be voluntarily 
warned and the terms in which such warning, if any, should be given, having 
regard to the effect that the warning may have, is as much an exercise of 
professional skill and judgment as any other part of the doctor’s comprehensive 
duty of care to the individual patient, and expert medical evidence should be 
treated in just the same way. The Bolam test should be applied.72 
 
 
This view that the patient should be told not what s/he expects to be told but what the 
medical profession feel s/he should be told was subsequently followed by the Court of 
Appeal in two cases.73  In Gold v Harringey Health Authority74 the claimant became 
pregnant and had her fourth child, despite having been sterilized in 1979 at the 
defendants’ hospital. She brought an action in negligence, and alleged that she was not 
warned of the risk of failure of the sterilization. The court was told that a substantial 
body of medical opinion in 1979 would not have informed the patient of the possibility 
that a sterilization operation could fail. In spite of this professional opinion, the court 
found for the claimant. On appeal, the Court of Appeal found in favour of the 
defendants. 
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This position was, however, strongly criticised by academic commentators who have 
argued, with good reason, that the duty to inform patients of benefits, risks and 
alternatives should be separated from the more technical aspects of care such as details 
of diagnosis and treatment.75 On the other hand, there is some logic in Lord Diplock’s 
view that the provision of information is part of the duty of care, just as is making a 
diagnosis or providing safe care. While it is accepted that there is a difference between 
the strictly technical aspects of care and the discussion of risks, benefits and 
alternatives, the divergence between the two when it comes to the law (whereby one 
test is applied to a part of the duty of care but a different test is applied to another 
component of that duty) only serves to underscore the inadequacy of the consent model 
-  discussion of risks, benefits and alternatives  had to be extricated from the duty of 
care in order for consent to work as a legal means of protecting patient self-
determination. Potentially, this can be avoided by exploring the option of a property 
model. With the property model, the question of whether Bolam applies to information-
giving does not arise; once the proprietary right is breached, the patient is entitled to 
redress. 
 
 
The first steps of departure from Bolam 
 
It could be argued that the shift away from the Bolam test in determining disclosure 
standards actually started with Sidaway itself. Although Lord Scarman was alone in 
taking the view that the patient’s right to information trumped professional opinion, 
three of the other four judges – Lord Bridge, Lord Keith and Lord Templeman - did take 
small but significant steps in this direction, by advocating a modified Bolam test.  
Lord Bridge, with whose judgement Lord Keith agreed, invoked the ‘realities of the 
doctor/patient relationship’76 as one reason why a doctrine enforcing the patient’s right 
to self-determination would be ‘quite impracticable in application’77. His view of the 
relationship is a vertical and paternalistic one. He said that the doctor ‘cannot set out to 
educate the patient to his own standard of medical knowledge of all the relevant factors 
involved’ 78  (a statement which emphasizes a vertical relationship) and expressed 
concern that disclosure of risk ‘may lead to that risk assuming an undue significance in 
the patient’s calculations’ 79  (a concern that is a hallmark of paternalism). Vertical 
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doctor-patient relationships and paternalism are both anachronistic. Had Lord Bridge 
adopted the interpretive model of doctor-patient relationship described and advocated 
in Chapter 2, there would have been no great barrier to the enforcement of patient self-
determination. 
The tour de force of Lord Bridge’s speech was the following: 
 
[A] decision what degree of disclosure of risks is best calculated to assist a 
particular patient to make a rational choice as to whether or not to undergo a 
particular treatment must primarily be a matter of clinical judgment. It would 
follow from this that the issue whether non-disclosure in a particular case should 
be condemned as a breach of the doctor’s duty of care is an issue to be 
determined primarily on the basis of expert medical evidence, applying the Bolam 
test.80 
 
 
However, what he says subsequently carries immense significance because it indicates a 
modified Bolam position: 
 
But I do not see that this approach involves the necessity ‘to hand over to the 
medical profession the entire question of the scope of the duty of disclosure, 
including the question whether there has been a breach of that duty’.81 
 
 
It appears that the judge was keen to uphold patient self-determination but preferred 
an incremental rather than a radical approach to achieving it: Bolam applies, but where 
the court deems fit, the appropriate standard of care regarding disclosure of information 
will be set not by medical opinion but by the court. What we see here is the beginning of 
a shift from the Bolam position. 
 
Lord Templeman said that, regarding results and options for treatment, ‘the doctor must 
decide in the light of his training and experience and in the light of his knowledge of the 
patient what should be said and how it should be said’82, but he goes on to say that: 
 
At the same time the doctor is not entitled to make the final decision with regard 
to treatment which may have disadvantages or dangers. Where the patient’s 
health and future are at stake, the patient must make the final decision. The 
patient is free to decide whether or not to submit to treatment recommended by 
the doctor and therefore the doctor impliedly contracts to provide information 
which is adequate to enable the patient to reach a balanced judgment, subject 
always to the [therapeutic privilege].83 
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Thus, Lord Templeman also takes a similar modified Bolam position, holding up the 
Bolam test as the appropriate test in this situation but also affirming the patient’s rights 
as final arbiter of what treatment may or may not be given. It is arguable that the 
modified Bolam test is nebulous, and simply reflected the reluctance of the judges to 
take a definitive step forward in the manner that Lord Scarman attempted to do. 
Further demonstrating the inadequacy of the consent model, Lord Templeman also said 
that ‘the relationship between doctor and patient is contractual in origin’ 84  – a 
statement which suggests that he was mindful of the obligation (regarding disclosure of 
information) owed to the patient by the doctor, but he was unable to enforce that 
obligation in this case. 
 
 
Medical opinion must withstand logical scrutiny: Bolitho v City and Hackney Health 
Authority85 
 
In Bolitho, the court showed that it was prepared to depart from the traditional position 
of excessive deference to the medical profession. Lord Brown-Wilkinson asserted that 
for expert medical opinion to be acceptable to the court it must be capable of 
withstanding logical scrutiny: 
 
These cases demonstrate that in cases of diagnosis and treatment there are cases 
where, despite a body of professional opinion sanctioning the defendant’s 
conduct, the defendant can properly be held liable for negligence (I am not here 
considering questions of disclosure or risk). In my judgment that is because, in 
some cases, it cannot be demonstrated to the judge’s satisfaction that the body 
of opinion relied on is reasonable or responsible. In the vast majority of cases, the 
fact that distinguished experts in the field are of a particular opinion will 
demonstrate the reasonableness of that opinion. In particular, where there are 
questions of assessment of the relative risks and benefits of adopting a medical 
practice, a reasonable view necessarily presupposes that the relative risks and 
benefits have been weighed by the experts in forming their opinions. But if, in a 
rare case, it can be demonstrated that the professional opinion is not capable of 
withstanding logical analysis, the judge is entitled to hold that the body of 
opinion is not reasonable or responsible. I emphasise that, in my view, it will very 
seldom be right for a judge to reach the conclusion that views genuinely held by a 
competent medical expert are unreasonable. The assessment of medical risks and 
benefits is a matter of clinical judgment which a judge would not normally be 
able to make without expert evidence.86 
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For a jurisdiction that appeared beholden to the medical profession this was a major 
development, and it was followed in a case87 relating to disclosure of information. While 
Bolitho has the appearance of a landmark case, however, the court’s position regarding 
the reasonableness of medical opinion was not novel. Sir John Donaldson,88 Master of the 
Rolls, had earlier said that: 
 
[T]he definition of the duty of care is not to be handed over to the medical or any 
other profession. The definition of the duty of care is a matter for the law and 
the courts. They cannot stand idly by if the profession, by an excess of 
paternalism, denies its patients real choice. In a word, the law will not allow the 
medical profession to play God....I think that, in an appropriate case, a judge 
would be entitled to reject a unanimous medical view if he were satisfied that it 
was manifestly wrong and that the doctors must have been misdirecting 
themselves as to their duty in law.89 
 
 
Also, in Smith v Tunbridge Wells Health Authority90 the court affirmed the patient's 
right to make an informed decision but stated that the materiality of risk was for the 
court (and not the medical profession) to determine. The judge said: 
 
In my judgement by 1988, although some surgeons may still not have been 
warning patients similar in situation to the plaintiff of the risk of impotence, that 
omission was neither reasonable nor responsible. 91 
 
 
The patient has a right to be informed of significant risks: Pearce v United Bristol 
Healthcare NHS Trust92 
 
Mrs Pearce brought an action in negligence against the defendants after she suffered a 
stillbirth. The pregnancy with her sixth child had been uncomplicated until it went two 
weeks beyond the estimated due date. At this point she asked her specialist for labour 
to be induced or the baby to be delivered by Caesarean section. The specialist declined 
her request, on the grounds that induction of labour would be risky and a Caesarean 
section would entail a longer stay in hospital. She accepted his recommendation that 
nature should take its course, but a few days later the baby died in the womb. Mrs 
Pearce claimed that the doctor should have informed her of the increased risk of 
stillbirth associated with expectant management beyond 42 weeks of pregnancy, and 
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that if she had been given this information she would not have opted for this line of 
management. At first instance her claim was dismissed, and she appealed, but the Court 
of Appeal also dismissed her claim.  
In dismissing the appeal, Lord Woolf followed the footsteps of the majority in Sidaway 
by agreeing that the patient was entitled to be informed by the doctor of any 
information that would be relevant to her decision making, and took cognisance of the 
decision in Bolitho. According to Lord Woolf93: 
 
In a case where it is being alleged that a plaintiff has been deprived of the 
opportunity to make a proper decision as to what course he or she should take in 
relation to treatment, it seems to me to be the law, as indicated in the cases to 
which I have just referred, that if there is a significant risk which would affect 
the judgment of a reasonable patient, then in the normal course it is the 
responsibility of a doctor to inform the patient of that significant risk, if the 
information is needed so that the patient can determine for him or herself as to 
what course he or she should adopt.94 (Emphases mine). 
 
 
Having acknowledged the patient’s entitlement to information, Lord Woolf nonetheless 
proceeded to dismiss the appeal on the basis of medical opinion that the risk of stillbirth 
in this case was not significant. This was not a favourable outcome for the claimant 
whose right to self-determination had been breached by the doctor’s failure to disclose 
relevant information, but progress had been made because the standard of disclosure 
was determined not by the Bolam test but by the reasonable patient test. 
 
If the position of the individual judges in Sidaway is examined in isolation, it seems clear 
that the apex court in the UK was not quite ready for a property analysis approach to 
the disclosure of information. When their Lordships’ modification of the Bolam test is 
taken into account and, more importantly, when the decisions of the Court of Appeal 
(Pearce) and the House of Lords (Bolitho) in subsequent years are considered, there is a 
clear shift in the courts’ position, in the direction of the position taken by Lord Scarman 
in Sidaway. This shift to a more patient-oriented stance opens the door to a re-
evaluation of the consent model, and perhaps even a conclusion that it should be 
replaced. 
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The courts’ shift towards a rights-based approach: Chester v Afshar95  
 
Lord Wolff, Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, admitted in a lecture given at 
University College London in January 2001 96  that the courts had been ‘over-
differential’97 to the medical profession but asserted that this had not only changed but 
had ‘changed for the better’98. He cited as one of the reasons for this change the 
increasing awareness of patients’ expectations and said that ‘the move to a rights-based 
society has fundamentally changed the behaviour of the courts’.99 The most striking 
manifestation of this changed behaviour was in Chester v Afshar.100 
 
Miss Carole Chester, a journalist, underwent a spinal operation in the hands of Mr Fari 
Afshar, a neurosurgeon.  The risk of cauda equina syndrome complicating this operation 
was about 1-2% but this risk materialised, and it was established at first instance that Mr 
Afshar did not warn Miss Chester of the risk.  At first instance, Judge Robert Taylor held 
that Mr Afshar was not negligent in his conduct of the operation. However, if Miss 
Chester had been informed of the risk of nerve damage, she would have taken time to 
consider her options and would not have had the operation on 21 November 1994. Since 
she would not have had the operation at the time it was performed, there was a causal 
link between the failure to warn and the injury suffered by the claimant. Mr Afshar 
appealed but by a majority of 3-2 the House of Lords decided in favour of Miss Chester.  
 
In doing so, the court broke (or at the very least, bent) the traditional rule of causation 
which required the claimant to show that had she been warned of the risk that 
materialised, she would not have undergone the operation. The court was concerned 
that she had not been warned of the risk of cauda equina syndrome, but Miss Chester’s 
truthfulness left it in a quandary: it was keen to protect her right to be informed of risks 
that may determine her decision whether to proceed, but causation was a stumbling 
block. While two of the judges stuck to the traditional causation rule, the majority felt 
that the right to self-determination was so fundamental that it had to be upheld at the 
expense of a legal tradition. The majority judges were unequivocal in asserting the 
primacy of self-determination.  
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Concern for self-determination and dignity 
 
Lord Walker recalled that Lord Scarman, in Sidaway, had described the patient’s right to 
make his own decision as a basic human right, and he pointed out that, although Lord 
Scarman was delivering a dissenting speech, the whole House recognized this right. Lord 
Hope said that ‘during the 20 years which have elapsed since Sidaway the importance of 
personal autonomy has been more and more widely recognised’101.  
 
Lord Steyn felt that a patient’s right to be informed of the risks of surgery ‘ought 
normatively to be regarded as an important right which must be given effective 
protection whenever possible’102. He prefaced this opinion by acknowledging that ‘not 
all rights are equally important’103, which is the basis on which some rights are deemed 
worthy of special protection as property. Emphasising the fundamental nature of the 
right to self-determination, he said that patients ‘have the right to make decisions 
which doctors regard as ill advised’.104 
 
Clearly, Lord Steyn manifested a Scarmanesque concern for the importance of patient 
self-determination. That he was willing to depart (and it could be argued that this 
departure was more than ‘narrow and modest’105) from time-honoured legal principles of 
causation for the sake of granting Miss Chester relief showed his strong commitment to 
protecting the patient’s right to self-determination. On the other hand, in maintaining 
that ‘[t]he court is the final arbiter of what constitutes informed consent’106, Lord Steyn 
shows that so long as the consent model is the preferred model, protection of patient 
self-determination will be dependent on malleable judicial opinion rather than the legal 
certainty offered by the property model. 
 
 
Concern for the protection of rights and remedies 
 
Lord Walker was of the opinion that where a surgeon has failed in his professional duty 
and the claimant has suffered injury directly within the scope of that duty, such a 
claimant should have a remedy, ‘even if it involves some extension of existing 
principle’107. 
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While Lord Steyn said that consent ‘ensures that due respect is given to the autonomy 
and dignity of each patient’108, his conclusion that Miss Chester’s ‘right of autonomy and 
dignity can and ought to be vindicated by a narrow and modest departure from 
traditional causation principles’109 shows that the consent model is actually inadequate 
for protecting this right without recourse to juridical gymnastics. His abandonment of 
firm adherence to traditionalist causation analysis in favour of a greater emphasis on 
policy and corrective justice showed that protection of self-determination has become a 
policy objective and reaffirmed a view long held in the academic legal community that 
the consent model as implemented in English courts often deprived the patient of 
corrective justice. 
 
Lord Hope spoke of Miss Chester’s right to be informed of the risks inherent in the 
proposed surgery, and said ‘the function of the law is to protect the patient’s right to 
choose’110. He put forward ‘the proposition that the law which imposed the duty to warn 
on the doctor has at its heart the right of the patient to make an informed choice as to 
whether, and if so when and by whom, to be operated on’111, and said that:  
 
The function of the law is to enable rights to be vindicated and to provide 
remedies when duties have been breached. Unless this is done the duty is a 
hollow one, stripped of all practical force and devoid of all content. It will have 
lost its ability to protect the patient and thus to fulfil the only purpose which 
brought it into existence.112  
 
The choice between these alternatives was for her to take, and for her alone. The 
function of the law is to protect the patient's right to choose. If it is to fulfil that 
function it must ensure that the duty to inform is respected by the doctor. It will 
fail to do this if an appropriate remedy cannot be given if the duty is breached 
and the very risk that the patient should have been told about occurs and she 
suffers injury.113   
 
He accepted that Miss Chester’s claim could not be upheld on the basis of conventional 
causation principles and turned to policy grounds for dismissing the appeal. As with his 
fellow judges Lord Steyn and Lord Walker, his willingness to modify the normal approach 
to causation in the interest of justice, manifests a deep commitment to rights protection. 
He highlights the difficulty faced by the law in providing an appropriate remedy when 
the consent model is applied. This difficulty could be avoided by adoption of property 
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analysis, as causation does not have to be established. Establishing a breach of the 
property right will be sufficient to draw a remedy. 
 
Chester is welcome, but does not go far enough 
 
With the decision in Chester, it could be said that the prudent patient has now, contrary 
to the assertion of Sir John Donaldson114 (then Master of the Rolls), been removed to the 
courts from his/her natural habitat, to the benefit of patients. The figurative 
appearance in court of the prudent patient is not, however, an end in itself.  The court’s 
decision in Chester was welcomed by academic commentators115 but, while the court 
was unequivocally clear about its commitment to patient self-determination, it did not 
go far enough towards freeing the potential claimant from the shackles of the consent 
model. For a start, the claimant was awarded damages not for the infraction of her right 
to self-determination per se, but for the injury she suffered. As argued above, the right 
to self-determination should be protected as a distinct legal right. 
 
Also noteworthy in Chester is that the House of Lords did not abandon causation. It 
could be said that the court found for the claimant by interpreting causation in the 
context of policy. The court held (by a majority) that, on policy grounds, causation had 
been fulfilled despite the absence of a statement by the claimant that but for the 
failure to warn her she would not have undergone the operation. An alternative 
viewpoint116 is that the court actually sidestepped causation, and the explanation of the 
decision lies in their Lordships’ exploration of the scope of the duty of care which led 
them to ‘a normative conclusion ….(the doctor ought to be liable for this injury) rather 
than a causative one (the doctor caused this injury)’117. Regardless of which explanation 
is preferred, Chester does not obviate causation. This means that the hurdle of proving 
causation in cases of failure to disclose information remains.  
The conclusion is that while Chester demonstrates a changed attitude and a strong 
commitment to protecting patient self-determination, it also shows that the courts need 
a suitable framework for translating this avowed commitment into real benefit for the 
patient – it is worth exploring the prospects of a model other than the consent model.  
 
 
  Edozien LC, 2013, Chapter 9 
  
277 
 
The index (or particular) patient versus the hypothetical patient 
 
The shift from the reasonable doctor test to the prudent patient test for disclosure of 
information may on the surface appear to be a major victory for champions of patient 
self-determination. Experience in other jurisdictions, however, shows that even with 
this shift the battle is not yet half-won.  Gerald Robertson,118 for example, has shown 
that in Canada the adoption of a prudent patient test has not resulted in more successes 
for claimants. The reasons for this are firstly, that the element of causation is a major 
stumbling block and, secondly, that patient self-determination is best protected by 
application of a subjective test for assessing disclosure of information. The problem 
posed by the substitution of the interests of a homogenised patient for those of the 
particular patient has been discussed in Chapter 3 (page 92) where this was identified as 
a weakness of the consent model. 
 
The most striking difference between Lord Scarman’s speech and those of the other 
judges in Sidaway is that, while others had the medical profession as their focal point, 
Lord Scarman had the patient (and his/her rights) as his focal point. This focus was 
maintained by the majority in Chester. Perhaps the greatest strength of the property 
model is that it shifts the starting point from the doctor’s duty to the rights of the 
particular patient, and does so without the inconsistencies demonstrated by the consent 
model. An example of such inconsistency in the consent model is the use of a subjective 
test for causation (would this patient have made a different decision if she had been 
well informed?) in contrast to an objective test for the standard of disclosure (what 
would a reasonable patient have expected to be told?).   
 
In focussing on the patient, however, it will usually not be helpful to the index patient if 
an objective test is applied. In Sidaway, Lord Scarman referred to this weakness when 
commenting on the prudent patient test: 
 
The ‘prudent patient’, however, cannot always provide the answer for the 
obvious reason that he is a norm (like the man on the Clapham omnibus), not a 
real person: and certainly not the patient himself.119 
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Lord Scarman was concerned that the law should address the position of the particular 
claimant, but was felt that this line of inquiry ‘would prove in practice to be frustrated 
by the subjectivity of its aim and purpose’120; accordingly, he applied the objective test.  
 
Nearly three decades after Sidaway, UK society has become so heterogeneous that the 
gap between the ‘prudent patient’ and the index patient has widened considerably. The 
growing heterogeneity of values and diminishing social consensus in the UK is described 
by one commentator121 as follows: 
 
Like many Western societies UK society has become more diverse and 
individualistic in the past half-century, with a diminished underpinning of social 
consensus. Values are still collectively held, but there are now many collectivities, 
and they are internally diverse. The individualisation of society.........is amplified 
by the effect of consumerism, which encourages people to express personal 
uniqueness through their valuation of particular experiences. So it is very risky to 
try to predict the values of an individual on any given issue, even if we believe we 
can locate that individual socially and culturally. In the end we can only rely on 
the individual to know their own values122 
 
 
Lord Hope also alluded to this in Chester: 
 
...the law which imposed the duty to warn on the doctor has at its heart the right 
of the patient to make an informed choice as to whether, and if so when and by 
whom, to be operated on. Patients may have, and are entitled to have, different 
views about these matters. All sorts of factors may be at work here - the patient's 
hopes and fears and personal circumstances, the nature of the condition that has 
to be treated and, above all, the patient's own views about whether the risk is 
worth running for the benefits that may come if the operation is carried out.123 
 
If the patient’s right to self-determination is to be better protected by a consent model 
then the subjective test (what does this patient want to know?) should be consistently 
applied, and this version of the consent model shares some, but not all, attributes of the 
property model. The subjective standard has its strengths as discussed above, but is not 
without possible disadvantage. Concern has been expressed that application of the 
subjective standard may foster defensive medicine and hinder the doctor-patient 
relationship.  Lord Scarman124 acknowledged that “the danger of defensive medicine 
developing in this country clearly exists” 125 , and there is some evidence 126  that it 
actually happens. As the property model is built on a foundation of trust and effective 
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communication between doctor and patient, there should be no fear that defensive 
medicine will be fostered. 
 
The property approach hybridises the ‘real consent’ of English law and the ‘informed 
consent’ of some US jurisdictions, taking the elements of both that are appropriate to 
contemporary legal, ethical and social thinking, but adds a subjective element to 
decision-making. In real consent, there is only a requirement for broad information to be 
provided, the standard is set by the medical profession, and either the objective or, less 
commonly the subjective test is applied. In informed consent, all material risks are 
disclosed, the standard is set by the law, and an objective test is applied (what would 
the reasonable patient want to know?). In the property model, all material risks are 
disclosed, the standard of disclosure is set by the law, but a subjective test is applied.  
 
Property analysis addresses the position of the particular claimant, not that of a 
hypothetical person. The doctor is obliged to communicate with, rather than merely 
inform, the patient. As said in the quotation above, in a heterogeneous multicultural 
society it is risky to try to predict the values of an individual on any given issue. Apart 
from the problem of determining what is reasonable for a particular patient, the courts, 
litigants and health professionals would be better served by certainty rather than by the 
whims of judges. In the property model, the patient has a protected right to make 
informed decisions about treatment based on his or her own values and circumstances. 
The doctor has a fiduciary duty to discuss the treatment options against the background 
of the patient’s particular circumstances and take reasonable steps to ensure that the 
patient makes an informed decision.  
 
In Sidaway, Lord Diplock drew a sharp line between information given voluntarily and 
information given in response to questioning, and placed the onus on the patient to ask 
questions – a far cry from Lord Scarman’s position which sees the patient’s right as the 
starting point. He also manifested elitist thinking when he suggests that what was good 
for the goose might not necessarily be good for the gander: 
 
...when it comes to warning about risks, the kind of training and experience that 
a judge will have undergone at the Bar makes it natural for him to say (correctly) 
it is my right to decide whether any particular thing is done to my body, and I 
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want to be fully informed of any risks there may be involved of which I am not 
already aware from my general knowledge as a highly educated man of 
experience, so that I may form my own judgment as to whether to refuse the 
advised treatment or not.127 
 
 
To acknowledge that a man of training and experience can correctly assert the right to 
be fully informed and to decide what is done to his body, then go on to say that for 
everyone else such information does not have to be provided unless they specifically ask 
for it, is the height of elitism. Positions such as this would be regarded as politically 
incorrect in today’s world. It also suggests that the subjective test is appropriate for the 
elite but an objective test has to be applied for others. The property model would pre-
empt such elitism and ensure a level playing field for all. 
 
Discussion of alternatives 
 
Another criticism of the consent model is that, reflecting the fact of its starting position 
being the doctor’s duty rather than the patient’s rights, it concentrates too much on 
disclosure of information about the particular treatment being offered, and not enough 
on alternative treatments: 
  
…English case law (and academic discussion) places relatively little emphasis on 
the disclosure of information about alternatives. If a patient is well-informed 
about, say, a surgical intervention which may alleviate back pain, the patient 
would usually be regarded as able to give ‘informed consent’ to it. However, 
there may be non-surgical alternatives about which the patient is unaware. For 
the patient, information about alternatives will sometimes be at least as 
important as information about the proposed procedure. 128 
 
A step towards redressing this in case law was taken in Janet Birch v University College 
London Hospital NHS Foundation Trust, which was briefly referred to supra.129 Citing and 
extending the principle established in Sidaway, Pearce and Chester that the doctor had 
a duty to disclose significant risks that would affect the decision of a patient, Cranston J 
held that this duty was not discharged if the patient was not made aware of the 
comparative risks of alternative available treatments. While this case goes some way to 
addressing the criticism quoted above, it cannot be assumed that a similar finding will 
apply in similar cases. The judge said there were ‘special circumstances’ in the case 
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which influenced his decision, and it is possible that, in the absence of special 
circumstances, a different decision may have been reached.   
In the property model, the focus is not on getting the patient to agree to a particular 
treatment (as in the consent model), but on giving the patient the best opportunity to 
make an informed decision on which treatment option (including the option of no 
intervention) best serves her values and interests. The transaction between doctor and 
patient would necessarily include discussion of alternatives as well as the treatment 
being offered. 
 
Therapeutic privilege 
 
Even if the risk be material, the doctor will not be liable if upon a reasonable 
assessment of his patient’s condition, he takes the view that a warning would be 
detrimental to his patient’s health. 130  Although Lord Scarman 131  cited therapeutic 
privilege as capable of trumping consent, this is unlikely to be a major issue in 
contemporary practice, given the professional safeguards against it that were described 
in Chapter 5 (pages 147-148). Experience elsewhere132 also shows that ‘the defence 
[therapeutic privilege] has been so narrowly interpreted …. that it has come to occupy 
an almost untenable position in Australia's medical jurisprudence’133  In any case, by 
taking the patient’s right as the default position, the property model places a heavier 
burden than the consent model on the doctor to justify any withholding of information 
under any circumstances. 
 
Application of the property model to the facts of Sidaway and Chester 
 
Against the background of the above narrative and analysis, the property model is 
applied to the facts of Sidaway and Chester as follows. 
The facts of the Sidaway case were outlined in Chapter 3 (pages 95-96), but are 
repeated here for ease of reference. Mrs Sidaway had suffered persistent neck and 
shoulder pain. She was relieved of this pain for some years after the defendant surgeon, 
Mr. Falconer, operated on her in 1960. She informed Mr. Falconer in 1973, that the pain 
had returned, and investigation showed a disc causing pressure on a nerve root. Mr 
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Falconer proceeded to operate. Mrs. Sidaway's spinal cord was damaged during this 
operation, and she became partially paralyzed as a result. She acknowledged that the 
operation was not negligently performed, but sued the hospital on the grounds that she 
had not been informed of the risk of nerve damage. Mr Falconer had died before the 
trial, so was unable to give his own account of what was disclosed, but the judge found 
that Mrs Sidaway had not been warned of the one to two per cent risk of spinal cord 
injury. As discussed above, the professional standard prevailed, and the court found in 
favour of the defendant. 
 
Applying property analysis, the starting point is Mrs Sidaway’s right to be given 
information that puts her in a position to make an informed decision about her care. 
This is what Lord Scarman attempted to do when he considered the scope of the doctor's 
duty ‘by beginning with the right of the patient to make his own decision’.134 This right 
would be protected as a distinct right, and Mrs Sidaway would not have needed to prove 
causation. In the property model, this right imposed a correlative fiduciary duty on Mr 
Falconer to effectively communicate with Mrs Sidaway and take reasonable steps to 
ensure that she understood information that he had provided. There would not have 
been a requirement to provide information on all possible risks, the emphasis being on 
quality rather than quantity of information. 
 In keeping with the transactional approach to consultation required by the property 
model, Mr Falconer would have advised Mrs Sidaway of any alternatives to the operation 
he had decided to perform, including the option of not operating. It was stated as a fact 
in court that what Mr Falconer proposed to do was ‘an operation of choice rather than 
necessity’.135 In other words, Mr Falconer offered Mrs Sidaway what O’Neill describes as 
‘a menu of one item’136.  This means that Mr Falconer failed in the fiduciary duty 
imposed by the property model. As Mrs Sidaway’s legitimate expectation that her 
surgeon would inform her of relevant risks as well as alternative treatments constituted 
a proprietary right, she had a claim in breach of property right against Mr Falconer.  
The professional standard does not apply in the property model, and the adequacy of 
disclosure of information would be assessed by forensic examination of the process of 
consultation between Mrs Sidaway and Mr Falconer. Medical opinion on what is usually 
disclosed or not disclosed in relation to the particular diagnosis would be relevant but 
not determinative.  
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Further, although Mrs Sidaway could not successfully bring an action in battery (because 
she had given a valid consent to be touched by Mr Falconer) under the consent model, 
she could validly claim trespass to bodily integrity under the property model (as well as 
the proprietary right in her legitimate expectation from the consultation), as her body is 
one dimension (the spatial dimension) of the property framework adopted in this thesis.  
 
Although she did not have to prove causation in this model, the damages awarded would 
not be merely nominal, for the property model includes a dimension which defines 
stringency of protection. This dimension accords highly stringent protection to the 
patient’s right described above, as it is a profoundly important right. Accordingly, 
compensation for infraction of this right will reflect this degree of protection and the 
concomitant need for deterrent remedy.   
In summary, a different outcome would be expected if the property model is applied to 
the facts of Sidaway: patient self-determination would have triumphed and Mrs Sidaway 
would have been awarded damages. 
 
In the case of Chester, Mr Afshar’s failure to warn his patient of the risk of cauda equina 
syndrome constituted a breach of Miss Chester’s proprietary rights, on the basis or the 
principles described above. The ‘starting point’137 for Lord Steyn was Miss Chester’s right 
to self-determination.138 Had the property model been applied, this would also have 
been the starting point for all five judges in this case, and the position of the dissenting 
judges would have been different (especially as the causation hurdle would have been 
absent). 
 
The court had a close look at the communication between Mr Afshar and Miss Chester, 
which itself speaks strongly for the importance attached to the transactional approach 
in the property model. Lord Hope139 summarised what transpired as follows: 
Miss Chester's account, which was the version which the trial judge accepted, was 
that she told Mr Afshar that she had heard a lot of horror stories about surgery 
and that she wanted to know about the risks, but that none of this was explained 
to her. She did not mention paralysis specifically as one of the risks that she 
wanted to be told about, and this was not mentioned as a risk of surgery by Mr 
Afshar. The reply which she got from him, as a throw away line, was that he had 
not crippled anybody yet. She agreed to the surgery because he made it all sound 
so simple.140 
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It is clear from this account that if property analysis is applied, it would be concluded 
that Mr Afshar did not take a transactional approach to communication with Miss Chester 
and did not discharge his fiduciary obligation as described in this thesis. He thus 
breached Miss Chester’s proprietary rights, and she was entitled to damages on this 
analysis, without any requirement for the court to consider causation. 
 
As there is no imperative to prove harm and causation in the property model, there 
would have been no place for Lord Bingham’s141 reservations about ‘the payment of 
potentially very large damages by a defendant whose violation of that right is not shown 
to have worsened the physical condition of the claimant’.142  As stated above regarding 
Mrs Sidaway, the quantum of damages would reflect the value placed by the public and 
the law on patient self-determination.143 
 
Clearly, the speeches of the majority judges in Chester showed that they concurred with 
one of the tenets of the property model: the primacy of the patient’s right to self-
determination. As shown in the narrative above, the judges were also keen to protect 
this right regardless of the obstacle posed by causation – which supports another tenet 
of the property model, the protection of the right as a distinct legal right. Thirdly, the 
judges focused on the doctor-patient relationship and on Miss Chester’s legitimate 
expectation from her consultation with Mr Afshar; both of these are the essence of 
property analysis and her legitimate expectation was a chose in action (see pages 171 
and 229). 
 
In summary, applying the property model to the facts of Chester yields the same 
outcome (the majority judgement), but without any jurisprudential contortions, no 
departures from established legal rules. As it stands, Chester is not necessarily a 
precedent for future cases  - given the departure from traditional rules of causation, it 
may be treated as a special case, with future cases distinguished from it. Had property 
analysis been applied, it would have become firmly established as setting the law for 
protection of patient self-determination. 
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Alternative approaches to protection of patient self-determination: human rights and 
contract 
 
In attempting to secure protection of the patient’s right to self-determination and 
clarify the doctor’s corresponding duties, it may be helpful to consider briefly human 
rights discourse and the law of contract (which applies to a bilateral relationship, with 
one party having a personal right to demand and expect performance from the other, 
and the other party having a duty to perform accordingly), as these potentially offer 
alternatives to property analysis. 
 
Human rights law as an alternative means of protecting patient self-determination 
 
In chapter 2 (pages 27-49 ), the patient’s right to self-determination was described as a 
foundational right, the ascendancy of rights thinking was given as one of the factors 
underlying the fall of paternalism, and the impact on case law was outlined. The 
consent model is supposed to protect patient self-determination. As this thesis has 
attempted to show, however, consent has not quite lived up to its billing. The question 
arises whether human rights law could be called to the rescue. Judges attempting to 
view information disclosure primarily from the scope of the doctor’s duty may, at least 
in theory, be constrained by human rights legislation which has the patient’s rights, not 
the doctor’s duty, as its starting point. The European Convention on Human Rights, 
particularly Article 8 (right to private and family life) could be invoked in respect of a 
failure to disclose material information, and it is unlawful for the NHS to act in breach 
of the Convention144. It has also been suggested that a doctor who delivers treatment of 
an experimental nature without obtaining the patient’s valid consent could be in breach 
of Article 3 (which prohibits inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment).145  
 
Following in the footsteps of the European Convention is the European Charter of 
Patients’ Rights146 which was produced by the Active Citizenship Network, a network of 
European civic organizations. It has not been incorporated in statute, but it contains two 
articles (out of 14) that are particularly germane to patient self-determination: 
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Article 4. Right to Consent 
Every individual has the right of access to all information that might enable him 
or her to actively participate in the decisions regarding his or her health; this 
information is a prerequisite for any procedure and treatment, including the 
participation in scientific research. 
 
Article 5. Right to Free Choice 
Each individual has the right to freely choose from among different treatment 
procedures and providers on the basis of adequate information. 
 
 
When the European Convention on Human Rights was incorporated into UK domestic law 
by the Human Rights Act 1998147, analysts148 anticipated that it would make a difference 
to the protection (or lack of it) afforded to patient self-determination: 
 
The current definition of “informed consent”—meaning, loosely, what the doctor 
decides you should know—may be altered in favour of a version of informed 
consent more common in the United States in which patients are told 
“everything.” The Bolam test is another tenet of medical law which may be 
reviewed. This test defines the standard of care which doctors must meet, if they 
are not to be negligent. At present doctors set the standard of care themselves: 
the test is, would a responsible body of medical opinion support the act in 
question? But patients' lawyers are keen to argue that it should not be a sufficient 
defence to a medical accident (especially when life is lost) to say that other 
responsible professionals would have done the same thing.149  
 
In Pretty v UK150 the European Court of Human Rights stated that:  
 
Although no previous case has established as such any right to self-determination 
as being contained in Article 8 of the Convention, the Court considers that the 
notion of personal autonomy is an important principle underlying the 
interpretation of its guarantees.151 
 
 
The court further stated152 that treating a competent adult without his/her consent 
could be interpreted as an infringement of Article 8 of the Convention. It was also 
feared that The Human Rights Act would open the floodgates of litigation but this has 
not materialised.153 It remains to be seen whether the European Charter of Patients’ 
Rights will have a significant legal impact.  
The apparent lack of impact of the Human Rights Act on litigation may be attributed to 
the aspirational nature of the Convention: it sets out broad rights that are generally 
accepted by society but does not specifically spell out correlative duties or obligations. 
  Edozien LC, 2013, Chapter 9 
  
287 
 
Also, the Human Rights Act applies only to the actions or inactions of public bodies, and 
not to transactions at the doctor/patient level which are matters of private law. 
 It is submitted that human rights law does not provide a resolution of the problems 
identified with consent. Human rights analysis does, however, provide justification for a 
property approach: if patient self-determination is a foundational or human right, then 
it should be afforded the protection that property analysis offers. 
 
Contract law as an alternative means of protecting patient self-determination 
 
In Lee v South West Thames Regional Health Authority154 (a case concerning disclosure 
of communication files relating to a brain-damaged infant), the judge suggested that the 
plaintiff could bring an action in contract for breach of the duty to inform. The potential 
use of contract law to secure stronger protection of patient self-determination is worth 
considering. 
 
It goes without saying that recognising the patient’s right to self-determination as a 
distinct legal right imposes correlative duties on the doctor. In this regard, it is 
important that clarity and balance are achieved. This in turn requires that attention be 
paid to the power relations between doctor and patient. A lop-sided distribution of 
power could easily result in paternalism (if the doctor is so dominant) or wanton 
consumerism (if the patient is all-powerful).  The transactional approach to consultation 
advocated in Chapter 5 (pages 150-151 aims to ensure that a power gradient conducive 
to bilateral flow of information is maintained. It is stressed that the duty referred to 
here is the duty to provide information and to take action to promote understanding: 
 
It is important, therefore, that this crucial distinction between the types of duties 
that doctors owe to their patients is borne in mind. On the one hand, there is the 
set of technical duties….and on the other there is the moral or ethical (but also 
legal) duty which demands information disclosure. The latter duty is defined not 
by the amount of information that the doctor thinks the patient should know, 
could handle or might want to know, but by the amount of information that the 
patient needs so that they are able to make an autonomous choice.155  
 
The relationship between patient and doctor has sometimes been described as 
contractual, and the law of contract is essentially about the relationship between two 
parties in relation to a defined tangible or intangible object: 
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[The] remedy, in the case of obligations, was always an action in personam: the 
plaintiff was not asserting a relationship between a person and a thing (in the 
sense that he could bring his remedy against whoever was, by some act, denying 
the plaintiff’s alleged right to the object in question – that was the crucial point 
in an action in rem), but rather a relationship between two persons; the plaintiff 
set out to sue the particular defendant because he, personally, was under a duty 
towards him, and not because (for instance) he happened to be in possession of 
some of the plaintiff’s property. If one translates this into the language of 
substantive law, one can say that the law of obligations is concerned with rights 
in personam, whilst rights in rem are the subject matter of property.156 
 
 
Contract could, therefore, potentially be employed to protect patient self-
determination. It is, however, subject to a major limitation: the doctrine of 
consideration*. Accordingly, only fee-paying patients have a legally-enforceable contract 
with the doctor. This means that in the UK, a patient who has not been provided with 
adequate information regarding his/her treatment can bring an action in contract if s/he 
was a private patient but not if s/he was an NHS patient. Also, while there may be legal 
merit in describing the doctor/patient relationship as contractual, in practice a contract 
approach may nurture consumerism, with patients feeling entitled to any treatment of 
their choice regardless of resource and other public interest considerations. It is 
submitted that while contract analysis aligns patient’s rights and doctor’s duties, it does 
not meet the degree of protection that property analysis provides to patient self-
determination. 
  
 
Consent, property and battery 
 
 In Chatterton v Gerson,157 Bristow J declared that ‘once the patient is informed in 
broad terms of the nature of the procedure which is intended, and gives her consent, 
that consent is real’158 and the cause of action for alleged failure to disclose risks is 
negligence, not trespass. As Lord Scarman159 put it, ‘damage is the gist of the action in 
the tort of negligence.’ 160   Placing emphasis on harm caused rather than on 
                                                 
* The doctrine stipulates that each party to a contract must exchange an item of value (such as money or 
service), if the contract is to be legally valid. This limitation has often led the courts to expand the law of 
torts – see A J E Jaffey, Contract in tort’s clothing 1985 5 Legal Studies 77 
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enhancement of patient self-determination raises questions about the suitability of the 
action in negligence as a vehicle for protecting self-determination. As mentioned in 
Chapter 3 (page 80), Kennedy161 has called for expansion of the tort of battery in order 
to provide better protection of the patient’s right to self-determination, particularly in 
cases of failure to disclose adequate information on risks and benefits. A similar 
proposition has been argued for by other commentators.162 Hockton163 speculated that 
the rise of human rights law could lead to greater use of this tort in consent cases, but 
this does not appear to have happened.  
 
Calls for wider application of battery in this context are themselves implicit 
acknowledgements of the inadequacies of negligence and the consent model in 
protecting patient self-determination. Also, although the court in Chester did not base 
its decision on battery, it has been argued164 that the weakening (or sidestepping) of the 
causation requirement in that case made the action of negligence akin to a battery 
action.  
 
Brazier165 advances two reasons why trespass to the person is unlikely to be developed 
into a suitable form of protection for patient self-determination in cases of inadequate 
disclosure of information. Firstly, (as discussed in Chapter 3) the courts have expressed 
strong opposition to the application of battery in such cases. Secondly, since trespass 
requires touching, cases (such as prescription of drugs without adequate information of 
risks and benefits) where there has been no touching will not be covered by an action in 
battery. 
 
For these reasons, there is a gap between what is needed (a form of action that 
prohibits infringement of the patient’s rights regardless of the occurrence of harm) and 
what is feasible in the common law. This gap can be filled by the property model. Action 
for breach of the proprietary right to one’s body can be an alternative to battery in 
cases of unauthorised invasion of bodily integrity. As the courts have shown great 
reluctance to accommodate cases against doctors brought in battery, this would be an 
alternative which provides the protection sought by advocates of an expansion of 
battery without eliciting judicial discontent.  
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There is a further reason why the way forward does not lie in battery. As discussed in 
Chapter 3 (page 77), a broad explanation of the treatment will usually be adequate 
defence to an allegation of battery, but more detailed discussion will usually be 
required in order to meet the duty of care in negligence. What is needed is a form of 
action that combines the advantages of an action in battery with the detailed (tailored) 
discussion required by the duty of care in negligence. The property model meets this 
need. In this model, the patient can say, ‘you have trespassed my property’ (referring to 
the spatial dimension of property; this would be an alternative to battery) and/or say 
‘you have breached my proprietary right by not providing adequate information to 
enable me make an informed choice’. The model thus combines the strengths of two 
torts while also overcoming their inadequacies. 
 
Conclusion 
 
To summarise, there is little doubt that the consent model is not ideal for the purpose 
of protecting the patient’s right to self-determination. Rather than remain fixated on 
this model in the hope of achieving the desired end, it would be preferable to consider 
what insights can be gained from an alternative model. The case of Chester v Afshar 
illustrates this. The challenge, however, has been to identify the alternative model. 
Human rights law and contract law are putative alternatives but they have limited 
practical application in this context. It is submitted that the property model proposed in 
this thesis meets the requirements of both patient and doctor, and serves as both a 
shield (in the sense that a doctor fulfilling the fiduciary duty under this model gets legal 
certainty and protection) and a sword (placing the patient on stronger footing to 
exercise his/her rights in decision making). It resolves the deficits of the consent model, 
and is consistent with recent guidelines from professional bodies.  
The attributes of both models are summarised in the table below which shows that there 
are some shared attributes but there are also key attributes that confer advantage to 
the property model. 
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 Consent model Property model 
 
Self-determination is protected as 
a distinct legal right 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Primary focus 
 
Duty of the doctor 
 
Rights of the patient 
Effective as a means of protection 
against unwanted treatment 
 
Yes (to a degree) 
 
Yes 
 
Effective in ensuring that all 
treatment options are discussed 
 
Marginally effective 
 
Optimally effective 
 
Doctor-patient communication 
Largely unidirectional and 
passive (the conduit 
paradigm) 
 
Transactional 
 
Doctor has an explicit fiduciary 
duty regarding communication 
with patient 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Promotes bilateral distribution of 
responsibility between patient 
and doctor 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Provides defence against battery 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Harm has to have occurred before 
patient can bring an action 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Causation has to be established 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
In conclusion, while it is widely recognised that the consent model is not fit for purpose, 
no suitable model has been devised to complement or supplant it. The property model 
appears to be more fit-for-purpose and offers the prospect of being the sought-after 
answer to the deficiencies of the consent model.   
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CHAPTER 10 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
“If the legitimate interests of patients are to be safeguarded by law, there is a need for 
developments which involve more than fine tuning of the law of torts”1 
 
‘[P]atients "need to be able to choose which dance they want, know the steps needed 
and be able to hear the music."’2 
 
Self-determination has traditionally been highly valued in Western societies. With the 
ascendancy of rights thinking, the right to self-determination has become even more 
highly valued, and this change has induced shifts in the medical and legal arena. In the 
sphere of medical investigation, diagnosis and treatment, it has led to the decline of 
paternalism. In the courts, deference to the medical profession has given way to a desire 
to uphold patient self-determination.  
Unfortunately, the current legal framework (the consent model) for dealing with breach 
of the patient’s right to self-determination has been relatively static and has not 
responded sufficiently to changing times and priorities. Although it is well recognised 
that the consent model is sub-optimal for protecting patient self-determination, suitable 
alternatives have not been proposed and one commentator hinted at a need for lateral 
thinking: 
 
Criticism of the Sidaway decision, and the hope that the House of Lords will come 
to adopt a different approach, has dominated English academic writing relating to 
‘informed consent’ for much more than a decade. It has distracted attention from 
the important question of whether the law of torts can ever have much of a role in 
protecting the legitimate interests of patients to be informed about risks and 
alternatives. It has also distracted attention from the question whether there are 
other ways in which the law could play a more significant role, and the related 
question of whether any other form of legal regulation is likely to do more harm 
than good.3 
 
The case of Chester v Afshar4 was a missed opportunity for lateral thinking and departure 
from fixation on consent. This thesis has attempted to explore an alternative way – the 
property model - in which the law could seek to protect the patient’s right to self-
determination. In preceding chapters, an effort has been made to show not only that the 
property model offers greater stringency of protection of patient self-determination than 
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the consent model does, but also that it could be more robust than contract and human 
rights law in providing this protection. It has also been shown that the property model is 
consistent with the evolution of UK case law relating to patient involvement in medical 
decision making, and with current professional guidance and professionalism. The model 
provides the judiciary with an appropriate tool for implementing the commitment to 
patient self-determination which was demonstrated in Chester. In essence, the decision 
in that case was based on policy considerations, and this thesis submits that the property 
model is consistent with public policy. 
 
The two models compared 
 
The consent and property models are not mutually exclusive – they have some properties 
in common (see comparator table on page 294). For example, the underlying principles of 
the property model are almost identical to those of the social construction theory of 
consent.5 There could be an argument for ameliorating consent rather than, as it were, 
throwing away the baby with the bath water. The point has been made in Chapter 1 
(page 13), however, that it is often preferable to think laterally and consider a new 
model instead of remaining fixated with a current model that is not fit for purpose. As 
discussed in Chapter 5 (page 156-158), scholarly efforts to make consent more protective 
of self-determination are unlikely to have practical application in courts or in clinical 
practice. 
 
For the patient, the property model removes some of the barriers s/he has to contend 
with under the consent model, making it more likely that his/her right to self-
determination will be respected by the doctor, and easier to obtain a remedy when the 
doctor’s duty to communicate effectively has been breached.  
For the doctor, the property model makes clear (at least compared to the consent 
model) what his/her duties are with respect to the patient’s need for information and 
the patient’s role as ultimate decision maker. For doctor and patient, the property model 
promotes communication (a two-way process) and promotes an interpretive model of 
their relationship. For the courts, the property model provides simplicity, clarity and 
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certainty, and a means to protect patient self-determination without the type of 
controversial judicial contortion shown in Chester. 
 
In the consent model the right to accept treatment is relative, whereas the right to 
refuse treatment is inalienable. In the property model, the right to self-determination is 
inalienable regardless of whether this is expressed as agreement to, or refusal of, 
treatment. 
 
Fundamentally, the property model is not intended to, and does not, confer or create 
any new rights. It is simply presented as a model affording more robust protection of a 
right (the right to self-determination) that is legally and ethically acknowledged. 
No constitutional, professional, or other conflict is generated by applying the property 
model to patient self-determination. For example, there is no conflict with human rights 
legislation or with professional regulation. 
 
Communication between doctor and patient 
 
Until the vulnerability of the patient arising from the informational gradient is addressed, 
there cannot be adequate protection for patient self-determination. Communication 
between doctor and patient is essential for meaningful expression of the patient’s right 
to self-determination, but this does not appear to feature in the consent model and 
Jones6  has stated that ‘it seems likely that the law does not have a positive effect on 
the quality of doctor-patient communication’7. 
Case law on consent has been concerned mostly with information disclosure, particularly 
the question of how much information should be disclosed and who determines this. 
Further, most of the cases relating to disclosure of information that have reached the 
courts have focussed on disclosure of risk. In clinical practice this has led to undue 
emphasis on risk, with particular focus on what percentage of occurrence warrants 
disclosure. A study8 of hospital clinicians reported that ‘[i]n order to meet the legal 
obligations relating to consent, the nature of the information provided to patients 
centres mainly on risk disclosure.’9 
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While Manson and O’Neill10 have emphasised the importance of communication in 
consent, Maclean11 points out that they have focused on the obligations of the healthcare 
professional, which shifts the discourse back to disclosure rather than to interaction 
between both parties. The property model is rooted in the kind of transactional process 
between doctor and patient that Manson and O’Neill12 recommend, rather than a 
unidirectional flow of information. This emphasis on communication has ethical as well as 
legal foundations: 
 
A narrative approach to ethics emphasizes the subjective experience and assumes 
that individuals experience health and illness differently. Its starting point 
therefore is that the individualized, subjective, partial and personal are important 
in the consultation in general, and in sharing information specifically. 
Immediately, information provision for the purposes of consent ceases to be a 
process whereby an expert professional gives a passive patient a version of 
esoteric and inaccessible knowledge that has taken the clinician years to 
acquire...............both the clinician and the patient are engaged in a shared 
endeavour where there is more than one way of knowing, experiencing and 
conceptualizing health and illness..............No longer is the clinician an expert 
vessel for the transfer of specialist knowledge to the non-participative patient. 
Rather, both patient and clinician are actively engaged in explaining, listening, 
negotiating and responding to each other in a shared and transformative process 
that affords each party respect and dignity13   
 
Recognition of the importance of the transactional approach renders redundant much of 
the debate on how much information should be given to patients, at least from an ethical 
standpoint: 
 
…the ethical challenge is not to identify how statistically significant a risk has to 
be before it is disclosed but to focus on that essential humanity. It is by sharing 
information and adapting it according to the needs, interests and priorities of 
individual patients that clinicians foster autonomy and give meaning to familiar 
terms such as choice, trust and care.14     
 
 
At least two commentators15 have advocated a shift from consent to choice. Skegg16 
states: 
 
Consent does, of course, involve choice. However the choice is usually a matter of 
deciding whether or not to consent to a particular proposal. The role of consent is 
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often seen to be that of protecting a practitioner from a risk of legal proceedings: 
information is disclosed to ensure that the consent is ‘legally effective’. 
A shift of emphasis to ‘informed choice’ could give greater prominence to the 
provision of information about alternatives, and to the provision of information by 
people who will not themselves be involved in carrying out the particular 
procedure to which consent may eventually be given.17  
 
The property model, unlike the consent model, mandates the doctor to discuss 
alternative treatments with the patient. The doctor is also obliged to take reasonable 
steps to ensure that the patient understands, and to present the patient with the 
information required to make an informed choice. With this emphasis on effective 
communication, the property model obviates the ethical problems associated with mere 
choice and empowers the patient to make a choice consistent with his/her own values, 
regardless of whether that choice may in the eyes of others appear risky or irrational. 
 
Self-determination and the question of trust 
 
The protection of patient self-determination should not be seen as merely recognising 
the patient’s right to make a decision and acceding to this right. Rather, it should also 
entail creating the right environment for this right to be fully exercised and 
acknowledging that the patient’s personal and social context underlies his/her exercise 
of this right. As stated in Chapter 2 (page 31), the doctor must a priori see the patient as 
an individual, with his/her own values, attitudes, beliefs and knowledge. The property 
model aims to achieve this through its emphasis on the nature of the doctor-patient 
relationship. This emphasis on relationships is in keeping with the ecological paradigm 
described in Chapter 1 (page 12). Ideally, the partnership18 between patient and doctor 
should rest on mutual trust and respect - the patient should repose trust in the doctor, 
and the doctor must respect the self-determination of the patient. Doctors have a 
responsibility not to betray the trust of their patients, and this is reflected in the view of 
the Royal College of Physicians19 that ‘[m]edical professionalism signifies a set of values, 
behaviours and relationships that underpin the trust the public has in doctors’.20 
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The consent model appears to have been weakened by the erosion of trust in the doctor. 
Conversely, doctors sometimes do not trust patients to make decisions about their own 
healthcare. Distrust of doctors has implications for patient self-determination: 
 
All possible measures aimed at reducing informational asymmetries can be 
effective and successful insofar as those who carry them out are trusted by the 
public. A source of information can be highly competent and honest, but if it is not 
trusted, those concerned will not be confident of its advice.21 
 
 
As a judge said in the US case of Arato v Avedon 22, the trust which the patient has in the 
doctor during the decision making process imposes an obligation on the doctor which 
transcends arms-length transactions.* 
The property model, by demanding a transactional approach to communication and 
emphasising the fiduciary responsibility of the doctor, has the potential to reinforce trust 
between both parties. It offers a platform for Bergsma and Thomasma’s 23  ‘beneficence-
in-trust’, the role whereby the doctor acts in the best interest of the patient while 
keeping in trust their moral values.  
 
The issue of causation 
  
In the consent model damages are awarded for injuries suffered by the claimant, where a 
causal link is established; in the property model the claimant receives a remedy for the 
breach of the right to self-determination and is not required to have suffered an injury or 
                                                 
*
 Arato v. Aredon  is an American case that illustrates deception and intentional non-disclosure in health care. Miklos 
Arato had a non-functioning kidney removed. During the operation, a tumour was found in the tail of his pancreas and 
this was removed. After the operation, his surgeon told Mr Arato and his wife that the entire tumour had been removed 
and he referred Mr Arato for adjuvant chemotherapy and radiation. Mr Arato was not given a prognosis and he died 
approximately one year after the initial diagnosis. His wife and children sued the surgeon and oncologist for not 
informing Mr Arato prior to chemotherapy that approximately 95% of patients with pancreatic cancer die within five 
years, arguing that if Mr Arato had known that at best chemotherapy would only have prolonged his life by a few 
months, he would not have undergone this treatment and would have tidied up his financial affairs before his death. The 
failure to do so resulted in substantial financial losses to his estate. The defence argued that non-disclosure was 
justifiable on the grounds that disclosure would have caused Mr Arato avoidable anxiety – the classic justification for 
paternalism. The jury returned a verdict in favour of the physicians, but this was reversed at the California Court of 
Appeals, and the matter went to the California Supreme Court, which decided in favour of the physicians. The Supreme 
Court held that the standard for determining whether a particular risk should be disclosed is its materiality to the patient’s 
decision, and said the jury was in the best position to determine this and had found that the defendants had reasonably 
disclosed to Mr. Arato information material to his decision whether to undergo the proposed chemotherapy/radiation 
treatment. 
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to prove causation.  In the consent model, the patient will have no remedy if the risk to 
which she was exposed without her knowledge did not result in an injury.  
 
The protection of a right deemed paramount should not be dependent on the presence or 
absence of injury resultant on undisclosed but materialized risk. In the property model,
the patient gets a remedy once the breach of her right to self-determination is 
established. The quantum of the remedy may, however, be partly determined by the 
damage resulting from the breach.  
 
Potential arguments against property analysis 
 
There are two main arguments that could be made against the property model. The first 
one is the commodification argument which has been discussed in Chapter 7 (pages 208-
211; 216). As Moses24 said, ‘even where a classification of property is otherwise 
appropriate, there is an understandable reluctance to treat something as an object of 
property where to do so poses moral or practical problems’25. As shown in Chapter 7 
(pages 211, 216), the commodification argument can be, and has been, defeated.  
Also, as the property model endorsed in this thesis is not that of property-as-a-thing but 
property-as-a-relationship, the moral problems referred to by Moses do not arise on this 
occasion. Furthermore, this model is consistent with the contemporary legal conception 
of property. It is even arguable that the notion of property as defining relationships 
between persons rather than relationship with things is founded on ancient precepts: one 
hundred years ago, it was said26 that: 
  
The term “legal relation” should always be used with reference to two persons, 
neither more nor less…….There can be no such thing as a legal relation between a 
person and a thing. The relation of A to his house is a physical relation; but A has 
many legal relations to other persons with respect to his house.27  
 
The social dimension to the legal concept of property, the idea that we consider property 
not in isolation but in the context of the owner’s relationships with others, parallels the 
observation made in Chapter 2 (pages 25-29) that the individual’s right to self-
determination exists not in a vacuum but in the context of relationships with other 
persons. This contextual emphasis reflects the ecological paradigm adopted in Chapter 1. 
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The second potential concern about the property model relates to the risk of absolute 
individualism – the fear that the property approach could promote atomism, engender 
consumerism and hamper the relationship between patient and doctor. This concern has 
also been addressed in the thesis. In keeping with the ecological paradigm adopted at the 
outset, the proprietary right advocated in this thesis is, as Kennedy28 would put it, a 
prima facie right, not an absolute right, meaning that it is ‘to be observed in the absence 
of any powerful justifying argument which allows [it] to be overridden [and], of course, 
any such justification must itself be derived from a morally sound principle’29. It does not 
confer on the patient a right to demand a particular treatment, and it is antithetical to 
the supermarket concept of healthcare delivery which offers ‘mere, sheer choice’30. Far 
from introducing barriers to the doctor/patient relationship, it calls for an interpretive 
model of relationship and a transactional approach to provision of information – both of 
which reduce the social and informational gradient between doctor and patient. The 
fiduciary role of the doctor is emphasised. 
 
Implementation of the new model 
 
 
The proposed property model can be implemented by legislation, in common law, or by 
incorporation into professional codes and guidance. It can also be introduced via a 
Commission established for this purpose, along the lines suggested by Brazier31 in the 
wake of Sidaway32. Except in emergency situations, it takes years to introduce new 
statutes in the UK. Law-making by judicial pronouncement is also slow and is dependent 
on the right cases reaching the courts, particularly the Supreme Court. The quickest way 
to get the proposed model into practice is by adopting it in professional codes. As shown 
in Chapter 8 (pages 235-236), some recent professional codes already have key elements 
of the property model and it should not be a difficult to formally incorporate the 
property model, once mental blocks are lifted. Two decades ago the term ‘clinical 
governance’ was non-existent, but following its introduction at the end of the last 
millennium33, it has speedily been established in professional codes and clinical practice. 
There is no reason why the same cannot apply to the property model, and clinical 
governance can itself be one of the vehicles for implementing this novel model. 
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In clinical practice, medical paternalism is ebbing; in the legal arena, it is ‘bye-bye 
Bolam’34; in both arenas it is time to welcome the property model which, to borrow an 
apt attribution, is ‘well suited to cut the Gordian knot of indeterminacies surrounding ….. 
consent’.35  
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GLOSSARY 
 
ablation of the endometrium Destruction (by burning) of the lining of 
the womb, in order to stop heavy 
menstrual bleeding 
 
antituberculous therapy   Treatment for tuberculosis 
cauda equina syndrome Condition in which there is loss of function 
of the nerve roots below the termination 
of the spinal cord 
classical Caesarean section Delivery of a baby through an incision in 
the longitudinal axis of the womb 
commodification Treat as a commodity that which is not 
usually regarded an one 
conversion Unauthorised taking of someone else’s 
property, with or without dishonest intent 
endometrium  The material lining the inside of the womb 
electromyogram  A test that measures the electrical activity 
in a muscle 
hemiplegia  Paralysis o the left or right half of the body
   
laminectomy  An operation to remove part of a bone spur 
in the spine 
leukaemia  Cancer of the white blood cells 
lymphokines  Substances released by blood cells as part 
of an immune response 
mastectomy  Excision of a breast 
myelogram   An image of the spine and spinal cord 
obiter dicta  Remarks made in passing by a judge, which 
are not essential determinants of the 
court’s decision 
property analysis  Application of basic principles of property 
law to deconstruction of a legal matter 
quasi-property  Having some but not all the attributes of 
property 
reify  To regard as a concrete thing that which is 
not necessarily regarded as such 
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splenectomy  Excision of the spleen 
therapeutic privilege   A principle by virtue of which a doctor may 
withhold information from a patient if s/he 
believes the information could 
psychologically harm the patient 
T-lymphocyte  A type of white blood cell; involved in 
immunity 
tort  A tort in civil law is an injury to a person 
  for which financial compensation may be 
  claimed. 
translumbar aortography  Imaging or the aorta, involving injection of 
a dye into the aorta via a needle  inserted 
near the spine  
utilitarian  Arising from or manifesting a theory that 
the best course of action is one which 
maximises a specific desired outcome (e.g. 
pleasure) 
Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease An incurable brain disease that leads to 
rapid deterioration of mental function 
 
social contract A theory that defines the relationship 
between the citizen(s) and the sovereign 
power in contract terms, with rights and 
obligations on each side.  
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